Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Merleau-Ponty and Nishida: Artistic expression as 'motor-perceptual faith'

This dissertation carries out a dialogue between Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Nishida Kitarō concerning their theories of artistic expression and faith. Both philosophers go through remarkably similar trajectories in their philosophic projects: In their early works they focus on the motor-perceptual body of the artist, and as they move towards the mature articulation of their ontologies, the concept of faith becomes central. I propose the term “motor-perceptual faith” to bring these seemingly diverse sets of concerns into a conceptual continuity. My study explores this connection, and argues that the artist’s motor-perceptual expressive body, as colourfully and sometimes poetically articulated in their early works, enacts the form of faith developed more abstractly in their later writings. Exploring these relations fosters a mutual expansion of the early by the later works, thus thickening the concept of faith by seeing it as enacted by the artist, while enlarging the concept of artistic expression by understanding it as a practice of motor‐perceptual faith. Framing these philosophers as putting forth a traditionally religious concept as illustrated by way of artistic expression, offers a new articulation of both of their writings, an important conceptual bridge between the two, while challenging un-ambiguous distinctions between art, philosophy and religion, and ultimately philosophy East and West.

La naissance de l'espace moderne: Merleau‐Ponty et Panofsky sur la perspective linéaire

Nous nous proposons d’examiner et de comparer les analyses de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et d’Erwin Panofsky sur la question de la perspective linéaire. Merleau-Ponty, dans le sillage des analyses de Panofsky, soutient la thèse selon laquelle la perspective linéaire est non seulement une technique picturale qui nous présente une vision et une interprétation de l’espace et, plus généralement, du monde se constituant en rupture avec la perception naturelle, mais une « construction symbolique » qui nous fait proprement voir et concevoir le monde d’après les principes de la géométrie euclidienne. Quoiqu’ils partagent la même interprétation historique et symbolique de la perspective, Merleau-Ponty et Panofsky diffèrent pourtant quant à la signification philosophique qu’ils lui donnent. Alors que pour Panofsky la perspective témoigne de la vérité indépassable du criticisme kantien, elle est l’expression chez Merleau-Ponty d’une interrogation ontologique sur la perception irréductible à la conception de l’espace de la philosophie moderne.

Merleau-Ponty e a psicologia infantil: análises da psicogênese em Wallon

Neste artigo tratamos das análises do filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty acerca das teorias da psicogênese de Henri Wallon. Focalizamos os cursos que Merleau-Ponty dedicara à psicologia da criança entre 1949 e 1952. Para o filósofo, ao longo da psicogênese, a distinção do indivíduo em relação ao mundo e a outrem jamais é terminada. A infância jamais é liquidada radicalmente, pelo simples fato de que não abandonamos nossa condição corporal, nosso poder de retomar as condutas e expressões fisionômicas dos outros e das coisas. Merleau-Ponty encontra indicações neste sentido nas teorias de Wallon, principalmente nos conceitos de sociabilidade sincrética e de ultracoisas.

A noção de esquema corporal na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty: análises em torno da 'Fenomenologia da Percepção'

The Throughout the work of Merleau-Ponty, besides philosophical concepts and images of his thinking, some theoretical-anthropological devices exist that reveal his approximation of human sciences. That is the case of the notion of body schema. Interested in discussing the role the critical development of this concept may have played in the passage from the first phase of his work to the period when the philosopher finds himself able to outline a new ontology, in this paper, we study the presence of the body schema notion in the Phenomenology of perception. We show that, in this book, Merleau-Ponty unsubstantiates the notion under analysis which, from a cognitive core that organizes our bodily experience, turns into the expression of our body parts’ mutual permeability, but also of the body’s permeability towards the world and other people.

Merleau-Ponty: uma ontologia do visível

This work discusses the ontology of the visible at the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), which points to a depth and opacity of the perceived world that oppose transparency of geometric world thought by René Descartes (1596-1650). At first we approached the Cartesian discourse developed in Dioptrics Descartes, the first of three scientific discourses published in 1637, being introduced by the famous Discourse method. In this sense, this research discusses the mechanistic explanation that the modern philosopher has the vision, process comprising the formation of images on the retina and its communication to the brain, and the subsequent reading performed by an immaterial mind. Discusses the notion of image as a result of the interpretation of the spirit because, for Descartes, is not the eye that sees, but the spirit that reads and decodes the signals that the body receives the world. At another point, reflected on the criticism of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the thought of overflight present in Dioptrics Descartes. Therefore, it takes as its reference the third part of the book The Eye and the Spirit (1961), in which the intellectualist approach of vision is considered a failed attempt to move away from the visible to rebuild it from anywhere . In this sense, it reflects on a new ontology proposed by Merleau-Ponty thinking being without departing from the puzzles of the body and vision. Puzzles that show a promiscuity between the seer and the seen, between sentient and sensitive. Thus, this paper discusses how visibility was treated by the contemporary philosopher, not as something to be judged by the spirit to get a real nature of things, but as a manifestation of the same things. Finally, this research explores the ontology of the visible in merleaupontiano thought, an ontology that does not rebuild or appropriates visible by a thought of overflight, but what you do from your own visibility as compared original and constant with depth in the world.

