O instituto do veto presidencial no constitucionalismo brasileiro contemporâneo

Nos Estados republicanos modernos, o sistema de freios e contrapesos é um dos modelos institucionais responsável por assegurar o equilíbrio entre os Poderes e prevenir abusos por parte dos governantes. Dois questionamentos podem ser encontrados na literatura brasileira sobre o tema e fundamentam esta Dissertação: um geral sobre o suposto poder excessivo que o nosso sistema político confere ao Poder Executivo e outro, específico, de que nesse contexto, o veto teria um papel central na supremacia do presidente da república sobre o Congresso Nacional no âmbito do processo legislativo. Partindo dessas premissas, a pesquisa avalia se essas características estão condizentes com as expectativas e o desenho institucional proposto para o Estado brasileiro pela Assembleia Nacional Constituinte ANC de 1987. Com base nos anais da ANC e em referências históricas, conclui-se que, ao menos no tocante ao instituto do veto presidencial, o modelo de preponderância do Poder Executivo observado no processo legislativo decorreu de uma opção deliberada e reafirmada pela elite política em 1988, quando da promulgação da Constituição.

A judicialização da política: o poder judiciário e a definição de políticas nacionais

O papel desempenhado pelo Poder Judiciário nos mais diversos Estados passa por sensível evolução ao longo do século XX, à medida que se desenvolveram os sistemas de controle de constitucionalidade. De um lado, os atores políticos assumem especial importância nesse processo. Os modelos de revisão judicial foram reforçados, no mais das vezes, em paralelo à positivação, em âmbito constitucional, de um amplo rol de direitos fundamentais e de princípios balizadores e limitadores do poder estatal. Com isso, os elementos cotejados no processo legislativo de tomada de decisões políticas são revestidos de status constitucional e transportados para o discurso argumentativo do Direito, o que leva a um processo de judicialização da Política que permite que a atividade legiferante seja passível de confronto perante instâncias judiciárias. Os instrumentos de controle de constitucionalidade assumem, assim, novos contornos, permitindo que o Judiciário interfira no conteúdo das escolhas políticas feitas pela maioria governante. De outro lado, o Poder Judiciário particularmente as Cortes Constitucionais passa a assumir a corresponsabilidade na efetivação das metas e compromissos estatais, com o que desenvolve uma política institucional mais proativa e comprometida com a concretização substancial de valores democráticos, interferindo, assim, de maneira mais incisiva e rígida no controle do processo político. A definição de políticas fundamentais e o processo legiferante passam a contar com constante participação do Judiciário. Na realidade brasileira, a Constituição de 1988 amplia as competência do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de controle de constitucionalidade, inserindo o órgão de maneira efetiva nesse contexto de intervenção judicial na Política. A última década, por sua vez, marcou uma perceptível mudança em sua atividade e em sua interferência no processo de tomada de decisões políticas pelos demais Poderes. Valendo-se dos diversos instrumentos de controle que lhe são disponibilizados, assumiu o compromisso de participar na efetivação dos preceitos constitucionais pátrios mediante a revisão do conteúdo normativo decorrente das escolhas políticas tomadas em outras instâncias. Desse modo, tornou-se verdadeiro copartícipe do processo de definição de políticas legislativas nacionais, seja rechaçando normas que repute inconstitucionais, seja proferindo decisões com claros efeitos normativos que buscam readequar e conformar as escolhas dos atores políticos. Nesse processo decisório, entra em jogo a intensidade com que a Corte busca impor sua visão e suas concepções no tocante à efetivação e concretização dos compromissos constitucionais. A sobreposição de ponderações judiciais e legislativas acarreta, a seu turno, importantes efeitos sistêmicos ao diálogo interinstitucional que se desenvolve entre os Poderes, em especial no que concerne à distribuição das funções estatais dentro das premissas democráticas e ao dimensionamento do papel que compete a cada um dos Poderes no processo de efetivação e proteção da Constituição.

