Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

Determinants of the price of allowance in the European Union emissions trading market

Teorian mukaan täydellisen kilpailun päästöoikeuskauppamarkkinoilla päästöoikeuden hinta muodostuu markkinoilla vallitsevan päästöjen vähentämisen rajakustannuksen perusteella. Euroopan päästökauppamarkkinoilla päästöjen vähentämisen kustannuksia nostavat suhteellisen lyhyet päästökauppajaksot ja epävarmuus järjestelmän jatkuvuudesta. Toisaalta päästökaupan osallistujien yhteenlaskettu päästöjen vähentämisen tarve lienee suhteellisen vähäinen ellei olematon ensimmäisellä päästökauppajaksolla. Euroopan päästökauppamarkkinoilla päästöjen vähentämisen tarve ja päästöjenvähentämisen kustannukset ovat osittain riippuvaisia muuttuvista tekijöistä. Päästöoikeuden hintaan voivat vaikuttaa päästökauppajakson aikana tapahtuva teollisuuden suhdannevaihtelu, polttoaineiden hintojen heilahtelut sekä säätilojen vaihtelu. Päästökaupan ensimmäisinä kuukausina päästöoikeuden hintakehityksellä on ollut yhteyksiä tekijöihin, joiden muutosten tulisikin vaikuttaa päästökauppamarkkinoiden tasapainoon. Näitä tekijöitä ovat esimerkiksi polttoainemarkkinoiden ja sähkömarkkinoiden hintakehitys sekä vaihtelut säätiloissa.

Asymptotic analysis of stock price densities and implied volatilities in mixed stochastic models

In this paper, we obtain sharp asymptotic formulas with error estimates for the Mellin con- volution of functions de ned on (0;1), and use these formulas to characterize the asymptotic behavior of marginal distribution densities of stock price processes in mixed stochastic models. Special examples of mixed models are jump-di usion models and stochastic volatility models with jumps. We apply our general results to the Heston model with double exponential jumps, and make a detailed analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the stock price density, the call option pricing function, and the implied volatility in this model. We also obtain similar results for the Heston model with jumps distributed according to the NIG law.

Revenue-neutral tax policy under price uncertainty

The firm's response to revenue-neutral taxation is investigated under price uncertainty. Revenue-neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant. Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to sign the firm's response: a reduction in the marginal rate causes the firm to contract output. Implications are established for the equilibrium level of treasury receipts.

Revenue-neutral tax policies under price uncertainty: reply

In their comment on my 1990 article, Yeh, Suwanakul, and Mai extend my analysis-which focused attention exclusively on firm output-to allow for simultaneous endogeneity of price, aggregate output, and numbers of firms. They show that, with downward- sloping demand, industry output adjusts positively to revenue-neutral changes in the marginal rate of taxation. This result is significant for two reasons. First, we are more often interested in predictions about aggregate phenomena than we are in predictions about individual firms. Indeed, firm-level predictions are frequently irrefutable since firm data are often unavailable. Second, the authors derive their result under a set of conditions that appear to be more general than those invoked in my 1990 article. In particular, they circumvent the need to invoke specific assumptions about the nature of firms' aversions toward risk. I consider this a useful extension and I appreciate the careful scrutiny of my paper.

Mimicking the one-dimensional marginal distributions of stochastic diffusions

In the large maturity limit, we compute explicitly the Local Volatility surface for Heston, through Dupire’s formula, with Fourier pricing of the respective derivatives of the call price. Than we verify that the prices of European call options produced by the Heston model, concide with those given by the local volatility model where the Local Volatility is computed as said above.

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second-best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost.

Preferences of Hungarian consumers for quality, access and price attributes of health care services — result of a discrete choice experiment

In 2010, a household survey was carried out in Hungary among 1037 respondents to study consumer preferences and willingness to pay for health care services. In this paper, we use the data from the discrete choice experiments included in the survey, to elicit the preferences of health care consumers about the choice of health care providers. Regression analysis is used to estimate the effect of the improvement of service attributes (quality, access, and price) on patients’ choice, as well as the differences among the socio-demographic groups. We also estimate the marginal willingness to pay for the improvement in attribute levels by calculating marginal rates of substitution. The results show that respondents from a village or the capital, with low education and bad health status are more driven by the changes in the price attribute when choosing between health care providers. Respondents value the good skills and reputation of the physician and the attitude of the personnel most, followed by modern equipment and maintenance of the office/hospital. Access attributes (travelling and waiting time) are less important. The method of discrete choice experiment is useful to reveal patients’ preferences, and might support the development of an evidence-based and sustainable health policy on patient payments.

