The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

¿Se encuentran protegidas las esposas o compañeras menores de 15 años de los miembros de las partes en un conflicto armado no internacional frente a la violencia sexual ejercida por sus propias parejas o por otros miembros del grupo al que pertenecen?

La protección general atribuida en los conflictos armados no internacionales por el artículo 3 común a la población civil, de la que las niñas menores de 15 años forman parte, no depende de su filiación con alguna de las partes en el conflicto, y se extiende, en principio, a todos los actos de violencia, entre los que se encuentran los de naturaleza sexual cometidos por cualquiera de las mismas, incluyendo aquellos cometidos por los miembros de la parte en el conflicto con la que se encuentren afiliadas. Los casos contra Thomas Lubanga y Bosco Ntaganda muestran que, como regla general, las niñas menores de 15 años no desarrollan de manera prolongada actividades de participación directa en las hostilidades, por lo que, a pesar de acompañar permanente al grupo y de ser “esposas” o “compañeras” de sus comandantes, no asumen una función continua de combate y no pueden ser consideradas como miembros del mismo. Además, los actos de naturaleza sexual coercitivamente desarrollados por las niñas menores de 15 años reclutadas por las FPLC en favor de los comandantes y miembros del grupo con las que se encuentran esposadas, no cumple ninguno de los tres requisitos exigidos por el concepto de participación directa en las hostilidades porque: (a) no son idóneos para causar directamente por sí mismos el umbral de daño requerido; (b) no forman parte integral de ninguna operación militar que pudiera generar dicho umbral de daño; y (c) no poseen el nexo beligerante requerido, puesto que no están específicamente diseñados para causar un menoscabo a la parte adversa de las FLPC. Tampoco las demás actividades desarrolladas por las niñas menores de 15 años alistadas o reclutadas por las FLPC, incluyendo trabajo doméstico (donde principalmente desempeñaron tareas culinarias), transporte de comida a bases aéreas y acompañamiento a las esposas de los comandantes, cumplen, según la Sala de Primera Instancia I en el caso Lubanga, con los tres requisitos necesarios para su consideración como participación directa en las hostilidades. De ahí, que las niñas no hayan perdido en ningún momento su protección general. A todo lo anterior hay que añadir que los niños y niñas menores de 15 años, al ser una población particularmente vulnerable, gozan de una especial protección durante los conflictos armados (con independencia de su naturaleza), tal y como se manifiesta en la Convención de los Derechos del Niño de 1989, los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949 y de sus Protocolos adicionales de 1977, el Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional de 1998 y las Resoluciones 1882 de 2009, 1960 de 2010 y 2106 de 2013 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Esta protección especial se extiende a los actos de violencia sexual cometidos por los miembros de las fuerzas armadas nacionales o grupos armados organizados que los alistan o reclutan. En consecuencia, la protección general y especial a que son acreedoras las niñas menores de 15 años, no se limita a las agresiones provenientes de las partes adversas en el conflicto, sino que se extiende también a la violencia sexual ejercida contra ellas por los miembros del propio grupo que las alistó o reclutó, incluso en el caso de que ésta sea ejercida por los comandantes que las tomaron como esposas o compañeras. Las niñas menores de 15 años alistadas o reclutadas entre 2002 y 2003 por las FPLC de Thomas Lubanga y Bosco Ntaganda eran sin duda acreedoras de dicha protección.

L’autorisation de recourir à la force accordée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme.

“El florecimiento del terrorismo islámico en el Sahel, un reto para la seguridad de Europa Occidental. Estudio de caso: Malí y España (2011- 2013)”

El objetivo central de este Estudio de Caso, consiste en investigar en qué sentido la proximidad geográfica y el hecho de que la región del Sahel constituya una zona de tránsito, influyen a que el crecimiento del terrorismo islámico en Malí comprenda una amenaza tanto para la seguridad nacional, como para la estabilidad de España. Se avanzará posteriormente con la descripción de herramientas específicas, tanto judiciales como de cooperación que el gobierno español ha buscado apoyar a nivel global y local, con el fin de repeler los desafíos que se generan como consecuencia del terrorismo; especial énfasis se hará, en aquellas medidas que este Estado europeo ha implementado con el propósito de enfrentar particularmente las amenazas que se generan hacia su territorio como resultado de la crisis terrorista en Malí.

A normalização das intervenções militares com propósitos humanitários pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas: os casos da Líbia e da Síria

Este trabalho tem por escopo investigar a normalização das intervenções militares com propósitos humanitários no âmbito do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Para tanto, abordou-se o tema em perspectiva histórica, considerando seu funcionamento e contexto de produção do discurso e focando por fim nas resoluções e projetos vetados de resoluções do Conselho de Segurança para a contenção dos conflitos civis na Líbia, entre fevereiro e outubro de 2011, e na Síria, entre março de 2011 e julho de 2012, no âmbito do fenômeno que ficou conhecido como “Primavera Árabe”.

Sanções econômicas internacionais

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Genocídio: o Conselho de Segurança da ONU nos casos de Ruanda e Darfur

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

O sistema da ONU e as crianças-soldado: convergências e divergências nas abordagens sobre crianças e conflitos armados

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Organization and dynamics of Conselho Municipal de Seguranca Alimentar e Nutricional de Sao Paulo: implications of their participation on the creation of a municipal food and nutrition security policy

Objective This study analyzed the internal functioning, organization and political participation of the local food and nutrition security council and possible implications of their participation on the creation of a municipal food and nutrition security policy in the city of Sao Paulo. Methods This qualitative study was done in three stages: document analysis; observation of meetings and semi-structured interviews with board members considered key informants. The axis of analysis was the political participation of the council, considering its internal aspects, like board members, operating dynamics of political participation of its members and the relationship between these topics and the council's actions for the definition and creation of a food and nutrition security policy. Results The intellectual profile of the board members does not represent the majority of the population, thereby facilitating the omission of actual issues in council discussions. Its strict internal dynamics and the asymmetry of its members generally prevent the active participation of board members and, specifically, discussions about a food and nutrition security policy. The so-called "militant members" have a differentiated, more aggressive participation, with greater mastery of the subject and its topics. Conclusion The board member profiles, internal organization of the council, complexity of the subject and its low insertion in the society distance the council from social needs and lead them to act incipiently with regard to the municipal policies of food and nutrition security.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

EU's sanctions against Russia - The need for clear goals (Comments on the 20-21 March Council). EPC Commentary, 21 March 2014

Over the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has increasingly relied on the use of restrictive measures in its external action. The EU has shown itself to be more open to the possibility of resorting to sanctions outside the United Nations, as well as in cooperation with other international actors, such as the United States. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has blocked and is expected to block any efforts of using this international body to address the crisis in Ukraine so the EU cannot hope for a global sanctions regime and is forced to use a unilateral sanctions regime, in cooperation with some other like-minded players (US, Canada, Australia, Japan).

No more compulsory engagement. The emancipation of German security policy. OSW Commentary no. 57, 2011-07-18

Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Germany’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its decision on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discussion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to cooperation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

The implementation of the Gender Perspective in the EU civilian and military missions: Leadership wanted. Security Policy Brief No. 67, October 2015

Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through which time the EU has grown as a security actor. The keys to produce a change in implementing gender mainstreaming in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well known by member states; the EU and external implementation reports1 are repeated again and again, but real change requires real willingness on the part of member states, and leadership.

Organizing for national security : hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, second session [-Eighty-seventh Congress, first session] ...

Pts. 2-9 have also special subtitles.

Organizing for national security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate.

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