Turing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Intellectual Property, Public Health, and Access to Essential Medicines

A recent controversy in the United States over drug pricing by Turing Pharmaceuticals AG has raised larger issues in respect of intellectual property, access to medicines, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In August 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals AG – a private biopharmaceutical company with offices in New York, the United States, and Zug, Switzerland - acquired the exclusive marketing rights to Daraprim in the United States from Impax Laboratories Incorporated. Martin Shkreli, Turing’s Founder and Chief Executive Officer, maintained: “The acquisition of Daraprim and our toxoplasmosis research program are significant steps along Turing’s path of bringing novel medications to patients with serious disorders, some of whom often go undiagnosed and untreated.” He emphasised: “We intend to invest in the development of new drug candidates that we hope will yield an even better clinical profile, and also plan to launch an educational effort to help raise awareness and improve diagnosis for patients with toxoplasmosis.” In September 2015, there was much public controversy over the decision of Martin Shkreli to raise the price of a 62 year old drug, Daraprim, from $US13.50 to $US750 a pill. The drug is particularly useful in respect to the treatment and prevention of malaria, and in the treatment of infections in individuals with HIV/AIDS. Daraprim is listed on the World Health Organization’s (WHO) List of Essential Medicines. In the face of much criticism, Martin Shkreli has said that he will reduce the price of Daraprim. He observed: “We've agreed to lower the price on Daraprim to a point that is more affordable and is able to allow the company to make a profit, but a very small profit.” He maintained: “We think these changes will be welcomed.” However, he has been vague and ambiguous about the nature of the commitment. Notably, the lobby group, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhARMA), disassociated itself from the claims of Turing Pharmaceuticals. The group said: “PhRMA members have a long history of drug discovery and innovation that has led to increased longevity and improved lives for millions of patients.” The group noted: “Turing Pharmaceutical is not a member of PhRMA and we do not embrace either their recent actions or the conduct of their CEO.” The biotechnology peak body Biotechnology Industry Organization also sought to distance itself from Turing Pharmaceuticals. A hot topic: United States political debate about access to affordable medicines This controversy over Daraprim is unusual – given the age of drug concerned. Daraprim is not subject to patent protection. Nonetheless, there remains a monopoly in respect of the marketplace. Drug pricing is not an isolated problem. There have been many concerns about drug pricing – particularly in respect of essential medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. This recent controversy is part of a larger debate about access to affordable medicines. The dispute raises larger issues about healthcare, consumer rights, competition policy, and trade. The Daraprim controversy has provided impetus for law reform in the US. US Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton commented: “Price gouging like this in this specialty drug market is outrageous.” In response to her comments, the Nasdaq Biotechnology Index fell sharply. Hillary Clinton has announced a prescription drug reform plan to protect consumers and promote innovation – while putting an end to profiteering. On her campaign site, she has emphasised that “affordable healthcare is a basic human right.” Her rival progressive candidate, Bernie Sanders, was also concerned about the price hike. He wrote a letter to Martin Shkreli, complaining about the price increase for the drug Daraprim. Sanders said: “The enormous, overnight price increase for Daraprim is just the latest in a long list of skyrocketing price increases for certain critical medications.” He has pushed for reforms to intellectual property to make medicines affordable. The TPP and intellectual property The Daraprim controversy and political debate raises further issues about the design of the TPP. The dispute highlights the dangers of extending the rights of pharmaceutical drug companies under intellectual property, investor-state dispute settlement, and drug administration. Recently, the civil society group Knowledge Ecology International published a leaked draft of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the TPP. Knowledge Ecology International Director, James Love, was concerned the text revealed that the US “continues to be the most aggressive supporter of expanded intellectual property rights for drug companies.” He was concerned that “the proposals contained in the TPP will harm consumers and in some cases block innovation.” James Love feared: “In countless ways, the Obama Administration has sought to expand and extend drug monopolies and raise drug prices.” He maintained: “The astonishing collection of proposals pandering to big drug companies make more difficult the task of ensuring access to drugs for the treatment of cancer and other diseases and conditions.” Love called for a different approach to intellectual property and trade: “Rather than focusing on more intellectual property rights for drug companies, and a death-inducing spiral of higher prices and access barriers, the trade agreement could seek new norms to expand the funding of medical research and development (R&D) as a public good, an area where the US has an admirable track record, such as the public funding of research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other federal agencies.” In addition, there has been much concern about the Investment Chapter of the TPP. The investor-state dispute settlement regime would enable foreign investors to challenge government policy making, which affected their investments. In the context of healthcare, there is a worry that pharmaceutical drug companies will deploy their investor rights to challenge public health measures – such as, for instance, initiatives to curb drug pricing and profiteering. Such concerns are not merely theoretical. Eli Lilly has brought an investor action against the Canadian Government over the rejection of its drug patents under the investor-state dispute settlement regime of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Health Annex to the TPP also raises worries that pharmaceutical drug companies will able to object to regulatory procedures in respect of healthcare. It is disappointing that the TPP – in the leaks that we have seen – has only limited recognition of the importance of access to essential medicines. There is a need to ensure that there are proper safeguards to provide access to essential medicines – particularly in respect of HIV/AIDs, malaria, and tuberculosis. Moreover, there must be protection against drug profiteering and price gouging in any trade agreement. There should be strong measures against the abuse of intellectual property rights. The dispute over Turing Pharmaceuticals AG and Daraprim is an important cautionary warning in respect of some of the dangers present in the secret negotiations in respect of the TPP. There is a need to preserve consumer rights, competition policy, and public health in trade negotiations over an agreement covering the Pacific Rim.

