Conceptualising a Chinese corporate governance framework : tensions between tradition, ideologies and modernity

Reflects on the challenges facing China's efforts to reform its corporate governance framework, and the extent to which the modernisation can be reconciled with the country's cultural traditions. Examines the development of China's legal and economic reforms since 1978, the debate which these have generated ad the shortcomings of the current corporate governance regime. Discusses how Confucian principles might be applied to issues of director's duties and corporate governance, and explains the benefits of such an approach.

Internalities and the Foundations of Corporate Governance

This paper considers the potential contained in an 'internalities' approach to corporate governance. Rather than viewing the company as a ‘black box’ that can only be regulated through state action, we argue that corporate governance holds in tension the relationship between investors, managers and the corporate board. It is from that tension that a change in corporate culture will emerge. We argue that a state focus on promoting and managing the dialogical character of corporate governance will limit the negative effects of corporate power

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

Corporate governance codes in Australia and New Zealand: Propriety and prosperity

Overview of the central features of corporate governance codes, 'Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations' (released by the ASX Corporate Governance Council) and 'Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines' (released by New Zealand Securities Commission) - whether the codes address the right problem - are the solutions of independence and disclosure conceptually and practically viable - whether codes pay sufficient attention to wealth creation.

Executive remuneration, financial performance and corporate governance in UK and Spanish listed firms

This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

Corporate governance in China

So far as Asia is concerned, corporate governance is an import. The concept itself was virtually unknown in China ¬a decade ago. Yet corporate governance has now been enthusiastically embraced in China, to the point that the year 2005 was declared the Year of Corporate Governance and extensive amendments have been made to several laws and regulations with an emphasis on corporate governance. This essay will consider the effectiveness of China’s corporate governance law on paper and in practice with the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance acting as a general guide.

The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance

The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost‐benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.

Ownership, corporate governance and timeliness of price discovery : Australian evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s ownership and corporate governance affect its timeliness of price discovery, which is referred to as the speed of incorporation of value-relevant information into the stock price. Using a panel data of 1,138 Australian firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, we predict and find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of price discovery. We test the identity of the largest shareholder and find that only firms with family as the largest shareholder exhibit faster price discovery. There is no evidence that suggests that the presence of a second largest shareholder affects the timeliness of price discovery materially. Although we find a positive association between corporate governance quality and the timeliness of price discovery, as expected, there is no interaction effect between the largest shareholding and corporate governance in relation to the timeliness of price discovery. Further tests show no evidence of severe endogeneity problems in our study.

Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance

Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors minimize risk for a given level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets. This study sets out to determine the role of the institutional investor in monitoring risk and firm performance. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical study shows a positive association between firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and performance for firms with increasing institutional shareholdings. The study also finds that the significance of this association depends on the institutional investor's ability to influence management, which in turn depends on the size of ownership and whether the investee firm does not have potential business dealings with the investor. We also find that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors engage in promoting short-term performance or exit rather than support long-term value creation. The results are robust while controlling the potential for endogeneity and using sensitivity tests to control for variants of performance and risk. These findings add to the growing body of literature examining institutional ownership and the importance of understanding the role of risk-management in the risk and return relation.

The post-financial crisis challenges for corporate governance and banking reform in China

The purpose of this paper is to review the impact of the global financial crisis on banking reform in China. The significant doubt concerning the efficiencies of Anglo-American model of corporate governance has raised a critical political question amongst scholars and practitioners as to whether China should continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to financial reform. This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate governance literature and regulatory reports. After examining the fundamental limitations of the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, which promotes greater liberalization and less control, the paper considers the risks in opening China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies. A critique of shareholder-capitalism is outlined in relation to the German’s “social market economy” styled capitalism. Through such analysis the paper explores a number of implications for China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model applicable to the Chinese context.

Global financial crisis: implications for Chinese corporate governance

This paper analyses the role of corporate governance failures and weaknesses in the global financial crisis with reference to the evolution of post-crisis corporate governance arrangements in China. The current crisis presents China with an opportunity to analyse its governance problems, reflect on its weaknesses and implement a strategy to address areas which need attention. This paper opens with a description of China’s exposure to the current global financial crisis and continues to critically evaluate the effectiveness of a free market system on corporate governance. Bratton (2002) maintains that incentive structures that motivate the self-regulatory systems generate less powerful checks against abuse than scholars and practitioners have believed. The paper highlights the need for corporate regulatory bodies and policy makers to revise and re-develop financial services sector regulations. Finally, the paper discusses the need of ethics in organizations - an issue that is beyond legislation. In an increasingly interconnected global economy, it is imperative to increase our understanding of what constitutes an effective corporate governance system. The paper contributes to the corporate governance body of literature within the Chinese context by providing insights into the contributing factors to corporate governance failure that led to the global financial crisis. It also provides policy recommendations for China’s policy makers to seriously consider. The results suggest a need for the re-examination of corporate governance adequacy and the institutionalisation of business ethics.

Conceptual framework for earnings management and corporate governance research

This study investigates the theoretical framework for earnings management and corporate governance research along with a focused review of relevant previous research that has investigated the effects of a variety of corporate governance factors and earnings management. Research background has been categorised using Australian corporate governance principles and recommendations issued in August 2007.

The effect of financial constraints, investment policy, product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash-flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.