Financial regulation and supervision in emerging markets: the experience of Latin America since the Tequila crisis

Includes bibliography

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

Measuring and testing for the systemically important financial institutions

This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.

The impact of deregulation and re-regulation on bank efficiency: evidence from Asia

Following the 1997 crisis, banking sector reforms in Asia have been characterised by the emphasis on prudential regulation, associated with increased financial liberalisation. Using a panel data set of commercial banks from eight major Asian economies over the period 2001-2010, this study explores how the coexistence of liberalisation and prudential regulation affects banks’ cost characteristics. Given the presence of heterogeneity of technologies across countries, we use a stochastic frontier approach followed by the estimation of a deterministic meta-frontier to provide ‘true’ estimates of bank cost efficiency measures. Our results show that the liberalization of bank interest rates and the increase in foreign banks' presence have had a positive and significant impact on technological progress and cost efficiency. On the other hand, we find that prudential regulation might adversely affect bank cost performance. When designing an optimal regulatory framework, policy makers should combine policies which aim to foster financial stability without hindering financial intermediation.

Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one

Assessing Dodd Frank Effects on banking capital structure and Banker´s Pay structure

The systemic financial crisis that started in 2008 in the United States had some severe effects in the economic activity and required the bailout of financial institutions with the use of taxpayer’s money. It also originated claims for stronger regulatory framework in order to avoid another threat in the financial market. The Dodd Frank Act was proposed and approved in the United States in the aftermath of the crisis and brought, among many other features, the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the tougher inspection of financial institutions with asset above 50 billion dollars. The objective of this work is to study the causal effect of the Dodd Frank Act on the behavior of the treatment group subject to monitoring by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (financial institutions with assets above 50 billion dollars) regarding capital and compensation structure in comparison to the group that was not treated. We use data from Compustat and our empirical strategy is the Regression Discontinuity Design, not usually applied to the banking literature, but very useful for the present work since it allows us to compare the treatment group and the non-treatment group in the year of the enactment of the law (2010). No change of behavior was observed for the Capital Structure. In the Compensation Schemes, however, a decrease was found in the item other compensation for CEOs and CFOs. We also performed a robustness check by running a placebo test on the variables in the year before the law was enacted. No significance was found, which supports the conclusion that our main results were caused by the enactment of the DFA.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used

Regulação financeira sistêmica no Brasil: desafios e propostas de aprimoramento institucional

A presente dissertação versa sobre o estudo da regulação financeira sistêmica brasileira e está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, descreve-se a essência das atividades financeiras e narra-se a trajetória histórica que deu ensejo à criação de Bancos Centrais e o surgimento da regulação bancária no mundo. Em seguida, discorre-se sobre o processo de expansão do sistema financeiro e sua internacionalização face à globalização financeira dos mercados. Após a exposição de razões políticas, comportamentais, econômicas e técnicas consideradas determinantes para a consumação da última crise financeira mundial (caso subprime), demonstra-se que uma regulação financeira sistêmica adequada constitui um processo complexo, dinâmico e contínuo de gestão pública com vistas a evitar ou atenuar os efeitos de crises sistêmicas. Nesse sentido, são expostos os motivos por que o Brasil enfrentou bem tal crise, através da apresentação da evolução dos processos regulatórios domésticos nos últimos anos. No segundo capítulo, utilizado o marco político-filosófico de John Rawls, sustenta-se a ideia de que a estabilidade financeira sustentável ao longo do tempo é uma questão de justiça básica que deve influenciar o desenho político-institucional em sociedades democráticas constitucionais. Nesse sentido, afirma-se a possibilidade de geração de um consenso sobreposto, segundo o ideal de razão pública, quanto à necessidade de estabelecimento de instituições, relativamente descoladas dos ciclos político-eleitorais e dotadas de especialização técnica, responsáveis pelo planejamento e acompanhamento público e transparente da sustentabilidade da execução da política monetária e da regulação financeira sistêmica propriamente dita no longo prazo. Adicionalmente, em razão da globalização financeira dos mercados, discorre-se sobre os limites e possibilidades do ideal de razão pública nos organismos financeiros internacionais (redes globais de governo), instituídos para definir padrões de regulação financeira sistêmica, e são feitos comentários acerca da existência de um Direito Administrativo Global. No terceiro capítulo, defende-se a ideia de razão prática regulatória como a diretriz adequada de atuação sustentável do Estado na economia com foco em resultados, a fim de estimular o progresso nos processos regulatórios, mediante o uso do better regulation como paradigma de análise de custos e benefícios. Após, expõe-se a noção de juridicidade administrativa como a mais compatível com a Constituição, além de defender-se a legitimidade democrática e o poder normativo das agências reguladoras financeiras. Por fim, com fundamento nas características do desenho institucional da estrutura regulatória brasileira, são formuladas propostas de aprimoramento institucional. No último capítulo, são feitos comentários sobre as vantagens, limites e riscos de judicialização dos processos regulatórios financeiros em democracias constitucionais, o que motiva a construção de parâmetros institucionais e materiais de atuação judicial, posteriormente analisados em precedentes importantes julgados no Brasil nos últimos anos.