Now the real international fight begins for the Trans-Pacific Partnership

In Atlanta, the trade ministers of a dozen countries across the Pacific Rim announced that they had successfully reached a concluded agreement upon the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The debate over the TPP will now play out in legislatures across the Pacific Rim, where sentiment towards the deal is much more mixed. The ministers insisted: “After more than five years of intensive negotiations, we have come to an agreement that will support jobs, drive sustainable growth, foster inclusive development, and promote innovation across the Asia-Pacific region … The agreement achieves the goal we set forth of an ambitious, comprehensive, high standard and balanced agreement that will benefit our nation’s citizens … We expect this historic agreement to promote economic growth, support higher-paying jobs; enhance innovation, productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in our countries; and to promote transparency, good governance, and strong labor and environmental protections.” But there has been fierce criticism of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, because of both its secrecy and its substance. Nobel Laureate Professor Joseph Stiglitz has warned that the agreement is not about free trade, but about the protection of corporate monopolies. The intellectual property chapter provides for longer and stronger protection of intellectual property rights. The investment chapter provides foreign investors with the power to challenge governments under an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime. The environment chapter is weak and toothless, and seems to be little more than an exercise in greenwashing. The health annex — and many other parts of the agreement — strengthen the power of pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology developers. The text on state-owned enterprises raises concerns about public ownership of postal services, broadcasters and national broadband services.

Dominating search: Google before the law

For many, particularly in the Anglophone world and Western Europe, it may be obvious that Google has a monopoly over online search and advertising and that this is an undesirable state of affairs, due to Google's ability to mediate information flows online. The baffling question may be why governments and regulators are doing little to nothing about this situation, given the increasingly pivotal importance of the internet and free flowing communications in our lives. However, the law concerning monopolies, namely antitrust or competition law, works in what may be seen as a less intuitive way by the general public. Monopolies themselves are not illegal. Conduct that is unlawful, i.e. abuses of that market power, is defined by a complex set of rules and revolves principally around economic harm suffered due to anticompetitive behavior. However the effect of information monopolies over search, such as Google’s, is more than just economic, yet competition law does not address this. Furthermore, Google’s collection and analysis of user data and its portfolio of related services make it difficult for others to compete. Such a situation may also explain why Google’s established search rivals, Bing and Yahoo, have not managed to provide services that are as effective or popular as Google’s own (on this issue see also the texts by Dirk Lewandowski and Astrid Mager in this reader). Users, however, are not entirely powerless. Google's business model rests, at least partially, on them – especially the data collected about them. If they stop using Google, then Google is nothing.

