159 resultados para franchise


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This research examines the evolution of interorganizational relationships in a franchising context. Using U-curve theory, we develop three hypotheses and contrast them with traditional lifecycle theory. Three groups of constructs are affected by lifecycle: cooperation variables, dependence variables, and relationship variables. Four distinct stages emerge, with highest levels of variables in the honeymoon stage, lower levels in routine and crossroad stages, and increasing levels in the stabilization stage. Franchisors should strive for “stability on high levels” before operational realities influence the franchisees. Franchisees’ intermediate lifecycle phases are most critical for the system, since opportunistic behavior and switching are most likely.

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In small-service settings, how do owner satisfaction, front-line employee satisfaction, and customer satisfaction relate to one another? The authors use generalized exchange theory (GET) to examine how satisfaction levels of these three constituents are reciprocated. The authors examine a European franchise system comprising 50 outlets, 933 employees, and 20,742 customers. Their results show two important findings. First, the effect of owner-franchisee's satisfaction on customer satisfaction is fully mediated by front-line employee satisfaction. Thus, managers of a service outlet can strongly impact the satisfaction and behavioral intentions of their customer base, even without direct contact with them. Second, the link between customer satisfaction and purchase intention is moderated by employee satisfaction at an outlet. The link between customer satisfaction and customer purchase intentions is almost twice as strong when employees are satisfied than when they are not. Thus, there is a "doublepositive effect:" not only does higher employee satisfaction at an outlet directly lead to higher customer satisfaction but it also indirectly strengthens the association between customer satisfaction and their repurchase intentions.

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Using franchise data, we identify that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism by strengthening the opportunism-enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied, and exit the system.

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The president of Choice Hotels International discusses important considerations for investors and operators interested in pursuing franchise affiliations.

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Franchising is an important form of organizational control. Possible benefits of franchising include its ability to reduce agency costs that increase with costly monitoring, and provide incentives for the use of local information by onsite managers. However, these benefits may come at a cost, as franchisees may reduce quality by choosing to free ride. While many studies have investigated the reasons for franchising, few studies have documented the impacts of franchising on unit level operating performance. Using time-series data from a number of lodging properties that were converted to franchisee control from company control, this study documents the performance impacts of franchising. The analysis reveals that conversion results in a modest decline in financial performance and an immediate sharp decline in quality.

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Resumo: 1 – Sumário do Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, de 25 de Janeiro de 2011; 2 – Texto completo do Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, de 25 de Janeiro de 2011, Juiz Conselheiro Garcia CALEJO (Relator), Juiz Conselheiro Hélder ROQUE e Juiz Conselheiro Sebastião PÓVOAS: cfr. http://www.dgsi.pt , 21 de Abril de 2011; 3 – Anotação; 3.1 – Introdução à anotação; 3.2 – A questão da resolução em termos gerais; 3.3 – A questão da resolução no «contrato atípico de franquia»; 4 – Conclusões; § Abstract: 1 - Summary of the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice, 25 of January of 2011; 2 - Complete text of the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice, 25 of January of 2011, Advising Judge Garcia CALEJO (Reporter), Advising Judge Hélder ROQUE and Advising Juiz Sebastião PÓVOAS: cfr. http://www.dgsi.pt , 21 of April of 2011; 3 - Notation; 3.1 - Introduction to the notation; 3.2 - The question of the resolution in general terms; 3.3 - The question of the resolution in the «atypical contract of franshise»; 4 - Conclusions;

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É importante chamar a atenção das possíveis diferenças entre o contrato de franquia e o contrato de agência no que diz respeito também ao problema da resolução em termos mais gerais ou em termos mais concretos; 1 – Sumário do Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, de 25 de Janeiro de 2011; 2 – Texto completo do Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, de 25 de Janeiro de 2011, Juiz Conselheiro Garcia CALEJO (Relator), Juiz Conselheiro Hélder ROQUE e Juiz Conselheiro Sebastião PÓVOAS: cfr. http://www.dgsi.pt , 21 de Abril de 2011; 3 – Anotação; 3.1 – Introdução à anotação; 3.2 – A questão da resolução em termos gerais; 3.3 – A questão da resolução no «contrato atípico de franquia»; 4 – Conclusões; Abstract: is important to draw attention to potential differences between the franchise agreement and agency agreement with regard also to the resolution problem in more general terms or in more concrete terms; 1 - Summary of the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice, 25 of January of 2011; 2 - Complete text of the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice, 25 of January of 2011, Advising Judge Garcia CALEJO (Reporter), Advising Judge Hélder ROQUE and Advising Juiz Sebastião PÓVOAS: cfr. http://www.dgsi.pt , 21 of April of 2011; 3 - Notation; 3.1 - Introduction to the notation; 3.2 - The question of the resolution in general terms; 3.3 - The question of the resolution in the «atypical contract of franshise»; 4 - Conclusions;

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is important to draw attention to potential differences between the franchise agreement and agency agreement with regard also to the resolution problem in more general terms or in more concrete terms; 1 - Summary of the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice, 25 of January of 2011; 2 - Complete text of the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice, 25 of January of 2011, Advising Judge Garcia CALEJO (Reporter), Advising Judge Hélder ROQUE and Advising Juiz Sebastião PÓVOAS: cfr. http://www.dgsi.pt , 21 of April of 2011; 3 - Notation; 3.1 - Introduction to the notation; 3.2 - The question of the resolution in general terms; 3.3 - The question of the resolution in the «atypical contract of franshise»; 4 - Conclusions;

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Mestrado em Controlo e Gestão dos Negócios

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Mestrado em Engenharia Mecânica – Gestão Industrial

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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We propose a theoretical analysis of democratization processes in which an elite extends the franchise to the poor when threatened with a revolution. The poor could govern without changing the political system by maintaining a continuous revolutionary threat on the elite. Revolutionary threats, however, are costly to the poor and democracy is a superior sys- tem in which political agreement is reached through costless voting. This provides a rationale for democratic transitions that has not been discussed in the literature.

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S'ha evidenciat l'existència d'una nova tendència artística batejada com a gastrodramatúrgia, en la que s'hi insereixen dos tipus de teatre: el teatre culinari, que incorpora en els seus espectacles les tres instàncies del menjar: preparar, servir i consumir un menjar real que serà mastegat, empassat i/o digerit, i el teatre gastronòmic, que podríem definir-lo com aquell teatre que es pot classificar "selon la franchise de leur allusion alimentaire" i, per extensió, "de ce que mangent les personnages" (Barthes 1971: 128). La seva aparició ha coincidit amb el fenomen gastronòmic de l'actualitat i n'ha permès la qualificació d'epifenomen de la postmodernitat