Crisis, change, and institutions in forest management: the Wet Tropics of northeastern Australia

This paper tests the four-phase heuristic model of change in resource management regimes developed by Gunderson et al. (1995. In: Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 489-533) by applying it to a case analysis of rainforest management in northeastern Australia. The model suggests that resource management regimes change in four phases: (i) crisis caused by external factors, (ii) a search for alternative management solutions, (iii) creation of a new management regime, and (iv) bureaucratic implementation of the new arrangements. The history of human use arid management of the tropical forests of this region is described and applied to this model. The ensuing analysis demonstrates that: (i) resource management tends to be characterized by a series of distinct eras; (ii) changes to management regimes are precipitated by crisis; and (iii) change is externally generated. The paper concludes by arguing that this theoretical perspective oil institutional change in resource management systems has wider utility. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Reinven????o do governo: o caso de culturas pol??ticas e estabelecimento de pol??ticas p??blicas

Nos ??ltimos anos, a institucionaliza????o de normas de confiabilidade e planejamento pol??tico, na administra????o p??blica israelense, tem preocupado v??rios comit??s sobre a reforma do servi??o p??blico e a reorganiza????o do governo. Este trabalho discute o hist??rico da cultura de estabelecimento das pol??ticas israelenses e seu efeito sobre recomenda????es para o planejamento, a an??lise, a avalia????o e a accountability das pol??ticas. Essa confian??a ?? interessante, em parte, porque tra??a uma rea????o aos arranjos institucionais, que s??o, de muitas maneiras, similares ??queles promovidos por defensores da Nova Gest??o P??blica. Ironicamente, no entanto, ela explica os esfor??os para substitu??-los por algo mais semelhante a arranjos burocr??ticos tradicionais.

Organiza????o dos usu??rios, participa????o na gest??o e controle das organiza????es sociais

O artigo discute a participa????o dos usu??rios na gest??o das Organiza????es Sociais, prevista num projeto da reforma do aparelho de Estado atualmente em curso. A participa????o dos usu??rios na gest??o das institui????es p??blicas ?? um instrumento que pode resolver problemas da rela????o principal-agente, garantindo a implementa????o eficiente das pol??ticas. No projeto das Organiza????es Sociais, essa participa????o ?? viabilizada, entre outros meios, pela presen??a de entidades representativas da sociedade civil no Conselho de Administra????o da institui????o, pressupondo, portanto, a organiza????o dos usu??rios. Por essa raz??o, no artigo s??o analisadas as possibilidades de organiza????o dos usu??rios com base na abordagem da ???l??gica da a????o coletiva???.

Capital intangível e direitos de propriedade intelectual : uma análise institucionalista

This paper deals with the main evolutions that explain the emergence of new institutional arrangements that characterize the post-fordism. (i) Hence, I will show that the property rights modifications bring forth new forms of competition;(ii) Also, I will make explicit the concrete expressions of this new competition, as well as how it translates itself in a sub-optimum allocation in the framework of the market game; (iii) I will study the modifications of externalities nature produced by technical progress; (iv) Finally, I will analyze the macroeconomic implications in regard to growth mechanisms and to capital nature.

A new model for EEZ surveillance and management in Portugal

Management Information Systems 2000, p. 103-111

Public private collaboration: Potentials for spatial data infrastructure development in developing countries - A caste study of Nigeria

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

Cape Verde’s foreign policy: an economic perspective

The virtuous cycle between development success and foreign policy in Cape Verde reflects a positive interaction between globalization and governance. Development success under globalization entails positive market perceptions regarding the orientation and predictability of policies as well as the accompanying institutional arrangements, thereby making foreign policy salient beyond the comparator group, or “aspirational”. Even if there is no universally applicable development model, an aspirational foreign policy can be built on positive rankings with respect to comparator groups. In Macedo and Pereira (2010), macrolevel policy and institutional combinations underpinning trade diversification and income convergence in West and Southern Africa are used to establish development success for Cape Verde and Mozambique respectively. Here, the narrative of long-term development helps identify the following drivers: moving towards a market economy; opening up to regional and global trade; increasing economic and political freedom; pursuing macroeconomic stability and financial reputation; ensuring policy continuity (especially in trade and industrial sectors) and focusing on human development (especially poverty reduction and education). Looking at GDP per capita and indicators of financial reputation and good governance of sub-regional peers is not sufficient to conclude that Cape Verde’s convergence will be sustained. Nevertheless, the positive interaction between trade and financial globalization, on the one hand, and democracy and good governance, on the other, have positive implications for the effectiveness of foreign policy across the region as well as in the Portuguese-speaking community.

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

Hybrids and Regulation in the Global Political Economy

While regulation theory literature has made important contributions to the much-debated domain of globalisation by focusing on various aspects of post-Fordism, it has not yet fully engaged with the implications that can be drawn from critical approaches in international political economy. Recent studies have explored the transnational bases of new patterns and agents of change beyond states, firms and institutions traditionally involved in regulatory practices. Hybrid is often used as a default attribute reflecting lack of clear understanding of the breadth of this new type of influence and the opacity of the means involved. Drawing on the insights of philology and mythology, the paper argues that the notion of hybrid is relevant in elucidating the ontological ambiguity between imaginary and real aspects of globalisation. Furthermore, it specifies the categories involved in the analysis of emerging forms of hybrid regulation. Recent scholarship on globalisation tends to focus on the private-public nexus of the subjects involved in new forms of institutional arrangements and authority. Here, subjects, objects and space are analysed as joint issues. By focusing particularly on transformations affecting the role of the state, forms of competition, and their rescaling on a transnational basis, the concept of global hybrid is seen as complementary to the emancipation of regulation approaches from early emphasis on national levels of compromises.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets : Does Spain behave differently?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets : Does Spain behave differently?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.

A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting

This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust; but institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. Keywords: Legislative bargaining, distributive politics, agenda-setting, proposal power. JEL C72, D72, D78.

Similar problems, different solutions: Comparing refuse collection in the Netherlands and Spain

Local public service provision can vary greatly because of differences in institutional arrangements, public service markets, and national traditions regarding government intervention. In this paper we compare the procedures adopted by the local governments of the Netherlands and Spain in arranging for the provision of solid waste collection. We find that Spain faces a consolidation problem, opting more frequently to implement policies of privatization and cooperation, at the expense of competition. By contrast, the Netherlands has, on average, larger municipalities, resorting somewhat less to privatization and cooperation, and more to competition. The two options - cooperation and competition - have their merits when striving to strike a balance between transaction costs and scale economies. The choices made in organizational reform seem to be related to several factors, among which the nature of the political system and the size of municipalities appear to be relevant.