Incidencia de las agresiones a la seguridad cibernética en el desarrollo informático de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos (2003-2013)

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo analizar la incidencia de las agresiones cibernéticas en el desarrollo informático de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos. Los diferentes estudios que se han realizado sobre el ciberespacio se han enfocado en el papel del individuo como actor principal y se ha dejado de lado las repercusiones que éste ha tenido para el Estado, como un nuevo eje de amenazas. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, esta investigación demostrará a partir del concepto de securitización, que se busca priorizar la “ciberseguridad” dentro de la agenda del gobierno estadounidense. Al ser este un estudio que aborda experiencias concretas durante un periodo de tiempo de más de 10 años, el diseño metodológico de la investigación será longitudinal, ya que abarcará estudios, artículos, textos y resoluciones que se han realizado desde 2003 hasta la actualidad.

IP spoofing attack and its countermeasures

IP spoofing is a technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host. It causes serious security problem in the cyber world, and is currently exploited widely in the information warfare. This paper at first introduces the IP spoofing attack through examples, technical issues and attacking types. Later its countermeasures are analysed in detail, which include authentication and encription, filtering and IP traceback. In particular, an IP traceback mechanism, Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM) is presented. Since the IP spoofing problem can not be solved only by technology, but it also needs social regulation, the legal issues and economic impact are discussed in the later part.

Conceptual modelling: choosing a critical infrastructure modelling methodology

This paper reports on further research undertaken regarding systems modelling as applied to critical infrastructure systems and networks and builds upon the initial modelling research of Pye and Warren (2006a). We discuss system characteristics, inter-relationships, dynamics and modelling of similar systems and why modelling of a critical infrastructure is important. In overview we compare four modelling methods and techniques previously
used to model similar systems and discuss their potential transference to model critical infrastructure systems, before selecting the most promising and suitable for modelling critical infrastructure systems for further research.

Security protection for critical infrastructure

Understanding and managing information infrastructure (II) security risks is a priority to most organizations dealing with information technology and information warfare (IW) scenarios today (Libicki, 2000). Traditional security risk analysis (SRA) was well suited to these tasks within the paradigm of computer security, where the focus was on securing tangible items such as computing and communications equipment (NCS,1996; Cramer, 1998). With the growth of information interchange and reliance on information infrastructure, the ability to understand where vulnerabilities lie within an organization, regardless of size, has become extremely difficult (NIPC, 1996). To place a value on the information that is owned and used by an organization is virtually an impossible task. The suitability of risk analysis to assist in managing IW and information infrastructure-related security risks is unqualified, however studies have been undertaken to build frameworks and methodologies for modeling information warfare attacks (Molander, Riddile, & Wilson, 1996; Johnson, 1997; Hutchinson & Warren, 2001) which will assist greatly in applying risk analysis concepts and methodologies to the burgeoning information technology security paradigm, information warfare.

Development of a supply chain management security risk management method : a conceptual model

This paper continues the prior research undertaken by Warren and Leitch (2009), in which a series of initial research findings were presented. These findings identified that in Australia, Supply Chain Management (SCM) systems were the weak link of Australian critical infrastructure. This paper focuses upon the security and risk issues associated with SCM systems and puts forward a new SCM Security Risk Management method, continuing the research presented at the European Conference of Information Warfare in 2009.This paper proposes a new Security Risk Analysis model that deals with the complexity of protecting SCM critical infrastructure systems and also introduces a new approach that organisations can apply to protect their SCM systems. The paper describes the importance of SCM systems from a critical infrastructure protection perspective. The paper then discusses the importance of SCM systems in relation to supporting centres of populations and gives examples of the impact of failure. The paper proposes a new SCM security risk analysis method that deals with the security issues related to SCM security and the security issues associated with Information Security. The paper will also discuss a risk framework that can be used to protect against high and low level associated security risks using a new SCM security risk analysis method.

Computer hacking and cyber terrorism: The real threats in the new millennium?

As the new millennium approaches, we are living in a society that is increasingly dependent upon information technology. However, whilst technology can deliver a number of benefits, it also introduces new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by persons with the necessary technical skills. Hackers represent a well-known threat in this respect and are responsible for a significant degree of disruption and damage to information systems. However, they are not the only criminal element that has to be taken into consideration. Evidence suggests that technology is increasingly seen as potential tool for terrorist organizations. This is leading to the emergence of a new threat in the form of 'cyber terrorists', who attack technological infrastructures such as the Internet in order to help further their cause. The paper discusses the problems posed by these groups and considers the nature of the responses necessary to preserve the future security of our society.

Narrative of the expedition which sailed from England in 1817, to join the South American patriots : comprising every particular connected with its formation, history, and fate; with observations and authentic information elucidating the real character of the contest, mode of warfare, state of the armies, etc. /

Hackett went out as lieutenant in Col. J. A. Gilmore's Artillery brigade, which was disbanded before reaching South America. The writer did not see any actual service, but his Narrative gives account of several British expeditions of 1817

The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War

The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.

'Cloak Without Dagger': How the Information Research Department Fought Britain's Cold War in the Middle East, 1948-1956

Vaughn, James, ''Cloak Without Dagger': How the Information Research Department Fought Britain's Cold War in the Middle East, 1948-1956', Cold War History (2004) 4(3) pp.56-84 RAE2008

History of biological warfare and bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism literally means using microorganisms or infected samples to cause terror and panic in populations. Bioterrorism had already started 14 centuries before Christ, when the Hittites sent infected rams to their enemies. However, apart from some rare well-documented events, it is often very difficult for historians and microbiologists to differentiate natural epidemics from alleged biological attacks, because: (i) little information is available for times before the advent of modern microbiology; (ii) truth may be manipulated for political reasons, especially for a hot topic such as a biological attack; and (iii) the passage of time may also have distorted the reality of the past. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide to clinical microbiologists an overview of some likely biological warfare that occurred before the 18th century and that included the intentional spread of epidemic diseases such as tularaemia, plague, malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, and leprosy. We also summarize the main events that occurred during the modern microbiology era, from World War I to the recent 'anthrax letters' that followed the World Trade Center attack of September 2001. Again, the political polemic surrounding the use of infectious agents as a weapon may distort the truth. This is nicely exemplified by the Sverdlovsk accident, which was initially attributed by the authorities to a natural foodborne outbreak, and was officially recognized as having a military cause only 13 years later.

CIIP-RAM - a step-wise security risk analysis methodology for critical information infrastructure protection

Wilh the protection of critical information infrastructure becoming a priority for all levels of management. there is a need for a new security methodology to deal with the new and unique attack threats and vulnerabilities associated with the new information technology security paradigm. The fourth generation security risk analysis melhod which copes wilh the shift from computer/information security to critical information iinfrastructure protectionl is lhe next step toward handling security risk at all levels. The paper will present the methodology of
fourth generation models and their application to critical information infrastructure protection and the associated advantagess of this methodology.

The puzzle in the bits: Cybersecurity, digital warfare and the future of Internet governance. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2013

CEPS Senior Research Fellow Andrea Renda persuasively shows in this new CEPS Commentary the extent to which the global economy has become heavily reliant on the Internet, but observes that this phenomenon is becoming increasingly insidious. It is efficient, no doubt: but he asks whether it is also secure?

Electronic Combat Stimulation Branch : Atlantic Ranges and Facilities, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Mode of access: Internet.