Global response sensitivity analysis of uncertain structures

The problem of characterizing global sensitivity indices of structural response when system uncertainties are represented using probabilistic and (or) non-probabilistic modeling frameworks (which include intervals, convex functions, and fuzzy variables) is considered. These indices are characterized in terms of distance measures between a fiducial model in which uncertainties in all the pertinent variables are taken into account and a family of hypothetical models in which uncertainty in one or more selected variables are suppressed. The distance measures considered include various probability distance measures (Hellinger,l(2), and the Kantorovich metrics, and the Kullback-Leibler divergence) and Hausdorff distance measure as applied to intervals and fuzzy variables. Illustrations include studies on an uncertainly parametered building frame carrying uncertain loads. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.