Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società

The thesis main topic is the conflict between disclosure in financial markets and the need for confidentiality of the firm. After a recognition of the major dynamics of information production and dissemination in the stock market, the analysis moves to the interactions between the information that a firm is tipically interested in keeping confidential, such as trade secrets or the data usually covered by patent protection, and the countervailing demand for disclosure arising from finacial markets. The analysis demonstrates that despite the seeming divergence between informational contents tipically disclosed to investors and information usually covered by intellectual property protection, the overlapping areas are nonetheless wide and the conflict between transparency in financial markets and the firm’s need for confidentiality arises frequently and sistematically. Indeed, the company’s disclosure policy is based on a continuous trade-off between the costs and the benefits related to the public dissemination of information. Such costs are mainly represented by the competitive harm caused by competitors’ access to sensitive data, while the benefits mainly refer to the lower cost of capital that the firm obtains as a consequence of more disclosure. Secrecy shields the value of costly produced information against third parties’ free riding and constitutes therefore a means to protect the firm’s incentives toward the production of new information and especially toward technological and business innovation. Excessively demanding standards of transparency in financial markets might hinder such set of incentives and thus jeopardize the dynamics of innovation production. Within Italian securities regulation, there are two sets of rules mostly relevant with respect to such an issue: the first one is the rule that mandates issuers to promptly disclose all price-sensitive information to the market on an ongoing basis; the second one is the duty to disclose in the prospectus all the information “necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment” of the issuers’ financial and economic perspectives. Both rules impose high disclosure standards and have potentially unlimited scope. Yet, they have safe harbours aimed at protecting the issuer need for confidentiality. Despite the structural incompatibility between public dissemination of information and the firm’s need to keep certain data confidential, there are certain ways to convey information to the market while preserving at the same time the firm’s need for confidentality. Such means are insider trading and selective disclosure: both are based on mechanics whereby the process of price reaction to the new information takes place without any corresponding activity of public release of data. Therefore, they offer a solution to the conflict between disclosure and the need for confidentiality that enhances market efficiency and preserves at the same time the private set of incentives toward innovation.

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO disputes settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or in indirect ways. The argument is empirically assessed by conducting a case study on four West African cotton-producing countries (C4) and their involvement in dispute settlement.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Music Piracy on Peer-to-Peer Networks

Content providers from the music industry argue that peer-to-peer (P2P) networks such as KaZaA, Morpheus, iMesh, or Audiogalaxy are an enormous threat to their business. They furthermore blame these networks for their recent decline in sales figures. For this reason, an empirical investigation was conducted during a period of 6 weeks on one of the most popular files-sharing systems, in order to determine the quantity and quality of pirated music songs shared. We present empirical evidence as to what extent and in which quality music songs are being shared. A number of hypotheses are outlined and were tested. We studied, among other things, the number of users online and the number of flies accessible on such networks, the free riding problem, and the duration per search request. We further tested to see if there are any differences in the accessibility of songs based on the nationality of the artist, the language of the song, and the corresponding chart position. Finally, we outline the main hurdles users may face when downloading illegal music and the probability of obtaining high quality music tracks on such peer-to-peer networks.

Nonpoint Pollution Control: Inducing First-best Outcomes through the Use of Threats

In this paper we develop a simple economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint-source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre-specified environmental goal. We first consider the case where the policy is applied to a single farmer, and then extend the analysis to the case where the policy is applied to a group of farmers. We show that in either case such a policy can induce cost-minimizing abatement without the need for farm-specific information. In this sense, the combined policy approach is not only more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach (which does not ensure that water quality goals are met) but also less costly than a pure ambient tax approach (since it entails lower information costs). However, when the policy is applied to a group of farmers, we show that there is a potential tradeoff in the design of the policy. In this context, lowering the cutoff level of pollution used for determining total tax payments increases the likely effectiveness of the combined approach but also increases the potential for free riding. By setting the cutoff level equal to the target level of pollution, the regulator can eliminate free riding and ensure that cost-minimizing abatement is the unique Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily. However, this cutoff level also ensures that zero voluntary abatement is a Nash equilibrium. In addition, with this cutoff level the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily will not strictly dominate the equilibrium under which it is not. We show that all results still hold if the background threat instead takes the form of reducing government subsidies if a pre-specified environmental goal is not met.

Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Valor de marca colectiva: aproximación desde el enfoque de la eficiencia

El objetivo del trabajo consiste en analizar la eficiencia de las empresas que integran una marca colectiva en una industria productora de bienes de experiencia. El supuesto básico es que la marca colectiva tiene un impacto positivo en la eficiencia de las empresas acogidas a la misma, el cual viene explicado porque la reputación colectiva fomenta una inversión eficiente en calidad. Sin embargo, la marca colectiva también puede tener un efecto opuesto sobre los incentivos de una empresa a una inversión en calidad ya que dicha marca puede crear un incentivo a “free ride”. Nuestra propuesta defiende que la interacción entre estos factores opuestos, reputación colectiva y “free ride”, viene moderada por las características de la marca colectiva y de la propia empresa. La metodología aplicada en el contraste de estas hipótesis se apoya en el Análisis Envolvente de Datos para estimar la eficiencia, así como en modelos econométricos para explicar la eficiencia empresarial mediante características de la marca colectiva y de la empresa. Los resultados obtenidos en el ámbito de las bodegas españolas evidencian que las marcas colectivas tienen un impacto positivo sobre la eficiencia, el cual viene moderado por el tamaño de la marca colectiva generando una relación curvilínea en forma de U invertida. Adicionalmente, el volumen de producción de la marca colectiva y el tamaño de las bodegas ejercen un efecto moderador en el impacto del tamaño de la marca colectiva sobre la eficiencia. En general, los resultados ponen de manifiesto la importancia de las marcas colectivas cuando se investigan industrias donde la calidad no es solamente señalizada por una marca típica individual.

