John Searlen teoria tietoisuudesta

Tutkielmassa esitellään ja arvioidaan John Searlen teoriaa tietoisuudesta. Tietoisuus (consciousness) on Searlen mukaan tärkein mielenfilosofinen käsite. Searle ei määrittele käsitettä tarkasti, vaan tyytyy esittämään sitä kuvaavia esimerkkejä ja analogioita. Tietoisuuden keskeisimmiksi ominaisuuksiksi Searlen teoriassa näyttävät muodostuvan intentionaalisuus (intentionality), subjektiivisuus (subjectivity) ja kausaalinen vaikutus käyttäytymiseen (mental causation). Näihin ominaisuuksiin liittyvät myös Searlen painavimmat tietoisuudesta esittämät argumentit. Argumenttien analysointi on tutkielman tärkein tavoite. Searlen yhteysperiaatteen (Connection Principle) mukaan intentionaalisia tiloja voi olla vain olennolla, jolla voi olla tietoisia intentionaalisia tiloja, ja jokainen alitajuinen intentionaalinen tila on ainakin potentiaalisesti tietoinen. Toisin sanoen intentionaalisuuden ja tietoisuuden välillä vallitsee välttämätön yhteys seuraavasti: on loogisesti välttämätöntä, että jokainen intentionaalinen tila voi ainakin periaattessa päästä tietoisuuteen.Tutkielmassa kuitenkin osoitetaan, että yhteysperiaateeseen on syytä suhtautua epäillen. Searlen yhteysperiaatteen puolesta esittämä argumentti näyttää nimittäin sisältävän dilemman. Jos erottelu intrinsiseen ja näennäiseen intentionaalisuuteen tulkitaan Searlen tavoin, syyllistytään sen olettamiseen, mikä pitäisi todistaa; jos taas erottelu tulkitaan toisin kuin Searle, argumentti ei tue yhteysperiaatetta. Searlen mukaan mentaaliset tilat ovat aina jonkun mentaalisia tiloja. Tästä väitteestä Searle pyrkii johtamaan toisen, paljon radikaalimman väitteen: mielen ilmiöt kuuluvat omaan ontologiseen kategoriaansa, subjektiivisten mentaalisten tilojen kategoriaan. Searlen käsitystä tukee Thomas Nagelin esittämä, hyvin samansisältöinen argumentti. Yksimielisyys ei kuitenkaan ole erehtymättömyyden tae, sillä Paul Churchlandin kritiikki näyttää pahasti horjuttavan Searlen subjektiivisuusargumentin uskottavuutta. Churchland väittää Searlen syyllistyvän intensionaaliseen virhepäätelmään. Yksittäisen henkilön episteemisen pääsyn rajoittuneisuudesta ei Churchlandin mukaan voida tehdä mitään ontologisia johtopäätöksiä, koska tiedetyksi tuleminen ei ole objektin aito ominaisuus. Vastaväite näyttää olevan kohtalokas Searlen subjektiivisuusargumentille. Subjektiivisuuden ongelma näyttää olevan perustava metafyysinen vedenjakaja, joka jakaa mielenfilosofiset teoriat toisaalta materialistisiin, toisaalta dualistisiin. Searle uskoo, että mieli-ruumis -ongelma (mind-body problem) on ratkaistavissa ilman, että tarvitsee valita kumpaakaan. Ratkaisu sisältyy kahteen Searlen näennäisesti yhteensopimattomaan teesiin. Ensimmäisen teesin mukaan mentaaliset tilat ovat todellisia ilmiöitä, eikä niitä voida redusoida mihinkään muuhun tai eliminoida määrittelemällä ne uudestaan. Toisen teesin mukaan aivojen operaatiot aiheuttavat mentaaliset tilat ja mentaaliset tilat ovat aivojen piirteitä. Teeseistä jälkimmäinen osoittautuu ongelmalliseksi syistä, jotka Jaegwon Kim on esittänyt. Jos mentaaliset tilat olisivat aivojen ominaisuuksia, ei mielen ja aivojen välinen suhde voisi olla kausaalinen, koska kausaatiossa (causation) on aina kyse kahden erillisen entiteetin tai tapahtuman välisestä relaatiosta, jossa suhteen osapuolien välillä on oltava ajallista etäisyyttä. Toiseksi Searlen vertaus tietoisuuden ja aivojen suhteesta kappaleen kiinteyden ja sen mikrorakenteen suhteeseen epäonnistuu, koska tietoisuus ja kiinteys kuuluvat Searlen teoriassa eri ontologisiin kategorioihin, eikä niitä siten voi ongelmattomasti rinnastaa. Searlen analogia kiinteyteen murtuu myös siksi, että kappaleen mikrorakenne ei yksinkertaisesti aiheuta sen kiinteyttä. Tietoisuus ei siis voi olla samanaikaisesti aivojen ominaisuus ja aivojen kausaalisen toiminnan seuraus. Tutkielmassa päädytään puolustamaan kantaa, että Searlen argumentit eivät ole vakuuttavia ja että Searle ei ole onnistunut eksplikoimaan teoriaa, joka välttäisi dualismiin ja materialismiin liittyvät tunnetut ongelmat. Kysymys mikä on mielen suhde ruumiiseen, jää siten avoimeksi. Avainsanat: intentionaalisuus, mentaalinen, mieli-ruumis -ongelma, Searle, subjektiivisuus, tietoisuus