Centralização de capital na saúde e participação do BNDES no contexto da política de desenvolvimento

O trabalho desenvolvido tem por objeto de estudo a participação do BNDES no processo de centralização de capital na área da saúde brasileira. Por meio da análise da política governamental para o setor produtivo da saúde, com enfoque na intervenção do BNDES, bem como do acompanhamento da dinâmica dos subsistemas que compõe o Complexo Econômico-Industrial da Saúde (CEIS), evidenciou-se a tendência às fusões e aquisições na área. O referido processo foi compreendido no contexto do desenvolvimento econômico brasileiro articulado à consolidação do capitalismo contemporâneo. Dessa forma, nos detivemos à discussão dos pressupostos da acumulação capitalista e à correlação estabelecida com o processo de centralização de capital. Sendo realizada articulação com a mercantilização da saúde. Abordamos, ainda, o debate sobre as características da política de desenvolvimento no país e sua articulação com as requisições do modo de produção capitalista. E, ainda apresentadas as principais políticas governamentais atuais que abrangem o CEIS e análise das mesmas. Compreendemos que o complexo da saúde move-se na direção estabelecida pela dinâmica capitalista atual, que pressupõe a financeirização do capital, articulada à formação de monopólios, com participação do Estado, por meio de abertura econômica, de incentivos e aplicação de recursos do fundo público.

A strategic review of electricity systems models

Electricity systems models are software tools used to manage electricity demand and the electricity systems, to trade electricity and for generation expansion planning purposes. Various portfolios and scenarios are modelled in order to compare the effects of decision making in policy and on business development plans in electricity systems so as to best advise governments and industry on the least cost economic and environmental approach to electricity supply, while maintaining a secure supply of sufficient quality electricity. The modelling techniques developed to study vertically integrated state monopolies are now applied in liberalised markets where the issues and constraints are more complex. This paper reviews the changing role of electricity systems modelling in a strategic manner, focussing on the modelling response to key developments, the move away from monopoly towards liberalised market regimes and the increasing complexity brought about by policy targets for renewable energy and emissions. The paper provides an overview of electricity systems modelling techniques, discusses a number of key proprietary electricity systems models used in the USA and Europe and provides an information resource to the electricity analyst not currently readily available in the literature on the choice of model to investigate different aspects of the electricity system.

Intelligent demand response electric water heating to integrate wind power in Ireland

Dwindling fossil fuel resources and pressures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will result in a more diverse range of generation portfolios for future electricity systems. Irrespective of the portfolio mix the overarching requirement for all electricity suppliers and system operators is that supply instantaneously meets demand and that robust operating standards are maintained to ensure a consistent supply of high quality electricity to end-users. Therefore all electricity market participants will ultimately need to use a variety of tools to balance the power system. Thus the role of demand side management (DSM) with energy storage will be paramount to integrate future diverse generation portfolios. Electric water heating (EWH) has been studied previously, particularly at the domestic level to provide load control, peak shave and to benefit end-users financially with lower bills, particularly in vertically integrated monopolies. In this paper, a continuous Direct Load Control (DLC) EWH algorithm is applied in a liberalized market environment using actual historical electricity system and market data to examine the potential energy savings, cost reductions and electricity system operational improvements.

Integrating wind power using intelligent electric water heating

Dwindling fossil fuel resources and pressures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will result in a more diverse range of generation portfolios for future electricity systems. Irrespective of the portfolio mix the overarching requirement for all electricity suppliers and system operators is to instantaneously meet demand, to operate to standards and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore all electricity market participants will ultimately need to use a variety of tools to balance the power system. Thus the role of demand side management with energy storage will be paramount to integrate future diverse generation portfolios. Electric water heating has been studied previously, particularly at the domestic level to provide load control, peak shave and to bene?t end-users ?nancially with lower bills, particularly in vertically integrated monopolies. In this paper a number of continuous direct load control demand response based electric water heating algorithms are modelled to test the effectiveness of wholesale electricity market signals to study the system bene?ts. The results are compared and contrasted to determine which control algorithm showed the best potential for energy savings, system marginal price savings and wind integration.

