Euthanasia and assisted suicide in selected European countries and US states: systematic literature review

BACKGROUND Legal in some European countries and US states, physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia remain under debate in these and other countries. OBJECTIVES The aim of the study was to examine numbers, characteristics, and trends over time for assisted dying in regions where these practices are legal: Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Oregon, Washington, and Montana. DESIGN This was a systematic review of journal articles and official reports. Medline and Embase databases were searched for relevant studies, from inception to end of 2012. We searched the websites of the health authorities of all eligible countries and states for reports on physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia and included publications that reported on cases of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. We extracted information on the total number of assisted deaths, its proportion in relation to all deaths, and socio-demographic and clinical characteristics of individuals assisted to die. RESULTS A total of 1043 publications were identified; 25 articles and reports were retained, including series of reported cases, physician surveys, and reviews of death certificates. The percentage of physician-assisted deaths among all deaths ranged from 0.1%-0.2% in the US states and Luxembourg to 1.8%-2.9% in the Netherlands. Percentages of cases reported to the authorities increased in most countries over time. The typical person who died with assistance was a well-educated male cancer patient, aged 60-85 years. CONCLUSIONS Despite some common characteristics between countries, we found wide variation in the extent and specific characteristics of those who died an assisted death.

Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: a prospective study.

The objective of this study is to determine if quality of care, symptoms of depression, disease characteristics and quality of life of patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) are related to requesting euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (EAS) and dying due to EAS. Therefore, 102 ALS patients filled out structured questionnaires every 3 months until death and the results were correlated with EAS. Thirty-one percent of the patients requested EAS, 69 % of whom eventually died as a result of EAS (22 % of all patients). Ten percent died during continuous deep sedation; only one of them had explicitly requested death to be hastened. Of the patients who requested EAS, 86 % considered the health care to be good or excellent, 16 % felt depressed, 45 % experienced loss of dignity and 42 % feared choking. These percentages do not differ from the number of patients who did not explicitly request EAS. The frequency of consultations of professional caregivers and availability of appliances was similar in both groups. Our findings do not support continuous deep sedation being used as a substitute for EAS. In this prospective study, no evidence was found for a relation between EAS and the quality and quantity of care received, quality of life and symptoms of depression in patients with ALS. Our study does not support the notion that unmet palliative care needs are related to EAS.

End games: Euthanasia under interminable scrutiny

It is increasingly asserted that the disagreements of abstract principle between adversaries in the euthanasia debate fail to account for the complex, particular and ambiguous experiences of people at the end of their lives. A greater research effort into experiences, meaning, connection, vulnerability and motivation is advocated, during which the euthanasia 'question' should remain open. I argue that this is a normative strategy, which is felicitous to the status quo and further medicalises the end of life, but which masquerades as a value-neutral assertion about needing more knowledge.

Does being against euthanasia legislation equate to being anti-euthanasia?

This study investigated issues raised in qualitative data from our previous studies of health professionals and community members, which suggested that being opposed to euthanasia legislation did not necessarily equate to being anti-euthanasia per se. A postal survey of 1002 medical practitioners, 1000 nurses and 1200 community members was undertaken. In addition to a direct question on changing the law to allow active voluntary euthanasia (AVE), four statements assessed attitudes to euthanasia with or without a change in legislation. Responses were received from 405 doctors (43%), 429 nurses (45%) and 405 community members (38%). Compared with previous studies there was a slight increase in support for a change in the law from medical practitioners, a slight decrease in support from community members and almost no change among nurses. Different interpretations of the results of the four attitude questions are possible, depending on the perspective of the interpreter.

How should Australia respond to media- publicised developments on euthanasia in Belgium?

This article considers the implications that recent euthanasia developments in Belgium might have for the Australian debate on assisted dying. Through media database and internet searches, four significant developments in Belguim were identified: three cases involving individuals who requested access to euthanasia, and recent changes to the Belgian Act on Euthanasia 2002, allowing children access to euthanasia. The article outlines these developments and then examines how they have been discussed in Australia by the different sides of the euthanasia debate. It concludes that these developments are important considerations that legislators and policy-makers in Australia should engage with, but argues that that engagement must be rational and also informed by the significant evidence base that is now available on how the Belgian (and other) assisted dying regimes operate in practice.