Anima, mente, corpo e inmortalità : la sfida del naturalismo

Resumen: Il saggio esamina il rapporto anima, mente, corpo alla luce delle sfide del nuovo naturalismo che molto spesso incorpora un secco riduzionismo ed un’opzione materialistica. Questa risulta un apriori, non l’esito di un argomento: J. Searle la chiama “la religione del nostro tempo”. Vengono poi esaminati l’attuale oblio dell’anima, la riduzione del suo tema al mind-body problem, la qualità della tesi ilemorfica, illustrata in specie attraverso le soluzioni dell’Aquinate, l’equivoco del dualismo cartesiano. Chiude il saggio uno sguardo sulla questione dell’immortalità dell’anima.

Paul Karl Feyerabend Las proyecciones de la proliferación teórica en la relación ciencia-metafísica

La doctrina de la Proliferación teórica de Paul Karl Feyerabend ha sido interpretada por sus especialistas como un intento de salvaguardar el ideal del progreso científico. Aunque tales estudios hacen justicia, en parte, a la intencionalidad de nuestro filósofo no explicitan la crítica fundamental que implica para Feyerabend el pluralismo teórico. La proliferación teórica constituye en sí misma una reductio ad absurdum de los distintos intentos del positivismo lógico y del racionalismo crítico por definir la ciencia a expensas de lo metafísico. Este artículo presenta la proliferación teórica como una reivindicación del papel positivo que ocupa la metafísica en el quehacer científico. Se consigna la defensa que hace Feyerabend de la metafísica en cuanto que ésta constituye la posibilidad de superar el conservadurismo conceptual, aumentar de contenido empírico de la ciencia y recuperar el valor descriptivo de las teorías científicas.

La forma del afecto : el orden de los modos a cada atributo implica el conocimiento de la unión de los atributos de una sola substancia

Se trata de una totalidad que sólo es concebible cuando se han abordado todos los puntos de vista que la abarcan. Así, todo aquel que lleve a cabo una lectura comprometida de esta obra, deberá seguir una petición que hace su autor

