Determinants of differential pricing of equity classes in the Brazilian equity market

We examine the differential pricing of equity classes between voting and non-voting shares in Brazilian listed companies with particular emphasis on privatized companies, and we discuss the role of majority control, liquidity, and governance issues that may influence these differentials over time. We include a brief discussion on the Brazilian corporate law system, its impact on controlling and minority shareholders, and the characteristics of the Brazilian privatization process, before proceeding to the econometric analysis. We find empirical evidence to support that liquidity is a major component for determining this differential pricing over time. Other variables, such as the ratio of non-voting equity to total equity, type of majority control, and changes in regulation signal the high level of agency costs between majority controllers and minority shareholders in explaining the differential pricing of equity classes.

Efeitos da cultura organizacional no desenvolvimento dos modelos de governança corporativa

Corporate governance can be understood like a management model that aims to build a good relationship between managers, controllers, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Implement corporate governance in an organization often requires a cultural change. Corporate governance as an organizational model needs reinforce cultural behaviors of its members so as which support the principles and values that increment the relationship between the organization and its stakeholders. The process of corporate structuring of an organization is largely determined by culture. Being the culture a set of organizational values that distinguishes one organization of other, it is natural that these organizations find adjustment difficulties during the implementation of international values. The organizations in the context of corporate governance can t think and act over themselves, but instead must think and take action on a set of actors who are strongly linked with them in order to achieve the same goals and objectives planned.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

Shareholder protection and stock market development

The dissertation contains five parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter starts from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial development literature. The commonly used methods in these cross-sectional analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments. Hence, the model uncertainty becomes a salient problem. The Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. The second Chapter looks into the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance regime on entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current literature focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur's control. As a result, the entrepreneur trade-offs the costs of monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection improves. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using panel data and GMM-sys estimator. The third Chapter investigates the corporate law and corporate governance reform in China. The corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the interests of stakeholders, which is inefficient. The Chapter combines the recent development of theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory and the property rights theory, to solve such problem. The enlightened shareholder value, which emphasizes on the long term valuation of the firm, should be adopted as objectives of listed firms. In addition, a move from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the default regime, is proposed.

Deleghe di voto e acquisto del controllo nelle societa' quotate

A fronte dal recepimento del direttiva SHR nel nostro ordinamento, realizzato dal d.lgs. 27/2010, il presente lavoro si propone anzitutto di analizzare l'attuale ruolo della delega di voto - sollecitata e non - per poi verificare quale sia l'interesse concretamente sotteso a un voto così esercitato, con particolare attenzione alla sollecitazione di deleghe di voto, oggi destinata espressamente (per la prevalente dottrina) a consentire al promotore il perseguimento di interessi propri. Le considerazioni riguardo all'interesse concretamente sotteso al voto esercitato per delega portano a vagliarne la rilevanza ai fini della nozione di controllo, ex art. 2359 c.c., la quale esclude espressamente dai voti rilevanti esclusivamente quelli esercitati "per conto terzi", e non, dunque, anche quelli esercitati nell'interesse proprio da un soggetto non titolare della partecipazione. Viene quindi affrontata la principale critica ad un controllo raggiunto per tale via e, più in generale, attraverso una delle varie forme di dissociazione tra titolarità della partecipazione e legittimazione all'esercizio del voto ad essa relativo, ovvero la apparente mancanza di stabilità. Considerando tuttavia che ogni ipotesi di controllo c.d. di fatto per definizione non gode di stabilità se non si scelga di ammettere una valutazione di tale requisito necessariamente prognostica ed ex ante, si giunge alla conclusione che la fattispecie di un controllo acquisito tramite sollecitazione di deleghe si distingue da altre ipotesi di controllo di fatto esclusivamente per la maggiore difficoltà dell'accertamento in fatto del requisito della stabilità. Si affronta infine la possibilità di garantire il diritto di exit (ovvero una tutela risarcitoria) del socio di minoranza che veda modificate le condizioni di rischio del proprio investimento a causa di una modifica del soggetto controllante derivante da sollecitazione di deleghe, tramite applicazione diretta della disciplina OPA ovvero riconducendo la fattispecie all'art. 2497quater, lett. d, ove ne ricorrano i presupposti.

