TTIP and Climate Change – How real are Race to the Bottom Concerns?

This paper examines concerns about the impact that TTIP could have on existing and future climate policies and laws from the inclusion of provisions on investment protection including investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS), the reduction of non-tariff barriers and the introduction of rules for trade in energy and raw materials. It argues that from an environmental perspective, ISDS should not necessarily be seen as a regime that goes against the defence of the environment or prevention of climate change. Although it might be used to challenge policies of an EU home State that increase levels of environmental protection, it can also be used to contest changes in an EU home State’s environmental policies that would reduce the protection of the environment, if foreign investment is affected. To a large extent, this also holds true for other areas of TTIP negotiations. While the achievement of a balance between rules that promote trade and those that maintain policy space for governments to respond to environmental concerns has to be closely monitored, benefits for climate could be seized from harmonisation of carbon laws at the level of the strictest regulations of two parties, provisions that promote trade in low carbon technologies and renewable energy and bilateral cooperation on climate change.

ISDS and TTIP – A miracle cure for a systemic challenge? EPC Policy Brief, 14 July 2014

The European Commission decided to carry out a public consultation, which closed on 13 July, on the possible inclusion of investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This decision came in a context of polarised public debate around this procedural mechanism which enables investors to bring a case against a country that hosts their investments. Even though the main question is whether or not to include ISDS in TTIP, the Commission eyes the public consultation as a way to correct the inconsistencies of the mechanism by modernising it. However, the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP will not be a miracle cure because ISDS is a complex multilayered systemic challenge which requires a multilateral solution. In this Policy Brief, Romain Pardo explores which challenges are posed by ISDS and the extent at which TTIP’s contribution can tackle these challenges.

Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong Dispute Settlement Provisions: New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements

To understand why some international institutions have stronger dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) than others, we investigate the dispute settlement provisions of nearly 600 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which possess several desirable case-selection features and are evoked more than is realized. We broaden the study of dispute settlement design beyond “legalization” and instead reorient theorizing around a multi-faceted conceptualization of the strength of DSMs. We posit that strong DSMs are first and foremost a rational response to features of agreements that require stronger dispute settlement, such as depth and large memberships. Multivariate empirical tests using a new data set on PTA design confirm these expectations and reveal that depth – the amount of policy change specified in an agreement – is the most powerful and consistent predictor of DSM strength, providing empirical support to a long-posited but controversial conjecture. Yet power also plays a sizeable role, since agreements among asymmetric members are more likely to have strong DSMs due to their mutual appeal, as are those involving the United States. Important regional differences also emerge, as PTAs across the Americas are designed with strong dispute settlement, as are Asian PTAs, which contradicts the conventional wisdom about Asian values and legalization. Our findings demonstrate that rationalism explains much of international institutional design, yet it can be enhanced by also incorporating power-based and regional explanations.

Problems and policies of dispute settlement and wage stabilization during World War II.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report of the State Land Settlement Board of the State of California.

Mode of access: Internet.

Balance Between Investment Protection and Sustainable Development in BITs: the Example of Switzerland

The objective of this article is to examine how substantive and procedural rights granted to foreign investors by Swiss bits are gradually being balanced with social and environmental provisions. Switzerland has enjoyed a long bit practice, as it signed its first treaty with Tunisia fifty years ago. Swiss bits rely on the post-establishment model and include usual standards of treatment. From 1981, they also systematically provide for a dispute settlement mechanism for disputes arising between an investor and a host State. Since the Switzerland - El Salvador bit in 1994, sustainable development concerns have been expressly inserted in some Swiss bits, as well as in several recent free trade agreements. Provisions on this theme are however far from being systematic in Switzerland's bit practice and essentially remain declaratory in nature. The trend towards wider inclusion of sustainable development provisions in bits still faces several practical and political challenges.

Haircut undone? The Greek drama and prospects for investment arbitration

As a result of the sovereign debt crisis that engulfed Europe in 2010, investors are much more likely to pursue dispute resolution options when faced with losses. This paper seeks to examine the position of investors who suffered losses in the Greek haircut of 2012 in the context of investment treaty arbitration. The paper evaluates arguments that investments in Greek sovereign bonds have been expropriated by the introduction of retrofit CACs and that compensation is payable as a result of the protections offered by BITs. The paper investigates whether sovereign bonds come within the definition of protected investment in BITs, assesses the degree to which CACs act as a jurisdictional bar to investor-state claims and attempts an evaluation of whether claims could be successful. The analysis uses as an illustration recent cases brought against Greece at ICSID. The paper concludes by considering whether the Greek haircut was expropriatory and reflects on the possible outcome of current arbitrations.

El Capítulo de Inversiones en el Acuerdo de Asociación Transpacífico:¿Una Posibilidad de Cambio y Convergencia?

