The role of rural land in mixed asset investment portfolios

Rural land has not always been considered as a major long-term investment with both institutional investors and absentee owners in countries such as U.K. and Australia. Although rural land is included in both single asset and mixed asset portfolios in the U.S, it is not at the same levels as either commercial or industrial property. Rural land occupies over 50% of the total area of Australia, and comprises over 115,000 economic farm properties (excludes rural residential, hobby farms and rural lifestyle blocks. However, less than 1.6% of the total economic farm numbers are actually owned by corporate or institutional investors. This low level of corporate involvement in the Australian rural property market has limited both the investment performance research and inclusion of this rural land type in both property and mixed asset investment portfolios. In the U.S. rural land is also the most extensive real estate type based on total area occupied. The United States Department of Agriculture statistics (1998) show that in 1997 there were 2.06 million farms in the U.S., covering 968 million acres, with a total value of $912 billion and generating an annual income of $202 billion. The level of corporate ownership of farms in the U.S. is also higher than the level of corporate farm ownership in Australia. This high level of institutional ownership in rural land in U.S has provided the opportunity for the rural property asset class to be analysed in relation to it’s investment performance and possible role in a mixed asset or mixed property investment portfolio.

Agency Conflicts and Corporate Payout Policies: A Global Study

We investigate the roles of finn and country level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policics. Based on a large sample of 29,610 firms in 42 countries from 2001 to 2006, we show there is a form of "pecking order" in investors' ability to extract cash (whether as dividends only or share repurchases) from firms. Although investors are able to use their legal powers to extract cash from firms in high protection countries, their ability to do so can be substantially hindered when agency costs at the firm level are high. In poor protection countries, investors seem to take whatever cash they can get, even though the amount may be small, and with scant regard for investment opportunities and firm level agency conflicts. Finally, compared to repurchases, we find dividends are more likely to be the sole method of payout in high protection countries and in non insider-dominated firms.

An analysis of the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance in smaller listed Australian companies

The objective of this thesis is to investigate the corporate governance attributes of smaller listed Australian firms. This study is motivated by evidence that these firms are associated with more regulatory concerns, the introduction of ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations in 2004, and a paucity of research to guide regulators and stakeholders of smaller firms. While there is an extensive body of literature examining the effectiveness of corporate governance, the literature principally focuses on larger companies, resulting in a deficiency in the understanding of the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance in smaller firms. Based on a review of agency theory literature, a theoretical model is developed that posits that agency costs are mitigated by internal governance mechanisms and transparency. The model includes external governance factors but in many smaller firms these factors are potentially absent, increasing the reliance on the internal governance mechanisms of the firm. Based on the model, the observed greater regulatory intervention in smaller companies may be due to sub-optimal internal governance practices. Accordingly, this study addresses four broad research questions (RQs). First, what is the extent and nature of the ASX Recommendations that have been adopted by smaller firms (RQ1)? Second, what firm characteristics explain differences in the recommendations adopted by smaller listed firms (RQ2), and third, what firm characteristics explain changes in the governance of smaller firms over time (RQ3)? Fourth, how effective are the corporate governance attributes of smaller firms (RQ4)? Six hypotheses are developed to address the RQs. The first two hypotheses explore the extent and nature of corporate governance, while the remaining hypotheses evaluate its effectiveness. A time-series, cross-sectional approach is used to evaluate the effectiveness of governance. Three models, based on individual governance attributes, an index of six items derived from the literature, and an index based on the full list of ASX Recommendations, are developed and tested using a sample of 298 smaller firms with annual observations over a five-year period (2002-2006) before and after the introduction of the ASX Recommendations in 2004. With respect to (RQ1) the results reveal that the overall adoption of the recommendations increased from 66 per cent in 2004 to 74 per cent in 2006. Interestingly, the adoption rate for recommendations regarding the structure of the board and formation of committees is significantly lower than the rates for other categories of recommendations. With respect to (RQ2) the results reveal that variations in rates of adoption are explained by key firm differences including, firm size, profitability, board size, audit quality, and ownership dispersion, while the results for (RQ3) were inconclusive. With respect to (RQ4), the results provide support for the association between better governance and superior accounting-based performance. In particular, the results highlight the importance of the independence of both the board and audit committee chairs, and of greater accounting-based expertise on the audit committee. In contrast, while there is little evidence that a majority independent board is associated with superior outcomes, there is evidence linking board independence with adverse audit opinion outcomes. These results suggest that board and chair independence are substitutes; in the presence of an independent chair a majority independent board may be an unnecessary and costly investment for smaller firms. The findings make several important contributions. First, the findings contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the extent, nature and effectiveness of governance in smaller firms. The findings also contribute to the policy debate regarding future development of Australia’s corporate governance code. The findings regarding board and chair independence, and audit committee characteristics, suggest that policy-makers could consider providing additional guidance for smaller companies. In general, the findings offer support for the “if not, why not?” approach of the ASX, rather than a prescriptive rules-based approach.

The impact of the Malaysian code on corporate governance: compliance, institutional investors and stock performance

In 2001, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) became an integral part of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules, which requires all listed firms to disclose the extent of compliance with the MCCG. Our panel analysis of 440 firms from 1999 to 2002 finds that corporate governance reform in Malaysia has been successful, with a significant improvement in governance practices. The relationship between ownership by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and corporate governance has strengthened during the period subsequent to the reform, in line with the lead role taken by the EPF in establishing the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group. The implementation of MCCG has had a substantial effect on shareholders' wealth, increasing stock prices by an average of about 4.8%. Although there is no evidence that politically connected firms perform better, political connections do have a significantly negative effect on corporate governance, which is mitigated by institutional ownership.

Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Property investment, construction and economic growth : the case of Malaysia

It is generally accepted that there is a close relationship between property investment and construction activity. The construction sector plays a crucial role in economic development, especially for a developing nation such as Malaysia. However, the volume of new properties added to the property market is only a fraction of the total volume of the property market. Is the conventional assumption of the relationship between property investment and construction supported by empirical data? This paper revisits the tripartite relationships between economic growths, property investment and construction activities with official Malaysian 2000Q1-2010Q4 quarterly time series data. The Granger causality tests are used to establish the causality runs from the GDP to the value of property transactions, and the growth of construction activities to GDP growth. The result is expected to be useful for policymakers and industrial practitioners in formulating industrial policies and corporate strategies.

Disclosure of proxy voting information by Australian managed investment schemes

The US Securities and Exchange Comission requires registered management investment companies to disclose how they vote proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold. The primary purpose of this rule is to enable fund investors to monitor the role of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance practices of public companies. In Australia, despite reform proposals, there are no regulations requiring institutional investors to report proxy voting procedures and practises. There is little evidence of voluntary disclosure of proxy voting by Australian managed investment schemes in equities, indicating that there are costs involved in such disclosure.

Corporate governance and misappropriation

This study examines the occurrence of misappropriation-type fraud within Australian listed firms and the relation between the incidence of this type of fraud and a firm's governance strength. We measure governance strength using factors relating to traditional corporate governance, such as board composition, CEO duality, and audit committee composition, as well as factors relating to information technology governance. In our study, we use actual dollar amount of fraud reported by listed companies responding to the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey as one of three different misappropriation measures and publicly available firm-specific data to measure the other variables in the model. Our study found that where the chief executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of chairperson of the board of directors, the likelihood of fraud increases. We also find that the greater the number of independent directors on the audit committee, the lower the level of fraud. Taken together, these results are particularly encouraging as they provide support for regulatory bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), which place considerable emphasis on the importance of establishing good corporate governance practices. The study provides empirical evidence that employing good corporate governance reduces the risk of the misappropriation of assets.

The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance

The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost‐benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.

Corporate governance and risk management : the role of risk management and compensation committees

This paper examines the role of compensation and risk committees in managing and monitoring the risk behaviour of Australian financial firms in the period leading up to the global financial crisis (2006–2008). This empirical study of 711 observations of financial sector firms demonstrates how the coordination of risk management and compensation committees reduces information asymmetry. The study shows that the composition of the risk and compensation committees is positively associated with risk, which, in turn, is associated with firm performance. More importantly, information asymmetry is reduced when a director is a member of both the risk and compensation committees which moderate the negative association between risk and firm performance for firms with high risk.

CFO inside debt and corporate innovation

This thesis examines the importance of CFO incentives on the value maximization of firm. It examines the association between CFO inside debt compensation i.e., CFO pensions and deferred compensation, and investment in corporate innovation. It finds that instead of encouraging innovation, CFO inside debt appears to have a dampening effect on investment in innovation.

Corporate governance and securities class actions

This study investigates the governance attributes of firms that have been subject to securities class actions (SCAs). There has been a recent sizable increase in the number of firms subject to SCAs in Australia. We examine a sample of firms that have been subject to SCAs due to disclosure breaches and match the firms by industry and size to a control sample. First, we examine the compliance culture of the SCA firms via the frequency of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)queries of the firm and find that the frequency of ASX queries is positively associated with the occurrence of a SCA. Secondly, we provide evidence that SCA firms exhibit weaker levels of corporate governance than the matched control sample. In addition, we contribute to the understanding of firms subject to SCAs and their corporate governance attributes. Our results suggest the presence of a nomination committee may be associated with higher agency costs and that the influence of CEO duality may reduce the effectiveness of a nomination committee.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Sustainability in infrastructure investment : building the business case

Many infrastructure agencies adopt sustainability objectives at a corporate level and incorporate sustainability targets and indicators as part of corporate reporting processes. These objectives are expected to translate to all stages of the project delivery process, including project selection. For infrastructure capital works projects and programs, a robust project management approach involves the development of a business case to guide investment decision making. A key tool in the assessment of project options and selection of a delivery strategy is Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). Infrastructure providers are required to undertake cost benefit analysis to support project selection through regulatory approval and budgetary processes. This tool has emerged through the prism of economic analysis rather than sustainability. A literature review reveals the limitations of CBA alone to effectively evaluate economic, environmental and social externalities or impacts that apply over a long time frame, and that are ultimately irreversible. Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) has been introduced as a means to incorporate a wider array of factors into decision making such as sustainability. This, however, presents new challenges with issues around how to transparently represent wider community values in the selection of a preferred solution. Are these tools effective in assessing the wider sustainability costs and benefits taking into account that these are public works with long life spans and significant impacts across institutional boundaries? The research indicates a need to develop clear guidelines for investment decision making in order to better align with corporate sustainability objectives. Findings from the literature review indicate that a more sustainable approach to investment decision-making framework should include: the incorporation of sustainability goals from corporate planning documents; problem definition and option generation using best practice investment management guidelines; improved guidelines for Business Case development using a combination of both Cost Benefit Analysis and Multi-Criteria Analysis; and an integrated public participation process.