Monetáris hatásosság közösségi szinten (The community level efficiency of monetary policy)

A monetáris integráció központi szereplője a Közösség jegybankja. A közös valuta értékállóságának közvetlenül fő meghatározója a jegybank. Mozgásterét azonban több tényező alakítja. E tanulmány az intézményi és stratégiai, a tagállami (decentralizált fiskális) és a pénzpiaci környezet függvényében vizsgálja az Európai Központi Bank (ECB) lehetőségeit és monetáris politikájának hatásosságát. / === / The efficiency of the European Economic and Monetary Union is a big dilemma of European applied economics. The first part introduces the monetary policy made by ECB. Rates and objectives are the framework of efficiency analysis. The second part details the common pool resource problem in the community of EMU countries, and describes the prisoner's dilemma of indebting in a currency community. The EMU practice shows free riding behavior of many member states what generally causes higher default risks. The increasing indebtedness shows dysfunction too, as the ECB must adjust the interest rate to the higher default risk which means cost premiums for fiscally disciplined countries as well. The third part analyses the efficiency of the ECB through the standards of monetary transmission. The updated criteria can explain any success or failure of the ECB in a not perfectly homogeneous community. The measures of transmission used in the study are the way of financing (banks vs. market), terms of financing, structure of the banking sector, private sector indebtedness, structure of savings and wealth, price elasticity, interest rate elasticity, wage elasticity. They show that the single monetary policy can create tension in the community not only because of the fiscal differences but also due to money market discrepancies.

Essays on durable goods consumption and firm innovation

This dissertation comprises three individual chapters. Chapter Two examines how free riding across neighbors influenced the diffusion of color television sets in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors concerning its patent output. Chapter Four discusses how knowledge stocks influence a patenting firm’s later diversification. Chapter Two documents the existence of a type of network effects—free riding across neighbors—in the consumption of color television sets in rural China, which reduces the propensity of non-owners to purchase. I construct a model of the timing of the purchase of a durable good in the presence of free riding, and test its key implications using household survey data in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors about its patent output by examining insider trading patterns and stock price changes in R&D intensive firms. It demonstrates that management has considerable information about its patent output beyond what is known to investors. It also shows that the predictive power of insider trading patterns on patent output comes from purchases rather than sales. Chapter Four discusses two sequential channels through which knowledge stocks may influence a firm’s later diversification. One is that firms with more knowledge are more likely to enter a new industry. The other is that firms’ businesses have a better chance of surviving, conditional on being formed. By examining U.S. public patenting firms in manufacturing sectors for 1984-1996, I find that knowledge stocks predict the likelihood of new industry entry when controlling for firm size. However, this predictive power is weakened when diversification effects are included. On the other hand, a survival study of newly established segments shows that initial knowledge stocks have significant positive effects on segment survival, whereas diversification effects are insignificant.

Reserva extrativista Acaú-Goiana: tragédia comum ou decisão coletiva?

In recent years we have observed, in Brazil, the expansion of democratic spaces, providing the use of participatory management strategies in common-pool areas. However, the existence of a co-management model does not guarantee its practice, neither that it will prevent the depletion of common features characterizing the tragedy proposed by Hardin. In this work we analysed the management of Acaú-Goiana RESEX which is located in the cities of Acaú (PB) and Goiana (PE), eight years after its legal creation. We evaluated how much the users of RESEX possess information (even if non formalized) regarding the common use of area and whether they exhibit collectivist values. We used as an interpretative tool the facilitators principles of common resource management (PGRC) identified by Elinor Ostrom and the questionnaire of human values proposed by Schwartz. The human values questionnaire was applied to 240 individuals, half beneficiary and the other half non-beneficiary, only the beneficiaries were submitted to the questionnaire of PGRC. Interviews were conducted in the period of May to September 2014. We tested three hypotheses: 1) The degree of dependence from RESEX resources will play an important role on indirect knowledge of the PGRC; 2) the inclusion of individuals in a communal area (RESEX) increases collectivists values; 3) higher collectivist value rates increases knowledge of PGRC. To this end, we defined levels of socio-economic dependence of RESEX resources, knowledge of PGRC and individual values. GLM statistic analysis of mean comparison and correlation were employed. Our results showed that the knowledge on six of the seven items analyzed in the basic principles (PGRC) is still low. The extended land area and the high number of users may be exerting a detrimental effect on the development of a co-management. Contrary to expected, it was not the dependency who influenced knowledge on the PGRC, but the time spent in contact with the RESEX. This indicates that direct contact with the environment, not the dependence of it, that raises awareness about PGRC. According to our hypothesis, individuals with collectivist values showed greater knowledge of PGRC and reduced hours of work within the RESEX, indicating a greater tendency of individuals refrain their use of the common resource. Individualistic values correlated with less knowledge of a PGRC. Among the beneficiaries, individuals with higher individualistic values had higher monthly income, while among non-beneficiaries there was no such correlation, demonstrating the economic advantages of individualism (free-riding) in situations of non-private use of resources. Our data emphasize the importance of guiding the main actors in the development of a co-participatory management in the direction of the basic principles, and to develop collectivist values among users of a common good can raise awareness of these principles.

Does generic entry always increase consumer welfare?

This article examines how the nature of competition between brands in a therapeutic category changes after generic entry and provides a framework for analyzing the effect of generic entry on consumer welfare that takes into account the generic free riding problem. It demonstrates that changes in competition along dimensions other than retail price - such as competition in research and development efforts and in promotional activities - may, in certain situations, result in generic entry having an overall negative impact on consumer welfare.