Building a Capital Markets Union….or designing a financial system for the euro area? CEPS Commentary, 2 June 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, economists Anton Brender, Florence Pisani and Daniel Gros challenge the foundation on which the European Commission launched a key debate earlier this year on the development of the EU’s financial system, with publication of its Green Paper "Building a Capital Markets Union". While acknowledging that a single capital market could be useful in the European Union, they argue that it is extremely dangerous to conduct one and the same monetary policy in an area with broadly varying financial practices and structures – as the first 15 years of the euro area's history have vividly shown. They conclude that financial integration of the countries in EMU must receive top priority in a process that the rest of the European Union may then subsequently join.

Keep capital markets union simple. ECMI Commentary No. 38/July 2015

A few additional initiatives will need to be taken before a European capital markets union is able to unleash its full potential. The main problem is fragmentation, arising from the deep differences existing from one country to another in the structure of markets, user preferences and the availability of well organised, long-term saving schemes. Several attempts have been made to address these barriers, but with limited or uneven success so far

Light and shadows in Europe’s new Action Plan for Capital Markets Union. ECMI Commentary No. 40/5 October 2015

The European Commission’s Action Plan consists, in a nutshell, of a short list of technical proposals and a longer one of (rather general) potential actions. Overall, the plan indeed proposes to achieve some short-term objectives, such as a reduction of listing costs for SMEs, but it lacks long-term vision. The plan bundles actions under rather generic objectives of long-term finance or cross-border investing. Improving the informational infrastructure (e.g. accounting standards, company data) and cross-border enforcement of rules is left to vaguely defined future actions, but these constitute the core of the capital markets infrastructure. Without a well-defined set of measurable objectives, the whole plan may lose political momentum and become an opportunity for interested parties to cherry pick their pet provisions. Building a single market, i.e. removing cross-border obstacles to capital circulation, is too challenging a task to simply appear as one of many items on a long list of general objectives, which incidentally do not include institutional reform. The ultimate risk is that the Commission may just miss a unique opportunity to revamp and improve the financial integration process in Europe after almost a decade of harmful financial retrenchment.

Europe’s Untapped Capital Market: Rethinking integration after the great financial crisis. Final report of the European Capital Markets Expert Group. Task Force Report, February 2016

In December 2014, ECMI and CEPS formed the European Capital Markets Expert Group (ECMEG) with the aim of providing a long-term contribution to the debate on the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project, proposed by the European Commission. After an intensive, year-long research effort and in-depth discussions with ECMEG members, this final report aims to rethink financial integration policies in the European Union and to devise an EU-wide plan to remove the barriers to greater capital markets integration. It offers a methodology to identify and prioritise cross-border barriers to capital markets integration and provides a set of policy recommendations to improve its key components: price discovery, execution and enforcement of capital markets transactions.

Capital Markets Union: A Work in Progress: Quick and high impact measures for the Capital Markets Union. European Policy Brief No. 37, September 2015

Capital Markets Union has three objectives. The first objective is to improve access to finance for all businesses but especially SMEs; the second is to increase the share of capital markets in the funding mix of the real economy; and the third is to make capital markets more effective and integrate them more closely across borders. This paper examines the best impact measures for the Capital Markets Union to proceed successfully.

Evaluating the impact of securities regulation on venture capital markets /

"Planning Office, National Bureau of Standards."

Federal housing enterprises : HUD's mission oversight needs to be strengthened : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives /

"B-278383"--P. 1.

Casual jobs and internal labour markets

This paper examines the role of casual employment as a route into permanent employment. Using a competing risks framework we compare transitions from casual to permanent employment made within the firm and to other firms. We also examine the wage outcomes and job durations of these two transitions. It is found that internal transitions occur at all occupational levels and display characteristics associated with probationary employment. Thus, as suggested by previous case study evidence, permanent positions at all levels in the firm are open to a degree of external competition.

Capital markets and the market structure of foreign investments

Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct ownership. Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital component of the multinational’s competitive market structure. Moreover, multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets. They can also mitigate higher levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial risk to creditors in the host economy. Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their equity to foreign market risk. Multinationals can modify the profit maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 countries.We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by modifying their capital structure and debt maturity. Further, we show how the operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or profit maximization. We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good asset utilization.

Essais en économie avec frictions financières

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats.

Firm financial constraints and the impact of monetary policy: evidence from financial conglomerates

Building on recent evidence on the functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates, this paper conducts a novel test of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. It does so by comparing monetary policy responses of small banks that are affiliated with the same bank holding company, and this arguably face similar constraints in accessing internal/external sources of funds, but that operate in different geographical regions, and thus face different pools of borrowers. Because these subsidiaries typically concentrate their lending with small local businesses, we can use cross-sectional differences in state-level economic indicators at the time of changes of monetary policy to study whether or not the strength of borrowers' balance sheets influences the response of bank lending. We find evidence that the negative response of bank loan growth to a monetary contraction is significantly stronger when borrowers have 'weak balance sheets. Our evidence suggests that the monetary authority should consider the amplification effects that financial constraints play following changes in basic interest rates and the role of financial conglomerates in the transmission of monetary policy.

Executives as Agents: Expatriate managers in subsidiaries of multinational banks. ACES Working Papers, June 2012

Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.

Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

Making political capital:the behaviour of UK financial markets during Election 97

This article examines the behaviour of the UK capital markets during the overnight trading period that coincided with the announcement of the results of the UK general election in May 1997. Evidence that the financial markets responded to the evolving pattern of results is found. In addition, the consensus move experienced as the markets opened the next trading day was influenced by the extent of the moves that had already occurred overnight.

A model of migrants' remittances with human capital investment and intrafamilial transfers

This study analyzes data on migrants' remittances using a two-period theory of intergenerational transfers based on an informal, intrafamilial loan arrangement using weak altruism, a behavior between strong altruism and pure self-interest. The model provides an integrated theory of migrants' remittances, human capital investment decisions, and intrafamilial transfers applicable to low-income countries with no official pension schemes and imperfect capital markets. Propositions, derived from the theory, are tested, re-analyzing original survey data on remittances of Pacific island migrants in Sydney. When weak altruism and strong altruism yield opposite predictions, the econometric results tend to confirm the former hypothesis and invalidate the latter.