UN Security Council decision-making: testing the bribery hypothesis


Autoria(s): Costa,Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz; Baccarini,Mariana
Data(s)

01/12/2014

Resumo

Liberal-Institutionalism and Structural Realism expectations about international organizations are confronted by looking at if and how US-controlled international aid is granted, and particularly if it is related or not to political affinity and to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership. A preliminary assessment suggests that these relations only hold for the period of the Cold War, and, even then, only when UNSC non-permanent membership is in years in which the Security Council was deemed very important.

Formato

text/html

Identificador

http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000200029

Idioma(s)

en

Publicador

Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais

Fonte

Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional v.57 n.2 2014

Palavras-Chave #decision-making process #great powers' behavior #international aid #international organizations #International Relations theory #Liberal-Institutionalism #Structural Realism #United Nations #United Nations General Assembly #United Nations Security Council
Tipo

journal article