The determinants of multinational contractors' willingness to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure projects : deploying the eclectic paradigm of internationalisation

Based on Dunning's dominant international business theory and the unique characteristics of construction, a novel framework is developed and tested to explain multinational contracting into Australia. Beyond contributions to theory, Australian governments now have clear evidence upon which to develop more effective procurement reform towards increasing the attractiveness of public sector major infrastructure projects and competition in this sector.

kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.

Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: A taxonomic review

In the global construction context, the Best Value or Most Economically Advantageous Tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the Lowest Price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder's price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an Economic Scoring Formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, Economic Scoring Formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having being considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESF and Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent thirty years little progress has been made - due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. This paper resumes the debate by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to assure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of twelve construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders’ bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder’s probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Non-competitive bids have recently become a major concern in both Public and Private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This work contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Who is the South African retail giant behind the David Jones bid?

Yesterday morning came the news South African retailer Woolworths had offered $4 a share to acquire David Jones, a proposal that has the approval of the department store’s board. This offer, worth an estimated A$2.15 billion, represents a 25% premium over the current share price value. An earlier offer, from rival Myer, was rejected earlier this year. But who is Woolworths? Not to be confused with Australia’s largest supermarket, Woolworths SA is one of South Africa’s largest retailers.

Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.

A Nash Bargaining Approach to Retention Enhancing Bid Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions with Discrete Bids

Bid optimization is now becoming quite popular in sponsored search auctions on the Web. Given a keyword and the maximum willingness to pay of each advertiser interested in the keyword, the bid optimizer generates a profile of bids for the advertisers with the objective of maximizing customer retention without compromising the revenue of the search engine. In this paper, we present a bid optimization algorithm that is based on a Nash bargaining model where the first player is the search engine and the second player is a virtual agent representing all the bidders. We make the realistic assumption that each bidder specifies a maximum willingness to pay values and a discrete, finite set of bid values. We show that the Nash bargaining solution for this problem always lies on a certain edge of the convex hull such that one end point of the edge is the vector of maximum willingness to pay of all the bidders. We show that the other endpoint of this edge can be computed as a solution of a linear programming problem. We also show how the solution can be transformed to a bid profile of the advertisers.

The Kandhkelgaon Story: a bold bid by women in Kandhkelgaon Village, Saintala Block, Bolangir District, to break out of their poverty trap

One third of the people on earth who are described as living in absolute poverty are found today in India. “These people,” says Mr B K Satpathy, “are caught in a poverty trap’.” “Poverty trap?” we ask. “These are creative weavers; their cloth has a distinctive style, but those who supply their thread also take away and sell the cloth, paying just a small labor cost for each saree. If they are skilled and work hard this amounts to only 25-30 rupees (60-70 US cents) per day.” Under this arrangement, weaving does not provide enough to live on, and people are seeking ways to escape their entrapment in poverty. (Pdf contains 6 pages).