UN Security Council decision-making: testing the bribery hypothesis
Data(s) |
01/12/2014
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Resumo |
Liberal-Institutionalism and Structural Realism expectations about international organizations are confronted by looking at if and how US-controlled international aid is granted, and particularly if it is related or not to political affinity and to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership. A preliminary assessment suggests that these relations only hold for the period of the Cold War, and, even then, only when UNSC non-permanent membership is in years in which the Security Council was deemed very important. |
Formato |
text/html |
Identificador |
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000200029 |
Idioma(s) |
en |
Publicador |
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais |
Fonte |
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional v.57 n.2 2014 |
Palavras-Chave | #decision-making process #great powers' behavior #international aid #international organizations #International Relations theory #Liberal-Institutionalism #Structural Realism #United Nations #United Nations General Assembly #United Nations Security Council |
Tipo |
journal article |