Perspex machine VII: The universal perspex machine

The perspex machine arose from the unification of projective geometry with the Turing machine. It uses a total arithmetic, called transreal arithmetic, that contains real arithmetic and allows division by zero. Transreal arithmetic is redefined here. The new arithmetic has both a positive and a negative infinity which lie at the extremes of the number line, and a number nullity that lies off the number line. We prove that nullity, 0/0, is a number. Hence a number may have one of four signs: negative, zero, positive, or nullity. It is, therefore, impossible to encode the sign of a number in one bit, as floating-, point arithmetic attempts to do, resulting in the difficulty of having both positive and negative zeros and NaNs. Transrational arithmetic is consistent with Cantor arithmetic. In an extension to real arithmetic, the product of zero, an infinity, or nullity with its reciprocal is nullity, not unity. This avoids the usual contradictions that follow from allowing division by zero. Transreal arithmetic has a fixed algebraic structure and does not admit options as IEEE, floating-point arithmetic does. Most significantly, nullity has a simple semantics that is related to zero. Zero means "no value" and nullity means "no information." We argue that nullity is as useful to a manufactured computer as zero is to a human computer. The perspex machine is intended to offer one solution to the mind-body problem by showing how the computable aspects of mind and. perhaps, the whole of mind relates to the geometrical aspects of body and, perhaps, the whole of body. We review some of Turing's writings and show that he held the view that his machine has spatial properties. In particular, that it has the property of being a 7D lattice of compact spaces. Thus, we read Turing as believing that his machine relates computation to geometrical bodies. We simplify the perspex machine by substituting an augmented Euclidean geometry for projective geometry. This leads to a general-linear perspex-machine which is very much easier to pro-ram than the original perspex-machine. We then show how to map the whole of perspex space into a unit cube. This allows us to construct a fractal of perspex machines with the cardinality of a real-numbered line or space. This fractal is the universal perspex machine. It can solve, in unit time, the halting problem for itself and for all perspex machines instantiated in real-numbered space, including all Turing machines. We cite an experiment that has been proposed to test the physical reality of the perspex machine's model of time, but we make no claim that the physical universe works this way or that it has the cardinality of the perspex machine. We leave it that the perspex machine provides an upper bound on the computational properties of physical things, including manufactured computers and biological organisms, that have a cardinality no greater than the real-number line.

Algumas considerações sobre o estatuto do psicológico no Projetofreudiano

Embora no Projeto freudiano não seja oferecida, de uma maneira explícita, uma conceituação a respeito do estatuto do psicológico, pensamos que é possível delinear esse estatuto e tentaremos fazê-lo com base em uma maneira de interpretar o modelo do psiquismo que é construído no texto freudiano. Isto levar-nos-á também a situar o Projeto em relação ao clássico problema mente-corpo. Pretendemos dar conta da tarefa proposta apoiando-nos, sobretudo, em uma distinção que estabeleceremos entre o representar, entendido como ato intencional, e a representação, entendida como traço de memória. Também contemplaremos a forma de comportamento do fator quantitativo-energético nas ordens processuais do psicológico e do neurofisiológico.

O problema da consciência: a abordgem neurocientífica do problema-corpo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Uma discussão do problema mente-corpo em Descartes e Espinosa, a partir da neurofilosofia de Antonio Damásio

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

A natureza comportamental da mente: behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

Psicossomática na saúde coletiva: um enfoque biopsicossocial

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

O problema da relação mente-corpo e a consciência como sua manifestação

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

Origins of molecular neurobiology:The role of the physicists

The revolution in the foundations of physics at the beginning of the twentieth century suggested to several of its most prominent workers that biology was ripe for something similar. In consequence, a number of physicists moved into biology. They were highly influential in initiating a molecular biology in the 1950s. Two decades later it seemed to several of these migrants, and those they had influenced, that the major problems in molecular biology had been solved, and that it was time to move on to what seemed to them the final problem: the nervous system, consciousness, and the age-old mind-body problem. This paper reviews this "double migration" and shows how the hopes of the first generation of physicist-biologists were both realized and dashed. No new physical principles were discovered at work in the foundations of biology or neuroscience. On the other hand, the mind-set of those trained in physics proved immensely valuable in analyzing fundamental issues in both biology and neuroscience. It has been argued that the outcome of the molecular biology of the 1950s was a change in the concept of the gene from that of "a mysterious entity into that of a real molecular object" (Watson, 1965, p.6); the gates and channels which play such crucial roles in the functioning of nervous systems have been transformed in a similar way. Studies on highly simplified systems have also opened the prospect of finding the neural correlatives of numerous behaviors and neuropathologies. This increasing understanding at the molecular level is invaluable not only in devising rational therapies but also, by defining the material substrate of consciousness, in bringing the mind-body problem into sharper focus. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Inc.