Old conflicts, new rivals? Airline competition in the European market

Christoph Franz of Lufthansa recently identified Ryanair, easyJet, Air Berlin and Emirates as the company’s main competitors – gone are the days when it could benchmark itself against BA or Air France-KLM! This paper probes behind the headlines to assess the extent to which different airlines are in competition, using evidence from the UK and mainland European markets. The issue of route versus network competition is addressed. Many regulators have put an emphasis on the former whereas the latter, although less obvious, can be more relevant. For example, BA and American will cease to compete between London and Dallas Fort Worth if their alliance obtains anti-trust immunity but 80% of the passengers on this route are connecting at one or both ends and hence arguably belong to different markets (e.g. London-San Francisco, Zurich-Dallas, Edinburgh-New Orleans) which may be highly contested. The remaining 20% of local traffic is actually insufficient to support a single point to point service in its own right. Estimates are made of the seat capacity major airlines are offering to the local market as distinct from feeding other routes. On a sector such as Manchester–Amsterdam, 60% of KLM’s passengers are transferring at Schiphol as against only 1% of bmibaby’s. Thus although KLM operates 5 flights and 630 seats per day against bmibaby’s 2 flights and 298 seats, in the point to point market bmibaby offers more seats than KLM. The growth of the Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) means that competition increasingly needs to be viewed on city pair markets (e.g. London-Rome) rather than airport pair markets (e.g. Heathrow-Fiumicino). As the stronger LCCs drive out weaker rivals and mainline carriers retrench to their major hubs, some markets now have fewer direct options than existed prior to the low cost boom. Timings and frequencies are considered, in particular the extent to which services are a true alternative especially for business travellers. LCCs typically offer lower frequencies and more unsociable timings (e.g. late evening arrivals at remote airports) as they are more focused on providing the cheapest service rather than the most convenient schedule. Interesting findings on ‘monopoly’ services are presented (including alliances) - certain airlines have many more of these than others. Lufthansa has a significant number of sectors to itself whereas at the other extreme British Airways has direct competition on almost every route in its network. Ryanair and flybe have a higher proportion of monopoly routes than easyJet or Air Berlin. In the domestic US market it has become apparent since deregulation that better financial returns can come from dominating a large number of smaller markets rather than being heavily exposed in the major markets - which are hotly fought over. Regional niches that appear too thin for Ryanair to serve (with its all 189 seat 737-800 fleet) are identified. Fare comparisons in contrasting markets provide some insights to marketing and pricing strategies. Data sources used include OAG (schedules and capacity), AEA (traditional European airlines traffic by region), the UK CAA (airport, airline and route traffic plus survey information of passenger types) and ICAO (international route traffic and capacity by carrier). It is concluded that airlines often have different competitors depending on the context but in surprisingly many cases there are actually few or no direct substitutes. The competitive process set in train by deregulation of European air services in the 1990s is leading back to one of natural monopolies and oblique alternatives. It is the names of the main participants that have changed however!

What’s so Special About Cyberspace ? Reflections on Elkin-Koren And Salzberger

Un résumé en français est également disponible.

Les politiques et pratiques commerciales québécoises en matière de boissons alcooliques dans le contexte du droit commercial international

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en Droit (LL.M.)"

What’s so Special About Cyberspace Reflections on Elkin-Koren And Salzberger

Dans cet article, l’auteur Ejan Mackaay présente les caractéristiques fondamentales du cyberespace et analyse les relations économiques et juridiques entre les acteurs du marché virtuel de l’Internet. Cette analyse s'inscrit en marge des travaux de Niva Elkin-Koren et Eli Salzberger, dont elle suit le plan. D'une part, il y est précisé que le marché virtuel de l’Internet remet en question l’analyse classique des interactions entre les acteurs économiques. La nouvelle analyse néo-institutionnel présente un cadre analytique qui relève plus adéquatement les relations complexes entre les acteurs économiques du marché virtuel que les théories économiques classiques. Cette nouvelle approche se fonde sur le concept que les acteurs économiques utilisent les ressources afin d’être intégrés au sein des institutions les plus actives et efficaces. D'autre part, il est fait mention que le cyberespace présente plusieurs caractéristiques d’un marché économique. Toutefois, étant virtuel, le cyberespace ne présente pas les mêmes limites qu’un marché physique. En effet, dans ce dernier, certaines limites physiques imposent diverses règles de comportement. Le législateur doit donc prendre conscience de l’absence de telles limites et des normes qu’elles imposaient afin de légiférer adéquatement sur les échanges dans le cyberespace. Ensuite, afin d’illustrer les divergences entre les marchés physiques et virtuels, une analyse est faite au regard des principaux échecs de marchés, soit l’établissement d’un monopole, l’accès aux biens publics, les informations imparfaites et les externalités négatives. Un monopole est un échec de marché qui restreint considérablement la compétition, peut être accrut par l’effet boule de neige et, s’il n’est pas contrôlé, peut mener à un effet de blocage ou d’exclusion de certains acteurs. Le second échec analysé est l’accès aux biens publics. Dans le cyberespace, le principal bien public est l’information qui peut être échangée entre les utilisateurs. Toutefois, certaines règles de droits d’auteur et de propriété intellectuelle peuvent considérablement limiter l’accès à ce bien. L’information incomplète des acteurs économiques constitue un autre échec de marché, mais le cyberespace offre plusieurs moyens d’accéder à l’information pertinente aux transactions éclairées. Enfin, les externalités négatives peuvent généralement être considérées comme des effets secondaires des échanges commerciaux. Toutefois il est souligné que ces dernières ont un effet très limité dans le cyberespace, étant donné le plus grand nombre d’options de retrait et la facilité accrue de l’exercer. Enfin, il est rappelé que le commerce électronique et le cyberespace remettent en questions toutes les théories économiques et politiques traditionnelles et offrent une perspective nouvelle sur le phénomène de la formation des normes.

