Conocimiento del Medio como elemento de integración de la Comunidad Educativa

Resumen basado en el de la publicación.

El veh??culo el??ctrico como herramienta de est??mulo a la innovaci??n y fomento de la inserci??n laboral de los estudiantes de tecnolog??as de la informaci??n

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Professores de Direito

1. Arthur Montenegro; 2. José Gabriel Pinto Coelho; 3. Luís Pinto Coelho; 4. Paulo Merêa; 5. Pedro Soares Martínez.

A mudança na cultura - identidade, interculturalidade e hibridação cultural

Para todos aqueles que, em busca de uma segurança imaginárias, e agarram a grandes frases estabilizadoras, em que avulta a palavra civilização e, sobretudo, «civilização ocidental», ou «euro-americana» e, de algum modo se identificam ou promovem o «orgulho branco», o mundo, na sua história recente, tem-se mostrado muito mais instável e ingrato do que desejariam. Não que tenham abdicado desse projecto de «americanização» do mundo que eufemisticamente designam de «globalização», atrelando a velha Europa ao comboio americano, ou atirando a «nova Europa» contra a «velha Europa» e continuando a emitir pseudópodes, sob a forma de governos-fantoches que ensaiam controlar as zonas mais rentáveis ou geo-estratégicas do mundo nos diferentes continentes e oceanos. Não conseguiram, no entanto, entravar alguns processos que agora não conseguem controlar. A descoberta paralisante de que os seus «primitivos» ou «inferiores», internos ou externos, não só não os admiravam como até mesmo os odiavam, pôs fim ao mito fordiano do «melting pot», o qual supostamente tornaria em «americanos» os imigrantes de todo o mundo que acorriam ao novo Eldorado. Como se viu mais tarde, não havia «melting pot» algum, os afro-americanos, os asiáticos e os judeus não eram «assimilados», os conflitos raciais estalaram mais claramente à saída da Segunda Guerra Mundial.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about

This paper examines the current global scene of distributional disparities within-nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world’s population now live in regions whose median country has a Gini not far from 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the ‘upwards’ side of the ‘Inverted-U’ between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the statistical support there was for the hypothesis that posits that, for whatever reason, ‘things have to get worse before they can get better’). Third, among middle-income countries Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is ‘centrifugal’, and leads to an increased diversity in the shares appropriated by the top 10 and bottom 40 per cent. The other is ‘centripetal’, and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world’s population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes; the other half, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, Globalisation is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich — because the rest ‘follows’ (middle classes able to defend their shares, and workers with ever more precarious jobs in ever more ‘flexible’ labour markets). Therefore, anybody attempting to understand the within-nations disparity of inequality should always be reminded of this basic distributional fact following the example of Clinton’s campaign strategist: by sticking a note on their notice-boards saying “It’s the share of the rich, stupid”.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.

Comparação e validação de vários métodos de mapeamento cortical para o planeamento pré-cirúrgico por Imagem Funcional de Ressonância Magnética

