Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

The Roads from Rio: Lessons From 20 Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations

A review of international environmental negotiations since the 'Earth Summit' in Rio de Janiero 1992

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Heterogeneity assumptions in the specification of bargaining models: a study of household level trade-offs between commuting time and salary

With many real world decisions being made in conjunction with other decision makers, or single agent decisions having an influence on other members of the decision maker's immediate entourage, there is strong interest in studying the relative weight assigned to different agents in such contexts. In the present paper, we focus on the case of one member of a two person household being asked to make choices affecting the travel time and salary of both members. We highlight the presence of significant heterogeneity across individuals not just in their underlying sensitivities, but also in the relative weight they assign to their partner, and show how this weight varies across attributes. This is in contrast to existing work which uses weights assigned to individual agents at the level of the overall utility rather than for individual attributes. We also show clear evidence of a risk of confounding between heterogeneity in marginal sensitivities and heterogeneity in the weights assigned to each member. We show how this can lead to misleading model results, and argue that this may also explain past results showing bargaining or weight parameters outside the usual [0,1] range in more traditional joint decision making contexts. In terms of substantive results, we find that male respondents place more weight on their partner's travel time, while female respondents place more weight on their partner's salary.

A solution concept for network games: The role of multilateral interactions

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of both players and their links and characterize it for a fixed network. Our characterization is along the lines of the characterization of the Position value for Network games by van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012). The allocation rule so defined admits multilateral interactions among the players through their links which distinguishes it from the other existing rules. Next, we extend our allocation rule to flexible networks à la Jackson (2005).

Employers, trade unions and concession bargaining in the Irish recession

The issue of concession bargaining between employers and unions during the Great Recession has received little attention in the research literature. This article presents a systematic analysis of the conduct of concession bargaining during the recession in Ireland in the context of three forms of concession bargaining identified in the international literature: integrative concession bargaining, distributive concession bargaining and ultra concession bargaining – each with different but overlapping sets of institutional foundations and implications for employers and trade unions. Drawing on focus groups of managers and union officials and a representative survey of employers, the article shows that distributive concession bargaining has been the predominant form in the Irish recession. This form of concession bargaining is likely to have few lasting direct effects on employer or union roles in collective bargaining but nevertheless appears to have significant indirect implications for the silent marginalization of unions in workplaces.

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Bargaining Power Dynamics and the Negotiation of Commercial Rights and Obligations: A Case of Athlete Agreements

This qualitative case study explored how the structural power imbalance in high performance sport influenced the bargaining process and resulting commercial rights and obligations of a single Canadian national sport organization’s (NSO1) Athlete Agreement. Principles comprising the doctrine of unconscionability, specifically the identification of a power imbalance between contracting parties, and the exploration of how that power imbalance influenced the terms of the contract, provided a framework to analyze factors influencing the commercial contents of NSO1’s Athlete Agreement. The results of this analysis revealed that despite the overarching influence of the inherent structural power imbalance on all aspects of NSO1 and its membership, an athletes’ level of commercial appeal can reach such heights as to balance the bargaining positions of both parties and subsequently influence the commercial contents of the Athlete Agreement.