What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU Institutional Framework?

he principle of subsidiarity refers in general to the choice of the most suitable and efficient level for taking policy action. The European Union associates subsidiarity with the way of taking decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’, as it is referred to in the EU treaties. Thus, ensuring the respect of subsidiarity within the EU legislative framework ensures that any EU action is justified when proposing draft legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty establishes new mechanisms reinforcing subsidiarity control, both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process, and by doing so, enhances mainly the role of the national parliaments (and to a lesser extent the regional parliaments) and the Committee of the Regions. But in the end, this is a way of ensuring legitimacy of the EU action as it is quite often questioned, especially in times of crisis. Years of practice will tell whether the words will join reality.

Why come here if I can go there? Assessing the ‘Attractiveness’ of the EU’s Blue Card Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants. Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 60, 14 October 2013

This paper analyses the attractiveness of the EU’s Blue Card Directive – the flagship of the EU’s labour immigration policy – for so-called ‘highly qualified’ immigrant workers from outside the EU. For this purpose, the paper deconstructs the understanding of ‘attractiveness’ in the Blue Card Directive as shaped by the various EU decision-making actors during the legislative process. It is argued that the Blue Card Directive sets forth minimum standards providing for a common floor – not a common ceiling: the Directive did not, as originally envisaged by the European Commission, create one European highly skilled admission scheme. This raises questions regarding its concrete use. A critical focus is placed on the personal scope of the Blue Card Directive and the level of rights offered, and a first comparative perspective on the implementation of the Directive in five member states is provided.

EU Democratic Legitimacy and National Parliaments. CEPS Essay No. 7, 25 November 2013

The role of national parliaments in the EU has been at the centre of a long debate. Since the Maastricht treaty, new powers to the EU level have been accompanied not only by an increasing role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process, but also by a number of declarations and protocols to ensure that national parliaments received the information and documents required to effectively monitor their governments in EU affairs. The Lisbon Treaty extended the guarantees and also included new modes of direct participation. The proper use of the mechanisms in place, namely, the subsidiarity checks, the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament, has become of vital importance in view of recent developments in EU economic policy and beyond. The choice for increasing inter-governmentalism in decision-making and the centralisation of the implementing and supervisory powers in the Commission and the Central Bank have raised questions about political accountability and the appropriate involvement of parliaments. However, the extent to which national parliaments should be more involved is also rather controversial. This essay examines the difficulty of defining and addressing the question of the democratic legitimacy in the EU. It examines the role of the national parliaments in the treaties and explores ways in which they can contribute to improving that legitimacy.

EU climate and energy policy: hope for more and better climate policy integration? IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/02/January 2014

Summary. With discussions on-going in the EU on the climate and energy policy framework to 2030, it is timely to assess the reality of climate policy integration into EU energy policy. Such an analysis can lead to lessons for the legislative process for the 2030 package, and even for policies in other sectors and beyond 2030. Climate change is a complex, crosscutting, long-term and global problem. Policymakers acknowledge that integrating climate policy objectives into the elaboration and agreement of measures in other sectors represents one method for striving towards coherent policies that respond adequately to the climate change problem. This policy brief presents the results and policy recommendations from the project “climate policy integration into EU energy policy”.

Interest Representation as a Clash of Unequal Allies

Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas in Congress. They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House committees. If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals they must rely on and work through members of Congress. As an interest group seeks to move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges it faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies. Legislative allies are members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the group’s policy needs (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76). For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it competes with other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the help of members of Congress that are willing to expend their time and effort to advocate for its policy positions (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). Given the importance of legislative allies to interest group success, are some organized interests better able to recruit legislative allies than others? This question has received little attention in the literature. This dissertation offers an original theoretical framework describing both when we should expect some types of interests to generate more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their effectiveness at mobilizing these allies toward effective legislative advocacy. It then tests these theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in the legislative process that many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, interest representation on legislative committees. The dissertation uncovers pervasive evidence that interests with a presence across more congressional districts stand a better chance of having legislative allies on their key committees. It also reveals that interests with greater amounts of leverage over jobs and economic investment will be better positioned to win more allies on key committees. In addition, interests with a policy agenda that closely overlaps with the jurisdiction of just one committee in Congress are more likely to have legislative allies on their key committees than are interests that have a policy agenda divided across many committee jurisdictions. In short, how groups are distributed across districts, the leverage that interests have over local jobs and economic investment, and how committee jurisdictions align with their policy goals affects their influence in Congress.