Basileia III e os dilemas da supervisão do sistema bancário internacional

A regulação e supervisão do sistema financeiro sempre foram motivos de apreensão por parte das principais autoridades econômicas mundiais. A globalização, o processo de liberalização financeira e a consequente interconexão econômica entre países maximizaram o risco sistêmico, aumentando a necessidade de marco regulatório e fiscalização mais eficientes. Assim, com a eclosão da crise norte-americana em 2008, o G-20 começou a atuar de forma mais ativa em prol da manutenção da higidez do sistema financeiro mundial. Para os bancos, o G-20 instruiu as principais instituições reguladoras como o Fundo Monetário Internacional, o Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira e o Comitê de Basileia (BCBS) a desenvolverem recomendações a fim de se solucionar o considerado principal problema da regulação dos mercados, o fato destes atualmente serem pró-cíclicos. Diante de tal cenário, em dezembro de 2009, o Comitê publicou um documento que considerou uma série de medidas a fim de solucionar tal problema, entre estas estava a inclusão do buffer de capital contracíclicodo novo marco regulatório proposto pelo Comitê, o Basileia III. O intuito do presente estudo é estudar esse buffer e analisar sua aplicabilidade no sistema bancário brasileiro e, porventura, sugerir metodologias alternativas de cálculo.

Capital Markets Union and ending short-termism: lessons from the European Commission's public consultation

The European Commission’s initiative to establish a Capital Markets Union is in sharp conflict with the more radical goals of downsizing significantly certain financial activities and firms that have become too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-govern and of ending or at least drastically limiting extreme speculation and short-termism in finance and the real economy in order to increase financial stability. The recent public consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union gives evidence of how weak such demands are compared to calls for deeper capital markets with more ‘shadow banking’ and rebuilding (sound) securitisation. The consultation is an example of how framing the problem and the refined better regulation agenda influence post-crisis financial reregulation and help to marginalize more radical ideas demanding a return to a more traditional banking model and transforming finance back to serving the real economy.

International Coordination in Cross-Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects

Bail-in is quickly becoming a predominant approach to banking resolution. The EU Bank Recovery Resolution Directive and the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s single point of entry strategy envisage creditors’ recapitalisations
to resolve a failing financial institution. However, this legislation focuses on the domestic aspects of bail-in, leaving the question of how it is applied
to a cross-border banking group open. Cross-border banking resolution has been historically subject to coordination failures, which have resulted in disorderly resolutions with dangerous systemic effects. The goal of this article is to assess whether bail-in is subject to the same coordination problems that affect other resolution tools, and to discuss the logic of international legal cooperation in bail-in policies. We demonstrate that, in spite of the evident benefit in terms of fiscal sustainability, bail-in suffers from complex coordination problems which, if not addressed, might lead to regulatory arbitrage and lengthy court battles, and, ultimately, may disrupt resolutions. We argue that only a binding legal regime can address those problems. In doing so, we discuss the recent Financial Stability
Board’s proposal on cross-border recognition of resolution action, and the role of international law in promoting cooperation in banking resolution.

Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area:What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration

The recent European economic crisis has dramatically exposed the failures of
the various institutional mechanisms in place to maintain economic stability
in Europe, and has unveiled the difficulty in achieving international coordination
on fiscal and financial stability policies. Drawing on the European
experience, this article analyzes the concept of economic stability in international
law and highlights the peculiar problems connected to its maintenance
or promotion. First, we demonstrate that policies that safeguard and
protect economic stability are largely regulated and managed at the national
level, due to their inextricable relationship with the exercise of national political
power. Until recently, more limited levels of pan-European integration
did not make the coordination of economic stability policies seem necessary.
However, a much deeper level of economic integration makes it very difficult
to tackle an international economic crisis through national responses. If EU
Member states wish to maintain and deepen economic integration, they
must accept an erosion of sovereignty over their economic stability policies.
This will not only deprive states of a fundamental anchor of political power,
but also create a challenge for the maintenance of democratic control over
economic policies. Second, this article argues that soft law approaches are
likely ineffective in enforcing the regulatory disciplines required to ensure
economic stability.