La renuncia al ejercicio de la acción social de responsabilidad

En el presente estudio se aborda un tema, el del régimen jurídico de la renuncia a la acción social de responsabilidad, que ha sido objeto de un escaso tratamiento por parte de la doctrina española. Estamos ante una institución controvertida, que regula la posibilidad de que una sociedad de capital abandone voluntariamente las pretensiones indemnizatorias que pudiera ostentar frente a alguno de sus administradores por los daños que éstos hubieran ocasionado en el patrimonio social como consecuencia del incumplimiento sus deberes de diligencia y lealtad. El hecho de que una sociedad de capital pueda acordar esta renuncia es un claro indicio del carácter dispositivo de las normas que regulan la responsabilidad de los administradores frente a la sociedad. Después de abordar de los antecedentes y evolución histórica de la renuncia a la acción social, la primera parte del estudio se centra en el análisis del ámbito material y temporal de su régimen jurídico, concluyendo que éste regula no sólo la renuncia o la transacción procesal, sino que se aplica cualquier acuerdo de la junta general que tenga como efecto una exoneración total o parcial de los administradores. La segunda parte del estudio profundiza en el régimen jurídico de la renuncia, haciendo hincapié en el derecho de veto que la Ley española y el Codice civile reconocen a la minoría y que se configura como una auténtica excepción al principio mayoritario que rige, con carácter general, la formación de la voluntad social. En el último capítulo se analizan los efectos de la renuncia acordada por la junta sobre la legitimación extraordinaria que ostentan los socios minoritarios y los acreedores sociales para el ejercicio de la acción social.

Doveri e responsabilita' degli amministratori nella crisi dei gruppi di societa'

Il presente studio si propone di individuare i doveri e le responsabilità, di tipo risarcitorio, degli amministratori, in particolare degli amministratori della società che esercita attività di direzione e coordinamento, in una situazione di crisi o insolvenza nel gruppo, anche in un’ottica di “prevenzione”, e, più precisamente, il complesso di regole di corretta gestione societaria e imprenditoriale, con le quali il silenzio della legge fallimentare in tema di gruppi di società non può non confrontarsi. In particolare, si indagherà sulla possibilità di individuare nel nostro ordinamento giuridico, nel momento di emersione della crisi, doveri di comportamento in capo agli organi di governo della società o ente che esercita attività di direzione e coordinamento, al fine di fronteggiare la crisi, evitando il peggioramento della stessa, ovvero per un risanamento anticipato e, quindi, più suscettibile di esito positivo, nella prospettiva di tutela dei soci c.d. esterni e dei creditori delle società figlie e, nello stesso tempo, dei soci della capogruppo medesima e, quindi, in una prospettiva più ampia e articolata rispetto a una società individualmente considerata. L’oggetto dell’analisi viene introdotto mediante un inquadramento generale della disciplina in materia di gruppi di società presente nel nostro sistema normativo, con particolare riguardo alla disciplina dell’attività di direzione e coordinamento introdotta dal legislatore della riforma del diritto societario (d.lgs. 17 gennaio 2003, n. 6) con gli artt. 2497 ss. cod. civ.. Nella seconda parte verranno individuati e approfonditi i criteri e i principi dai quali ricavare le regole di governance nei gruppi di società e la relativa responsabilità degli amministratori nelle situazioni di crisi nel gruppo. Sulla scorta delle suddette argomentazioni, nell'ultima parte verranno individuate le regole di gestione nell'ambito del gruppo nel momento di “emersione” della crisi e, in particolare, i possibili “strumenti” che il nostro legislatore offre per fronteggiarla.