Strategic interactions of urban land developers in the housing market

This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices, considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic function of the rival s quality. The behavior of the equilibrium pro ts reveals that, in general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational advantage. The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations, in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and pro ts are increasing with quality valuation parameter. RESUMO: Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es- tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços, considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex- aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo. No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio, é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso, as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.

An Analysis of Colombian Power Market Price Behavior from an Industrial Organization Perspective

We analyze the behavior of spot prices in the Colombian wholesale power market, using a series of models derived from industrial organization theory -- We first create a Cournot-based model that simulates the strategic behavior of the market-leader power generators, which we use to estimate two industrial organization variables, the Index of Residual Demand and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- We use these variables to create VAR models that estimate spot prices and power market impulse-response relationships -- The results from these models show that hydroelectric generators can use their water storage capability strategically to affect off-peak prices primarily, while the thermal generators can manage their capacity strategically to affect on-peak prices -- In addition, shocks to the Index of Residual Capacity and to the HHI cause spot price fluctuations, which can be interpreted as the generators´ strategic response to these shocks

Effect of deproteinization and tubular occlusion on microtensile bond strength and marginal microleakage of resin composite restorations

Dentin adhesion procedure presents limitations, especially regarding to lifetime stability of formed hybrid layer. Alternative procedures have been studied in order to improve adhesion to dentin. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to evaluate in vitro the influence of deproteinization or dentin tubular occlusion, as well as the combination of both techniques, on microtensile bond strength (µTBS) and marginal microleakage of composite resin restorations. MATERIAL AND METHODS: Extracted erupted human third molars were randomly divided into 4 groups. Dentin surfaces were treated with one of the following procedures: (A) 35% phosphoric acid gel (PA) + adhesive system (AS); (B) PA + 10% NaOCl + AS; (C) PA + oxalate + AS and (D) PA + oxalate + 10% NaOCl + AS. Bond strength data were analyzed statistically by two-way ANOVA and Tukey's test. The microleakage scores were analyzed using Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests. Significance level was set at 0.05 for all analyses. RESULTS: µTBS data presented statistically lower values for groups D and B, ranking data as A>C>B>D. The use of oxalic acid resulted in microleakage reduction along the tooth/restoration interface, being significant when used alone. On the other hand, the use of 10% NaOCl alone or in combination with oxalic acid, resulted in increased microleakage. CONCLUSIONS: Dentin deproteinization with 10% NaOCl or in combination with oxalate significantly compromised both the adhesive bond strength and the microleakage at interface. Tubular occlusion prior to adhesive system application seems to be a useful technique to reduce marginal microleakage.

Influence of light-curing unit systems on shear bond strength and marginal microleakage of composite resin restorations

The aim of the present study was to evaluate the influence of different photopolymerization (halogen, halogen soft-start and LED) systems on shear bond strength (SBS) and marginal microleakage of composite resin restorations. Forty Class V cavities (enamel and dentin margins) were prepared for microleakage assessment, and 160 enamel and dentin fragments were prepared for the SBS test, and divided into 4 groups. Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon tests showed statistically significant difference in microleakage between the margins (p < 0.01) with incisal margins presenting the lowest values. Among the groups, it was observed that, only at the cervical margin, halogen soft-start photo polymerization presented statistically significant higher microleakage values. For SBS test, ANOVA showed no statistical difference (p > 0.05) neither between substrates nor among groups. It was concluded that Soft-Start technique with high intensity end-light influenced negatively the cervical marginal sealing, but the light-curing systems did not influence adhesion.

E-contracting with price configuration for Web services and QoS

The large amount of information in electronic contracts hampers their establishment due to high complexity. An approach inspired in Software Product Line (PL) and based on feature modelling was proposed to make this process more systematic through information reuse and structuring. By assessing the feature-based approach in relation to a proposed set of requirements, it was showed that the approach does not allow the price of services and of Quality of Services (QoS) attributes to be considered in the negotiation and included in the electronic contract. Thus, this paper also presents an extension of such approach in which prices and price types associated to Web services and QoS levels are applied. An extended toolkit prototype is also presented as well as an experiment example of the proposed approach.