872 resultados para Moral hazard
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Este trabajo ha sido previamente presentado en las XVII Jornadas Luso-Espanholas de Gestao Científica, celebradas en Evora (Portugal) en febrero de 2006.
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[EN] Purpose. This work aims to present, from the company viewpoint, a structured account of management proposals and practices directed toward improving the intensity and effectiveness of continuous management training (CMT). Design/methodology/approach. The article takes as its main theoretical referents the Theory of Human Capital, the Resource-Based Vision and the contributions made via the new institutional economy with regard to the problems of information asymmetry between companies, employees and training providers and completes the proposals that derive from this theoretical approach. To do this, experience-based contributions are collected from a selection of company training and HR managers from twelve Basque companies characterised by their strong investment in management training. The methodology used was qualitative and obtained by different qualitative techniques: Focus Groups, Nominal Groups and the Delphi Method, which make up the so-called Hybrid Delphi. Findings and implications. The proposals are aimed at the main agents in training activity: training providers, associations and public agents engaged in management training and, particularly, companies themselves. The initiatives seek above all to increase training market transparency, to improve mutual commitments between companies and managers, and to link training and development with culture and strategic management, so that firms make optimal investment in management training. Originality/value. The methodology used is original, and the contributions are consistent with the theory, have a proven practical utility, and are presented in a hierarchy, which facilitates decision making.
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Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.
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Introduction: Copayments for prescriptions are associated with decreased adherence to medicines resulting in increased health service utilisation, morbidity and mortality. In October 2010 a 50c copayment per prescription item was introduced on the General Medical Services (GMS) scheme in Ireland, the national public health insurance programme for low-income and older people. The copayment was increased to €1.50 per prescription item in January 2013. To date, the impact of these copayments on adherence to prescription medicines on the GMS scheme has not been assessed. Given that the GMS population comprises more than 40% of the Irish population, this presents an important public health problem. The aim of this thesis was to assess the impact of two prescription copayments, 50c and €1.50, on adherence to medicines.Methods: In Chapter 2 the published literature was systematically reviewed with meta-analysis to a) develop evidence on cost-sharing for prescriptions and adherence to medicines and b) develop evidence for an alternative policy option; removal of copayments. The core research question of this thesis was addressed by a large before and after longitudinal study, with comparator group, using the national pharmacy claims database. New users of essential and less-essential medicines were included in the study with sample sizes ranging from 7,007 to 136,111 individuals in different medication groups. Segmented regression was used with generalised estimating equations to allow for correlations between repeated monthly measurements of adherence. A qualitative study involving 24 individuals was conducted to assess patient attitudes towards the 50c copayment policy. The qualitative and quantitative findings were integrated in the discussion chapter of the thesis. The vast majority of the literature on this topic area is generated in North America, therefore a test of generalisability was carried out in Chapter 5 by comparing the impact of two similar copayment interventions on adherence, one in the U.S. and one in Ireland. The method used to measure adherence in Chapters 3 and 5 was validated in Chapter 6. Results: The systematic review with meta-analysis demonstrated an 11% (95% CI 1.09 to 1.14) increased odds of non-adherence when publicly insured populations were exposed to copayments. The second systematic review found moderate but variable improvements in adherence after removal/reduction of copayments in a general population. The core paper of this thesis found that both the 50c and €1.50 copayments on the GMS scheme were associated with larger reductions in adherence to less-essential medicines than essential medicines directly after the implementation of policies. An important exception to this pattern was observed; adherence to anti-depressant medications declined by a larger extent than adherence to other essential medicines after both copayments. The cross country comparison indicated that North American evidence on cost-sharing for prescriptions is not automatically generalisable to the Irish setting. Irish patients had greater immediate decreases of -5.3% (95% CI -6.9 to -3.7) and -2.8% (95% CI -4.9 to -0.7) in adherence to anti-hypertensives and anti-hyperlipidaemic medicines, respectively, directly after the policy changes, relative to their U.S. counterparts. In the long term, however, the U.S. and Irish populations had similar behaviours. The concordance study highlighted the possibility of a measurement bias occurring for the measurement of adherence to non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs in Chapter 3. Conclusions: This thesis has presented two reviews of international cost-sharing policies, an assessment of the generalisability of international evidence and both qualitative and quantitative examinations of cost-sharing policies for prescription medicines on the GMS scheme in Ireland. It was found that the introduction of a 50c copayment and its subsequent increase to €1.50 on the GMS scheme had a larger impact on adherence to less-essential medicines relative to essential medicines, with the exception of anti-depressant medications. This is in line with policy objectives to reduce moral hazard and is therefore demonstrative of the value of such policies. There are however some caveats. The copayment now stands at €2.50 per prescription item. The impact of this increase in copayment has yet to be assessed which is an obvious point for future research. Careful monitoring for adverse effects in socio-economically disadvantaged groups within the GMS population is also warranted. International evidence can be applied to the Irish setting to aid in future decision making in this area, but not without placing it in the local context first. Patients accepted the introduction of the 50c charge, however did voice concerns over a rising price. The challenge for policymakers is to find the ‘optimal copayment’ – whereby moral hazard is decreased, but access to essential chronic disease medicines that provide advantages at the population level is not deterred. This evidence presented in this thesis will be utilisable for future policy-making in Ireland.
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Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We model trust as mutual, reciprocal altruism between pairs of coworkers and show how it induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. We conclude by discussing how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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I study the institution of avoiding hiring one’s own Ph.D. graduates for assistant professorships. I argue that this institution is necessary to create better incentives for researchers to incorporate new information in studies, facilitating the convergence to asymptotic learning of the studied fundamentals.
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This paper studies disinflationary shocks in a non-linear New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and moral hazard in the labor markets. Our focus is on understanding the wage formation process as well as welfare costs of disinflations in the presence of such labor market frictions.
The presence of imperfect information in labor markets imposes a lower bound on worker surplus that varies endogenously. Consequently equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no shirking condition is binding or not. We also evaluate both regimes from a welfare perspective when the economy is subject to a perfectly credible disinflationary shock.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2015
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This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.
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La notion d’aléa moral est le gold standard de la politique de la demande en santé et justifie les politiques de partage des coûts visant à faire payer le patient. Sous l’effet des critiques théoriques dont elle a fait l’objet, la notion d’aléa moral a été progressivement vidée de son ambition originelle pour en appeler à la moralisation du comportement du patient. Elle a débouché sur une segmentation des patients distinguant ceux qui doivent être mis à contribution financière au non de la responsabilité individuelle et ceux qui doivent être protégés de cette responsabilisation. Ce texte montre que la constitution d’ordres de priorité en matière de santé est peu compatible avec l’approche en termes d’aléa moral. Les ordres de priorité ne répondent pas à une conception instrumentale. Ils reposent sur des valeurs sociétales partagées et des préférences éthiques qui sont en opposition avec la conception standard de la responsabilité et la promotion de l’individualisme.
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Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.
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Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.
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I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.
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Metodología para la estimación de cápitas de planes de salud. Se propone un método de cuantificación de insumos a emplear, la estimación de costos indirectos asociados a las intervenciones y un método de anualización para los costos fijos que generalmente trascienden en su vida útil al período de duración de una cápita. Finalmente, a través de un ejercicio práctico de estimación de la cápita del Componente de Salud del Programa Oportunidades de México se ilustra la aplicación del desarrollo metodológico expuesto en la parte inicial.