Report of the Independent Body on Pharmacy Contract Pricing

Report of the Independent Body on Pharmacy Contract Pricing On 18 February 2008 the Minister for Health and Children announced the appointment of an Independent Body to recommend a new, interim community pharmacy dispensing fee for the General Medical Service (GMS), Drugs Payment Scheme (DPS) and other community drug schemes.The Terms of Reference for the Independent Body on Pharmacy Contract Pricing are as follows: â?oTo advise the Minister for Health and Children on the appropriate level of dispensing fee to be paid to community pharmacists for existing services provided under the GMS and community drug schemes having regard to: Click here to download PDF: 110kb

Framework Agreement between the Minister for Health and the Irish Medical Organisation in respect of a process for engagement concerning the GMS/GP Contract

Minister of State with responsibility for Primary Care, Alex White TD, today (4 June 2014) concluded a series of meetings with the Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) with the signing of the Framework Agreement between the Minister of Health, the HSE and the Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) setting out a process for engagement concerning the GMS/GP contract and other publicly funded contracts involving General Practitioners (GPs). Download document here

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector

ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.

Drivers License Cost Study Report, 2003

Drivers License Cost Study Report

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

A Review of the Driver's License Issuance Program Administered by the Department of Transportation and the County Treasures, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2005

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2005 Deer License Purchase Deadlines and Season Dates, 2005

This 12 page document outlines the regulations for deer hunting in Iowa.

2005 Deer License Purchase Deadlines and Season Dates, 2005

This 12 page document outlines the regulations for deer hunting in Iowa.

Fall Turkey Hunting Regulations and License Guide, 2005

Regulations and lincense guide for fall turkey hunting.

2005 Affidavit for Nonresident Iowa Landowner Antlerless-Only Deer Hunting License, 2005

Regulations for hunting in Iowa.

Doctors without borders: The returns to an occupational license for Soviet immigrant physicians in Israel

Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders arewidespread. In this paper, we measure the returns to an occupationallicense using novel data on Soviet trained physicians that immigrated toIsrael. An immigrant re-training assignment rule used by the IsraelMinistry of Health provides an exogenous source of variation inre-licensing outcomes. Instrumental variables and quantile treatmenteffects estimates of the returns to an occupational license indicate excesswages due to occupational entry restrictions and negative selectioninto licensing status. We develop a model of optimal license acquisitionwhich suggests that the wages of high-skilled immigrant physicians in thenonphysician sector outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrantsface in acquiring a medical license. Licensing thus leads to lower averagequality of service. However, the positive earnings effect of entry restrictionsfar outweighs the lower practitioner quality earnings effect that licensinginduces.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Should I Buy the Service Contract?", January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Should I Buy the Service Contract?"

Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.