O problema mente-corpo na psicologia fenomenológica de Edith Stein : implicações para uma fundamentação da ciência psicológica

Psychology is a relatively new scientific branch and still lacks consistent methodological foundation to support its investigations. Given its immaturity, this science finds difficulties to delimit its ontological status, which spawnes several epistemological and methodological misconceptions. Given this, Psychology failed to demarcate precisely its object of study, leading, thus, the emergence of numerous conceptions about the psychic, which resulted in the fragmentation of this science. In its constitution, psychological science inherited a complex philosophical problem: the mind-body issue. Therefore, to define their status, Psychology must still face this problem, seeking to elucidate what is the mind, the body and how they relate. In light of the importance of this issue to a strict demarcation of psychological object, it was sought in this research, to investigate the mind-body problem in the Phenomenological Psychology of Edith Stein (1891-1942), phenomenologist philosopher who undertook efforts for a foundation of Psychology. For that, the discussion was subsidized from the contributions of the Philosophy of Mind and the support of the phenomenological method to the mind-body problem. From there, by a qualitative bibliographical methodology, it sought to examine the problem of research through the analysis of some philosophical-psychological philosopher's works, named: "Psychic Causality” (Kausalität Psychische, 1922) and “Introduction to Philosophy" (Einführung in die Philosophie, 1920). For this investigation, it was made, without prejudice to the discussion, a terminological equivalence between the terms mind and psyche, as the philosopher used the latter to refer to the object of Psychology. It sought to examine, therefore, how Stein conceived the psyche, the body and the relationship between them. Although it wasn't the focus of the investigation, it also took into account the spiritual dimension, as the philosopher conceived the human person as consisting of three dimensions: body, psyche and spirit. Given this, Stein highlighted the causal mechanism of the psyche, which is based on the variations of the vital force that emerges from the vital sphere. In relation to the corporeal dimension, the philosopher, following the analysis of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), highlighted the dual aspect of the body, because it is at the same time something material (Körper) and also a linving body (Leib). On the face of it, it is understood that the psyche and the body are closely connected, so that it constitutes a dual-unit which is manifested in the Leib. This understanding of the problem psyche-mind/body provides a rich analysis of this issue, enabling the overcoming of some inconsistencies of the monistic and dualistic positions. Given this, it allows a strict elucidation of the Psychology object, contributing to the foundation of this science.

As relações de interação e integração entre cérebro, corpo-propriamente-dito e meio-ambiente na constituição da mente consciente

This dissertation will be marked by our proposal to hold a theoretical perspective to the classical mind-body problem, and more precisely for the defense of the idea that consciousness (or conscious mind) emerges from the interaction and integration relationships between body proper, brain and environment. This purpose will lead us to assume an alternative position with respect to the more traditional perspectives to the mind-body problem, ie an alternative perspective not only in relation to the dualistics forms of mind-body, but also in regards to the reductive physicalists, which usually reduces mind to brain. Aiming to support a position that both avoid the idea that mind and body are distinct substances and the theory that the brain explains the consciousness in its totality, we will dedicate an important part of this work to explain how the structure of consciousness depends significantly of the body proper and the bodily information mechanisms as well as the environment and the physiological mechanisms through which we place ourselves in space, in front of us and the other bodies (organic and inorganic). Given that the relationship between brain, body and environment involves different mental levels — from the most primitive and unconscious mental mechanisms until conscious and sophisticated levels — we will proceed to the task of assuming a model to explain in what sense these levels contribute to that our instincts and the most sophisticated dimensions of our mental life are part of the one and the same process, which is why we will structure our argument from the ideia that mind, self, and consciousness are the different hierarchical levels which make up the totality of our psychic life and therefore organic one. Imbued with this conceptual approach, we will advance to the focus of this work, namely the reasons that will lead us to give a prominent role to the body proper and the environment in the constitution of the conscious mind, or even the reasons that will lead us to defend the thesis according to which we are embodied and situated, as well as the reasons that will lead us to reject the theoretical positions that dichotomize man and world. In order to support the thesis that we are embodied and situated, and therefore with the purpose of overcoming the theoretical paradigms that dichotomize consciousness and world, we will turn out to the authors and the perspectives we believe to be more successful in this endeavor, including the phenomenological approaches to bodily self-consciousness, the enactivists perspectives and the researches dedicated to mapping the interaction and integration relationships between brain, body and environment. To achieve our goals, the dissertation will be divided into two chapters: the first chapter will emphasize in what way the structuring of consciousness depends on the body proper and the environment, while in the second chapter we will resort to the phenomenological dimensions of bodily self-consciousness, emphasizing the bodily information channels that provide us the immediate certainty, in a first person perspective, that the self is bodily in a non-metaphorical sense.