Na análise funcional de imagens do cérebro podem utilizar-se diferentes métodos na identificação de zonas de activação. Tem havido uma evolução desde o método de correlação [19], para outros métodos [9] [14] até o método baseado no modelo linear generalizado que é mais comum ser utilizado hoje e que levou ao pacote de software SPM [15]. Deve-se principalmente à versatilidade que o método tem em realizar testes com diferentes objectivos. Têm sido publicados alguns estudos comparativos. Poucos têm sido quantitativos [20] e quando o são, o número de métodos testados é reduzido[22]. Há muitos estudos comparativos do ponto de vista da estatística envolvida (da matemática) mas que têm em geral apenas ns académicos. Um objectivo deste estudo é comparar os resultados obtidos por diferentes métodos. É de particular interesse averiguar o comportamento de cada método na fronteira do local de activação. As diferenças serão avaliadas numericamente para os seguintes métodos clássicos: t de Student, coeficiente de correlação e o modelo linear generalizado. Três novos métodos são também propostos - o método de picos de Fourier, o método de sobreposição e o método de amplitude. O segundo pode ser aplicado para o melhoramento dos métodos de t de Student, coe ciente de correlação e modelo linear generalizado. Ele pode no entanto, também manter-se como um método de análise independente. A influência exercida em cada método pelos parâmetros pertinentes é também medida. É adoptado um conjunto de dados clínicos que está amplamente estudado e documentado. Desta forma elimina-se a possibilidade dos resultados obtidos serem interpretados como sendo específicos do caso em estudo. Há situações em que a influência do método utilizado na identificação das áreas de activação de imagens funcionais do cérebro é crucial. Tal acontece, por exemplo, quando um tumor desenvolve-se perto de uma zona de activação responsável por uma função importante . Para o cirurgião tornase indispensável avaliar se existe alguma sobreposição. A escolha de um dos métodos disponíveis poderá ter infuência sobre a decisão final. Se o método escolhido for mais conservador, pode verificar-se sobreposição e eliminar-se a possibilidade de cirurgia. Porém, se o método for mais restritivo a decisão final pode ser favorável à cirurgia. Artigos recentes têm suportado a ideia de que a ressonância magnética funcional é de facto muito útil no processo de decisão pré-operatório [12].O segundo objectivo do estudo é então avaliar a sobreposição entre um volume de activação e o volume do tumor. Os programas informáticos de análise funcional disponíveis são variados em vários aspectos: na plataforma em que funcionam (macintosh, linux, windows ou outras), na linguagem em que foram desenvolvidos (e.g. c+motif, c+matlab, matlab, etc.) no tratamento inicial dos dados (antes da aplicação do método de análise), no formato das imagens e no(s) método(s) de análise escolhido(s). Este facto di culta qualquer tentativa de comparação. À partida esta poderá apenas ser qualitativa. Uma comparação quantitativa implicaria a necessidade de ocorrerem três factos: o utilizador tem acesso ao código do programa, sabe programar nas diferentes linguagens e tem licença de utilização de software comercial (e.g. matlab). Sendo assim foi decidido adoptar uma estratégia unificadora. Ou seja, criar um novo programa desenvolvido numa linguagem independente da plataforma, que não utilize software comercial e que permita aplicar (e comparar quantitativamente) diferentes métodos de análise funcional. A linguagem escolhida foi o JAVA. O programa desenvolvido no âmbito desta tese chama-se Cérebro.

Os efeitos do plasma não térmico à pressão atmosférica no desenvolvimento larval e anomalias morfológicas de Drosophila Melanogaster

O plasma não térmico nos cuidados de saúde é um campo emergente que tem as suas raízes na ciência de plasmas. Este tipo de investigação tem crescido rapidamente e é agora objeto de um amplo esforço de pesquisa interdisciplinar envolvendo a medicina, a biologia, a física, a química e a engenharia. Têm sido feitos vários trabalhos de modo a elucidar quais as interações das espécies produzidas pelo plasma com os sistemas vivos. É evidente que o mecanismo da interação do plasma com os sistemas vivos é complexo, em parte devido à complexidade do plasma mas principalmente devido à enorme complexidade da biologia. O principal objetivo desta dissertação foi observar os efeitos do plasma não térmico à pressão atmosférica (PNTPAs) no desenvolvimento larval e anomalias morfológicas de Drosophila melanogaster. Para o efeito, foram expostas e analisadas fenotipicamente 2.566 larvas após exposição, dos diferentes estádios (1.º, 2.º e 3.º) de desenvolvimento. Os testes foram realizados com aplicações de plasma com e sem ultra violeta, em duas linhas diferentes de Drosophila; uma linha selvagem preparada por nós e uma linha laboratorial. A análise fenotípica revelou que após exposição as larvas apresentavam alterações no fenótipo e no comportamento que não foram observadas no controlo, nomeadamente anomalias nas mudas, traqueias partidas, formação de massas melanóticas que podiam persistir até à fase adulta, excesso de gotículas lipídicas, atraso no desenvolvimento, comportamento de não alimentação e formação de pupa imatura que levava à formação de pupa precoce e morte pupal. Na fase pupal, as anomalias mais comuns estavam relacionadas com a forma do pupário (causadas pela pipação prematura), apresentando um desenvolvimento aberrante. Entre os vários fenótipos observados, o mais significativo foi o criptocefálico (alterações na eversão dos discos imaginais) levando à morte pupal. Nos adultos, as principais anomalias morfológicas foram registadas na formação e segmentação das patas, na forma e padrão das nervuras das asas e na formação do tórax. A similaridade destes resultados com trabalhos publicados relacionados com a hormona esteróide ecdisona indicam que provavelmente o PNTPA poderá ter influenciado a biossíntese e/ou a regulação da ecdisona, a principal hormona que regula o desenvolvimento e a metamorfose em Drosophila.

O argumento dos contrários e a hipótese sobre a imortalidade no Fédon de Platão

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior

Lógos e noûs no Fedro de Platão

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior

Cuatro fuentes de "desindustrialización" y un nuevo concepto del "síndrome holandés"

Incluye Bibliografía