Le jeu en ligne : une analyse comparative du statut juridique du jeu en ligne et des cadres juridiques adoptés pour règlementer et gérer ses risques.

Le jeu a toujours été perçu comme un vice, responsable de nombreux troubles sociaux. Par conséquent, les gouvernements ont adopté divers cadres juridiques pour contrôler et gérer ses conséquences négatives. Malgré qu'il soit omniprésent, le jeu en ligne est illégal au Canada, aux États Unis et dans plusieurs autres pays. La règlementation du jeu en ligne et la gestion de ses troubles sociaux présente un plus grand défi pour les gouvernements, particulièrement en raison de sa nature technologique et extraterritoriale. Ce mémoire identifiera les risques et conséquences liés au jeu, en particulier les problèmes de jeu, ainsi que les cadres juridiques adoptés pour les règlementer et minimiser. Nous examinerons le statut juridique du jeu en ligne dans différentes juridictions, dont le Canada, les États Unis, le Royaume-Uni et ailleurs dans l'Union européenne. Ces cadres juridiques comprennent l'interdiction du jeu en ligne aux États Unis, la légalisation, l’octroi de licences et taxation du jeu en ligne au Royaume Uni et les cadres juridiques employés au Canada et ailleurs, offrant du jeu en ligne exclusivement par l’entremise de monopoles d'état pour contrôler sa disponibilité et minimiser ses conséquences néfastes. Nous tirerons des conclusions quant à l'efficacité relative des différents cadres juridiques adoptées pour règlementer le jeu en ligne.

Distributed conditional computation

L'objectif de cette thèse est de présenter différentes applications du programme de recherche de calcul conditionnel distribué. On espère que ces applications, ainsi que la théorie présentée ici, mènera à une solution générale du problème d'intelligence artificielle, en particulier en ce qui a trait à la nécessité d'efficience. La vision du calcul conditionnel distribué consiste à accélérer l'évaluation et l'entraînement de modèles profonds, ce qui est très différent de l'objectif usuel d'améliorer sa capacité de généralisation et d'optimisation. Le travail présenté ici a des liens étroits avec les modèles de type mélange d'experts. Dans le chapitre 2, nous présentons un nouvel algorithme d'apprentissage profond qui utilise une forme simple d'apprentissage par renforcement sur un modèle d'arbre de décisions à base de réseau de neurones. Nous démontrons la nécessité d'une contrainte d'équilibre pour maintenir la distribution d'exemples aux experts uniforme et empêcher les monopoles. Pour rendre le calcul efficient, l'entrainement et l'évaluation sont contraints à être éparse en utilisant un routeur échantillonnant des experts d'une distribution multinomiale étant donné un exemple. Dans le chapitre 3, nous présentons un nouveau modèle profond constitué d'une représentation éparse divisée en segments d'experts. Un modèle de langue à base de réseau de neurones est construit à partir des transformations éparses entre ces segments. L'opération éparse par bloc est implémentée pour utilisation sur des cartes graphiques. Sa vitesse est comparée à deux opérations denses du même calibre pour démontrer le gain réel de calcul qui peut être obtenu. Un modèle profond utilisant des opérations éparses contrôlées par un routeur distinct des experts est entraîné sur un ensemble de données d'un milliard de mots. Un nouvel algorithme de partitionnement de données est appliqué sur un ensemble de mots pour hiérarchiser la couche de sortie d'un modèle de langage, la rendant ainsi beaucoup plus efficiente. Le travail présenté dans cette thèse est au centre de la vision de calcul conditionnel distribué émis par Yoshua Bengio. Elle tente d'appliquer la recherche dans le domaine des mélanges d'experts aux modèles profonds pour améliorer leur vitesse ainsi que leur capacité d'optimisation. Nous croyons que la théorie et les expériences de cette thèse sont une étape importante sur la voie du calcul conditionnel distribué car elle cadre bien le problème, surtout en ce qui concerne la compétitivité des systèmes d'experts.