Related Lending and Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it was confirmed that banks lend to their related parties in many countries. The question examined in this article is whether related lending functions to alleviate the problems of asymmetric information or transfers profits from depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. The effects of related lending on the profitability and risk of banks in Indonesia are examined using panel data from 1994 to 2007 comprising a total of 74 Indonesian banks. The effects on return on asset (ROA) varied at different periods. Before and right after the crisis, a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. In middle of the crisis, it turned to negative; and this has also been the case in the most recent period as the Indonesian economy has normalized. Effects of related lending on bank risk measured by the Z-score and non-performing loan is not clear. After undergoing bank restructuring, related lending has decreased and the profit structure of banks has changed.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging markets?: Evidence from India

Using firm level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership concentration on post-M&A performance of firms. Our analysis has implications for both the M&A literature, which emphasises the role of agency conflict between managers and owners of widely held companies as a key reason for M&A failures, and the corporate governance literature, especially in the context of emerging market economies. A cautious interpretation of our results suggests that while ownership concentration may reduce the manager–owner agency conflict, it may nevertheless precipitate other forms of agency conflict such that ownership concentration may not necessarily improve post-M&A performance. In particular, our results have implications for the literature on the agency conflict between large (or majority) shareholders and small (or minority) shareholders of a company, especially in contexts such as emerging market economies where corporate governance quality is weak.

CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

Using self-referencing to explain the effectiveness of ethnic minority models in advertising

Advertising research has generally not gone beyond offering support for a positive effect where ethnic models in advertising are viewed by consumers of the same ethnicity. This study offers an explanation behind this phenomenon that can be useful to marketers using self-reference theory. Our experiment reveals a strong self-referencing effect for ethnic minority individuals. Specifically, Asian subjects (the ethnic minority group) self-referenced ads with Asian models more than white subjects (the ethnic majority group). However, this result was not evident for white subjects. Implications for academics and advertisers are discussed.

Shareholder values, not shareholder value : the role of 'ethical funds' and 'ethical entrepreneurs' in connecting shareholders' values with their investments

This article rebuts the still-common assumption that managers of capitalist entities have a duty, principally or even exclusively, to maximise the monetary return to investors on their investments. It argues that this view is based on a misleadingly simplistic conception of human values and motivation. Not only is acting solely to maximise long-term shareholder value difficult, it displays, at best, banal single-mindedness and, at worst, sociopathy. In fact, real investors and managers have rich constellations of values that should be taken account of in all their decisions, including their business decisions. Awareness of our values, and public expression of our commitment to exemplify them, make for healthier investment and, in the long term, a healthier corporate world. Individuals and funds investing on the basis of such values, in companies that express their own, display humanity rather than pathology. Preamble I always enjoyed the discussions that Michael Whincop and I had about the interaction of ethics and economics. Each of us could see an important role for these disciplines, as well as our common discipline of law. We also shared an appreciation of the institutional context within which much of the drama of life is played out. In understanding the behaviour of individuals and the choices they make, it seemed axiomatic to each of us that ethics and economics have a lot to say. This was also true of the institutions in which they operate. Michael ·had a strong interest in 'the new institutional economics' I and I had a strong interest in 'institutionalising ethics' right through the 1990s.' This formed the basis of some fascinating and fruitful discussions. Professor Charles Sampford is Director, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Foundation Professor of Law at Griffith University and President, International Institute for Public Ethics.DrVirginia Berry is a Research Fellow at theKey Centre for Ethics, Law,Justice andGovernance, Griffith University. Oliver Williamson, one of the leading proponents of the 'new institutional economics', published a number of influential works - see Williamson (1975, 1995,1996). Sampford (1991),' pp 185-222. The primary focus of discussions on institutionalising ethics has been in public sectorethics: see, for example, Preston and Sampford (2002); Sampford (1994), pp 114-38. Some discussion has, however, moved beyond the public sector to include business - see Sampford 200408299

Comprehension as social and intellectual practice : rebuilding curriculum in low socioeconomic and cultural minority schools

This article reframes the concept of comprehension as a social and intellectual practice. It reviews current approaches to reading instruction for linguistically and culturally diverse and low socioeconomic students, noting an emphasis on comprehension as autonomous skills. The Four Resources model (Freebody & Luke, 1990) is used to make the case for the integration of comprehension instruction with an emphasis on student cultural and community knowledge, and substantive intellectual and sociocultural content in elementary school curricula. Illustrations are drawn from research underway on the teaching of literacy in primary schools in low SES communities.