Spanish Abstract: El presente trabajo analiza los posibles efectos que generaría en la regulación internacional de la inversión extranjera, el acuerdo de un capítulo de inversiones en el Acuerdo de Asociación Transpacífico (TPP), actualmente en negociaciones, sobre la base de la información disponible a la fecha. El artículo aborda cuatro aspectos que presentan especial importancia dada la divergencia de intereses entre algunos de los Estados negociadores: el ámbito de protección de la inversión extranjera; las normas sobre transparencia de los regímenes de inversión y sus disputas; la irrupción de entidades estatales como inversionistas extranjeros; y la solución de controversias a través del arbitraje inversionista-Estado. El autor concluye que en comparación a la actual fragmentación regulatoria de la que dan cuenta los acuerdos internacionales de inversión suscritos por los países negociadores del TPP, la incorporación de un capítulo de inversiones en ese Acuerdo es una oportunidad para avanzar en la convergencia de la regulación sobre inversión extranjera, tanto en materia de estándares sustantivos de protección de la inversión como en la mejora del arbitraje inversionista-Estado como mecanismo de solución de controversias.

The Recent International and Regulatory Decisions about Geographical Indications, 2007

As worldwide consumer demand for high-quality products and for information about these products increases, labels and geographical indications (GIs) can serve to signal quality traits to consumers. However, GI systems among countries are not homogeneous and can be used as trade barriers against competition. Philosophical differences between the European Union and the United States about how GIs should be registered and protected led to the formation of a WTO dispute settlement panel. In this paper we discuss the issues behind the dispute, the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel decision, and the EU response to the panel decision leading to the new Regulation 510/2006. Given the potential for GI labels to supply consumer information, context is provided for the discussion using recent literature on product labeling. Implications are drawn regarding the importance of the panel decision and the EU response relative to GI issues yet to be negotiated under the Doha Round.

Les tiers dans le contentieux arbitral des investissements internationaux : de l'intervention au recours direct

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international.

L'étendue de la compétence ratione materiae du juge étatique dans le règlement des différends nés de l'exécution d'un contrat complexe.

Les arrêts sur l’affaire Beaudoin c. Université de Sherbrooke (Cour Supérieure et Cour d’Appel du Québec 2008-2010) ont porté sur l’intensité de l’obligation de consultation insérée dans l’accord de partenariat de recherche. Ce type de partenariat est souvent créé par un accord et peut prendre plusieurs formes. La plupart d’entre elles sont méconnues par le droit, c’est pourquoi la doctrine les considère comme étant des entreprises complexes puisque le choix des partenaires est souvent guidé par le souci d’échapper au formalisme qu’imposent les règles étatiques. Cependant, les pratiques connues dans le secteur d’activité des associés et les accords qui les lient sont souvent les seules règles qu’ils suivent. En cas de conflit, ils recourent généralement à un tiers expert pour régler leur litige, la saisine des tribunaux ne se faisant qu’exceptionnellement. Dans cette cause, les contractions entre les deux décisions ont soulevé quelques interrogations : d’une part, sur la capacité des tribunaux à trancher des conflits qui peuvent naître au cours de l’exécution de ce type de contrat, et d’autre part sur la compatibilité des règles matérielles applicables au fond par les juges lorsque les parties ne sont liées que par la lex contractus et les usages reconnus dans leur secteur d’activité. Cette étude tente donc d’identifier la forme de partenariat en cause afin de mesurer l’étendue de la compétence ratione materiae du juge dans la résolution des conflits nés d’un contrat complexe (PARTIE I), et d’examiner l’opportunité de recourir aux modes alternatifs de résolution des litiges (PARTIE II).

The mutual agreement procedure and arbitration of double taxation disputes

It is in the interest of most states to eliminate double taxation (i.e. the payment of the same tax in two jurisdictions) of transnational commercial enterprises. Because such disputes involve, on the one hand, the state imposition of taxes, a right universally asserted by all states, and private entities on the other, taxation disputes between such parties are not, on their face, easily susceptible to arbitration. This article analyzes two dispute settlement procedures-the OECD First Model Tax Convention and a similar EU Convention-with the exclusive focus on disputes relating to the imposition of double taxation. It will look at the ways in which state roles may vary under these procedures from assisting in the negotiation process to taking a part similar to, but with important differences from, diplomatic protection on behalf of an affected enterprise. The article will examine the situations under which the settlement procedure is required and/or available, how the procedures are triggered, the obligations and parts played by the parties, the means by which the disputes are resolved (from negotiations to tribunals) and the limitations of the procedures. Are they “taxpayer friendly”? As a result the reader may draw comparisons between the two procedures. Finally, the article will look at the proposed OECD Arbitration Clause which is intended to be incorporated into Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention as well as how these mechanisms relate and/or conflict with bilateral tax treaties and the GATS.