Expanding our Constitutional Horizons: A Comprehensive Study of Quasi-Constitutionality in Canada

A number of laws in Canada which uphold rights are referred to as quasi-constitutional by the courts in recognition of their special importance. Quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted through the regular legislative process, although they are being interpreted and applied in a fashion which has become remarkably similar to constitutional law, and are therefore having an important affect over other legislation. Quasi-constitutionality has surprisingly received limited scholarly attention, and very few serious attempts at explaining its significance have been made. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive study of quasi-constitutionality which considers its theoretical basis, its interpretation and legal significance, as well as its similarities to comparable forms of law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part I examines the theoretical basis of quasi-constitutionality and its relationship to the Constitution. As a statutory and common law form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutionality is shown to signify an association with the Canadian Constitution and the foundational principles that underpin it. Part II proceeds to consider the special rules of interpretation applied to quasi-constitutional legislation, the basis of this interpretative approach, and the connection between the interpretation of similar provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation and the Constitution. As a statutory form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutional legislation is given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation which significantly expands the rights which they protect. The theoretical basis of this approach is found in both the fundamental nature of the rights upheld by quasi-constitutional legislation as well as legislative intent. Part III explores how quasi-constitutional statutes affect the interpretation of regular legislation and how they are used for the purposes of judicial review. Quasi-constitutional legislation has a significant influence over regular statutes in the interpretative exercise, which in some instances results in conflicting statutes being declared inoperable. The basis of this form of judicial review is demonstrated to be rooted in statutory interpretation, and as such it provides an interesting model of rights protection and judicial review that is not conflated to constitutional and judicial supremacy.

Actores y factores del contexto institucional que permiten entender la discusión y aprobación de la Ley 975 de 2005

El trabajo de investigación es un estudio de caso que pretende analizar la forma en que factores del contexto institucional y la capacidad de influencia de ciertos actores se reflejan en la discusión y aprobación de la Ley 975 de 2005. Factores del contexto institucional y la capacidad de influencia sobre las posiciones asumidas por los actores políticos y sociales en las diferentes etapas del proceso legislativo y sobre las decisiones que se tomaron para la aprobación de la Ley, en torno a dos elementos fundamentales de ésta que son el delito político y la rebaja de penas. Para ello, se tiene en cuenta el enfoque neo-institucional y el concepto de agencia.

Compliance aware business process design

Historically, business process design has been driven by business objectives, specifically process improvement. However this cannot come at the price of control objectives which stem from various legislative, standard and business partnership sources. Ensuring the compliance to regulations and industrial standards is an increasingly important issue in the design of business processes. In this paper, we advocate that control objectives should be addressed at an early stage, i.e., design time, so as to minimize the problems of runtime compliance checking and consequent violations and penalties. To this aim, we propose supporting mechanisms for business process designers. This paper specifically presents a support method which allows the process designer to quantitatively measure the compliance degree of a given process model against a set of control objectives. This will allow process designers to comparatively assess the compliance degree of their design as well as be better informed on the cost of non-compliance.

State of Iowa Appropriations Process, 2013

State of Iowa Appropriations Process. Flow chart of the process.

Budget Process in Iowa, September 18, 2008

Budget Process: The Governor and the State Legislature appropriate the state resources after the revenue receipts are estimated by the Revenue Estimating Conference.

Issue review : Iowa's expenditure limitation process.

This issue review provides a review of Iowa's expenditure law and recent statutory and session-law changes that have changed the process. This issue review also includes examples from the fiscal year 2013 budget enacted during the 2012 legislative session to help explain how the various aspects of the expenditure limitation law are applied to legislative decision making. At the end of this issue review is a schematic showing the distribution of fiscal year 2012 general fund surplus revenues when the expenditure limitation provisions are applied.

Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.