Doctors and their patients : A context for understanding the wish to hasten death

There is a paucity of research that has directly examined the role of the health professional in dealing with a terminally ill patient's wish to hasten death (WTHD) and the implications of this for the support and services needed in the care for a dying patient. Themes to emerge from a qualitative analysis of interviews conducted on doctors (n=24) involved in the treatment and care of terminally ill patients were (i) the doctors' experiences in caring for their patients (including themes of emotional demands/expectations, the duration of illness, and the availability of palliative care services); (ii) the doctors' perception of the care provided to their respective patients (comprising themes concerning satisfaction with the care for physical symptoms, for emotional symptoms, or overall care); (iii) the doctors' attitudes to euthanasia and (iv) the doctors' perception of their patients' views/beliefs regarding euthanasia and hastened death. When responses were categorised according to the patients' level of a WTHD, the theme concerning the prolonged nature of the patients' illnesses was prominent in the doctor group who had patients with the highest WTHD, whereas there was only a minority of responses concerning support from palliative care services and satisfaction with the level of emotional care in this group. This exploratory study presents a set of descriptive findings identifying themes among a small group of doctors who have been involved in the care of terminally ill cancer patients, to investigate factors that may be associated with the WTHD among these patients. The pattern of findings suggest that research investigating the doctor-patient interaction in this setting may add to our understanding of the problems (for patients and their doctors) that underpins the wish to hasten death in the terminally ill.

Terminally ill cancer patients’ wish to hasten death

This exploratory study investigated factors associated with the wish to hasten death among a sample of terminally ill cancer patients. Semi-structured interviews conducted on a total of 72 hospice and home palliative care patients were subjected to qualitative analysis using QSRNUDIST. The main themes to emerge suggested that patients with a high wish to hasten death had greater concerns with physical symptoms and psychologica l suffering, perceived themselves to be more of a burden to others, and experienced higher levels of demoralization, while also reporting less confidence in symptom control, fewer social supports, less satisfaction with life experiences and fewer religious beliefs when compared with patients who had a moderate or no wish to hasten death. The implications of these findings will be discussed.

Ending the life of the act/omission dispute: Causation in withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures

My aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. My argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. I then provide a clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This enables me, in conclusion, to clarify important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Serum bone formation marker correlation with improved osseointegration in osteoporotic rats treated with simvastatin

Objective: Simvastatin has been shown to enhance osseointegration of pure titanium implants in osteoporotic rats. This study aimed to evaluate the relationship between the serum level of bone formation markers and the osseointegration of pure titanium implants in osteoporotic rats treated with simvastatin. Materials and methods: Fifty-four female Sprague Dawley rats, aged 3 months old, were randomly divided into three groups: Sham-operated group (SHAM; n=18), ovariectomized group (OVX; n=18), and ovariectomized with Simvastatin treatment group (OVX+SIM; n=18). Fifty-six days after ovariectomy, screw-shaped titanium implants were inserted into the tibiae. Simvastatin was administered orally at 5mg/kg each day after the placement of the implant in the OVX+SIM group. The animals were sacrificed at either 28 or 84 days after implantation and the undecalcified tissue sections were processed for histological analysis. Total alkaline phosphatase (ALP), bone specific alkaline phosphatase (BALP) and bone Gla protein (BGP) were measured in all animal sera collected at the time of euthanasia and correlated with the histological assessment of osseointegration. Results: The level of ALP in the OVX group was higher than the SHAM group at day 28, with no differences between the three groups at day 84. The level of BALP in the OVX+SIM group was significantly higher than both OVX and SHAM groups at days 28 and 84. Compared with day 28, the BALP level of all three groups showed a significant decrease at day 84. There were no significant differences in BGP levels between the three groups at day 28, but at day 84 the OVX+SIM group showed significantly higher levels than both the OVX and SHAM groups. There was a significant increase in BGP levels between days 28 and 84 in the OVX+SIM group. The serum bone marker levels correlated with the histological assessment showing reduced osseointegration in the OVX compared to the SHAM group which is subsequently reversed in the OVX+SIM group.

Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.