Merleau-Ponty: uma ontologia do visível

This work discusses the ontology of the visible at the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), which points to a depth and opacity of the perceived world that oppose transparency of geometric world thought by René Descartes (1596-1650). At first we approached the Cartesian discourse developed in Dioptrics Descartes, the first of three scientific discourses published in 1637, being introduced by the famous Discourse method. In this sense, this research discusses the mechanistic explanation that the modern philosopher has the vision, process comprising the formation of images on the retina and its communication to the brain, and the subsequent reading performed by an immaterial mind. Discusses the notion of image as a result of the interpretation of the spirit because, for Descartes, is not the eye that sees, but the spirit that reads and decodes the signals that the body receives the world. At another point, reflected on the criticism of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the thought of overflight present in Dioptrics Descartes. Therefore, it takes as its reference the third part of the book The Eye and the Spirit (1961), in which the intellectualist approach of vision is considered a failed attempt to move away from the visible to rebuild it from anywhere . In this sense, it reflects on a new ontology proposed by Merleau-Ponty thinking being without departing from the puzzles of the body and vision. Puzzles that show a promiscuity between the seer and the seen, between sentient and sensitive. Thus, this paper discusses how visibility was treated by the contemporary philosopher, not as something to be judged by the spirit to get a real nature of things, but as a manifestation of the same things. Finally, this research explores the ontology of the visible in merleaupontiano thought, an ontology that does not rebuild or appropriates visible by a thought of overflight, but what you do from your own visibility as compared original and constant with depth in the world.

Within the carnal: re-reading Merleau-Ponty through the language of drawing

In order to present visual art as a paradigm for philosophy, Merleau-Ponty investigated the creative processes of artists whose work corresponded closely with his philosophical ideas. His essays on art are widely valued for emphasising process over product, and for challenging the primacy of the written word in all spheres of human expression. While it is clear that he initially favoured painting, Merleau-Ponty began to develop a much deeper understanding of the complexities of how art is made in his late work in parallel with his advancement of a new ontology. Although his ontology remains unfinished and only exists as working notes and a manuscript entitled The Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty had begun to appreciate the fundamental role drawing plays in the making of art and the creation of a language of expression that is as vital as the written or spoken word. Through an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished manuscript and working notes my thesis will investigate his working methods and use of materials and also explore how he processed his ideas by using my own art practice as the basis of my research. This research will take the form of an inquiry into how the unfinished and incomplete nature of text and artworks, while they are still ‘works in progress’, can often reveal the more human and carnal components of creative processes. Applying my experience as a practitioner and a teacher in an art school, I focus on the significance of drawing practice for Merleau-Ponty’s later work, in order to rebalance an overemphasis on painting in the literature. Understanding the differences between these two art forms, and how they are taught, can offer an alternative engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s later work and his struggle to find a language to express his developing new ontology. In addition, by re-reading his work through the language of drawing, I believe we gain new insights which reaffirm Merleau-Ponty's relevance to contemporary art making and aesthetics.

Merleau-Ponty et la connaissance de soi

Notre objectif est d’habiliter la conception merleau-pontienne de la connaissance de soi. La difficulté consiste en ce que Merleau-Ponty fait reposer tout savoir sur un contexte perceptif que le sujet est par principe incapable d’appréhender dans sa totalité. La connaissance s’appuie ainsi sur un contexte comportant des zones d’ombre qui éludent la réflexion. Nous éclairons d’abord cette affirmation générale à partir de deux principes fondamentaux empruntés à la Gestalttheorie, dont le premier stipule que la donnée de base de la perception est une figure sur un fond et le second que nos structures mentales cherchent l’équilibre. Nous appliquons ensuite ces prémisses au problème spécifique de la connaissance de soi. Cette présentation nous permet de cibler deux obstacles à notre prétention : l’irréductibilité du sujet à ce qu’il donne à voir dans l’effort réflexif, ainsi que sa liberté fondamentale, contaminant la vérité de son caractère arbitraire. Finalement, nous montrons que ces deux obstacles ne sont qu’apparents, à condition toutefois de renoncer à une connaissance de soi absolue, et de ménager un espace entre le déterminisme et la liberté.

Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts

Having initially not had the attention of Sartre or Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s work is arguably now more widely influential than either of his two contemporaries. Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts presents an accessible guide to the core ideas which structure Merleau-Ponty’s thinking as well as to his influences and the value of his ideas to a wide range of disciplines. The first section of the book presents the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, the major debates of his time, particularly existentialism, phenomenology, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history and society. The second section outlines his major contributions and conceptual innovations. The final section focuses upon how his work has been taken up in other fields besides philosophy, notably in sociology, cognitive science, health studies and feminism.

Merleau-Ponty, naturalism and phenomenological ontology

 Dr Pollard’s thesis is entitled: Merleau-Ponty, Naturalism and Phenomenological Ontology.