Vertikale Integrationsstrukturen kommunaler Verkehrsunternehmen : eine transaktionskostentheoretische Evaluation

Der Markt für öffentlichen Personennahverkehr (ÖPNV) wird liberalisiert, in die gewachsenen Monopolstrukturen werden Marktmechanismen implementiert. Ziel der neuen ordnungspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen ist die Steigerung der Effizienz des defizitären Verkehrsbereichs, der von kommunalen Verkehrsunternehmen dominiert wird. Diese erbringen als Quasi-Monopolisten traditionell die Verkehrsdurchführung, regelmäßig anfallende Defizite werden von der öffentlichen Hand ausgeglichen. Bedingt durch ihre Leistungsstrukturen sind kommunale Verkehrsunternehmen in einem Wettbewerbsmarkt kaum konkurrenzfähig. Charakteristisch für diesen Unternehmenstyp ist der hohe Grad an vertikal integrierten Wertschöpfungsstufen. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Branchen erbringen kommunale Verkehrsunternehmen die wesentlichen Teile der gesamten ÖPNV-Wertschöpfungskette innerhalb der eigenen Unternehmensgrenzen. An dem hohen vertikalen Integrationsgrad setzt die Untersuchung an. Mit dem von Williamson entwickelten Instrumentarium der Transaktionskostentheorie werden die Leistungsbereiche einer transaktionskostentheoretischen Bewertung unterzogen. Als Alternativen zum institutionellen Arrangement der vertikalen Integration – das als Hierarchie bezeichnet wird – stehen die Arrangements Kooperation und Markt zur Verfügung. Die Bewertung zeigt, welche Leistungsbereiche unter transaktionskostentheoretischen Gesichtspunkten hierarchisch institutionalisiert werden sollten und welche alternativ erbracht werden können. Aus den Ergebnissen werden Strategieempfehlungen abgeleitet, die als Arbeitshypothesen einer anschließenden empirischen Überprüfung unterzogen werden. Die befragten ÖPNV-Experten bewerten somit die Marktfähigkeit der Strategieempfehlungen. Die Untersuchungsergebnisse werden für die Erarbeitung eines alternativen Koordinierungsarrangements für kommunale Verkehrsunternehmen herangezogen. Das Modell basiert auf der Grundlage Strategischer Netzwerke. Kommunale Verkehrsunternehmen nehmen in dem Modell die Rolle des Nukleus ein, der eine Vielzahl von Netzwerkpartnern steuert und für die Erbringung der ÖPNV-Leistungen mit diesen kooperiert.

El contrato de concesión de servicio público. las nuevas técnicas de generación y explotación de infraestructura y las demás aplicaciones que surgen como consecuencia del cambio institucional.

Se trata de una nueva actualización del marco económico de la concesión de servicio público, resaltando principalmente las nuevas aplicaciones que este contrato puede tener en un marco del servicio público liberalizado. De esta manera puede vislumbrarse un nuevo uso generalizado en el control del oportunismo político en materia del régimen tarifario lo que lo erige en un valido instrumento para la preservación de la inversión extarnjera. Del mismo modo puede emplearse como un instrumento para la generación de infraestructura en materia de servicios públicos y finalmente como un instrumento para la regulación alterna de monopolios naturales.