The von Neumann Minimax Theorem and its relatives and a study of externality in on-line auctions

This work consists of a theoretical part and an experimental one. The first part provides a simple treatment of the celebrated von Neumann minimax theorem as formulated by Nikaid6 and Sion. It also discusses its relationships with fundamental theorems of convex analysis. The second part is about externality in sponsored search auctions. It shows that in these auctions, advertisers have externality effects on each other which influence their bidding behavior. It proposes Hal R.Varian model and shows how adding externality to this model will affect its properties. In order to have a better understanding of the interaction among advertisers in on-line auctions, it studies the structure of the Google advertisements networ.k and shows that it is a small-world scale-free network.

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Aterritorialité des atteintes face aux logiques territoriales de protection juridique et problème de l’absence d’homogénéité des législations protectrices (quid des safe harbor priciples)

Au lendemain de l’adoption de la sphère de sécurité (ou Safe Harbor Principles) entre l’Union européenne et les États-Unis, il convient de revenir sur les principes mis de l’avant, après une longue période de discussion, pour encadrer le traitement des renseignements personnels entre ces deux systèmes juridiques. Ce rappel permettra de mieux mesurer la portée de ladite sphère de sécurité face aux logiques territoriales de protection des renseignements personnels et à l’absence d’homogénéité de celles-ci.