Practice and Procedure. Self-executing order - construction - whether further judicial at required for self-executing order to take effect

In Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2010] QCA 207, a self-executing order had been made in consequence of continuing default by parties to the proceedings in meeting their disclosure obligations. The case involved several questions about the construction and implications of the self-executing order. This note focuses on the aspects of the case relating to that order.

Civil applications in the Magistrates Court are often set down for hearing by a judicial registrar, but there is now some uncertainty on the limitation of this practice

The decision of the District Court of Queensland in Mark Treherne & Associates -v- Murray David Hopkins [2010] QDC 36 will have particular relevance for early career lawyers. This decision raises questions about the limits of the jurisdiction of judicial registrars in the Magistrates Court.

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, s 32 - Duty to Disclose - consequences of non-disclosure - discretion to excuse non-compliance

In Newson v Aust Scan Pty Ltd t/a Ikea Springwood [2010] QSC 223 the Supreme Court examined the discretion under s 32(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), to permit a document which has not been disclosed as required by the pre-court procedures under the PIPA to be used in a subsequent court proceeding. This appears to be the first time that the nature and parameters of the discretion have been judicially considered.

Judicial and legislative considerations in the taxation of compensation receipts : an international comparison

In 1995, the Federal Commissioner of Taxation released Taxation Ruling TR 95/35 in an attempt to comprehensively address the appropriate capital gains tax treatment of a receipt of compensation, awarded either by the courts or via a settlement. The ruling was in response to the numerous, somewhat contradictory, court decisions of the early 1990s. Despite the release of TR 95/35, there still appears to be a lack of consensus as to the appropriate treatment of such awards. It has been suggested that the only way a taxpayer can, with any certainty, determine their liability is to obtain a private binding ruling, a far from satisfactory situation. In an attempt to clarify what the capital gains tax consequences of a compensation receipt should be, this article examines the Australian position and explores the comparative jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and Canada to ascertain whether the Australian attitude is consistent with these international jurisdictions. This article concludes that while the jurisdictions, through differing approaches, achieve a similar result, there is still a need to address the uncertainties that remain.

UCPR rule 687 - exercise of discretion to fix costs - applicable principles

Although the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) have always included a power for the court to order a party to pay an amount for costs to be fixed by the court, until recently the power was rarely used in the higher courts. In light of recent practice directions, and the changes to the procedures for assessment of costs contained in the new Chapter 17A of the UCPR, this is no longer the case. The judgment of Mullins J in ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 9 provides some helpful guidance for practitioners about the principles which might be applied.

Prosecutorial discretion in assisted dying in Canada : a proposal for charging guidelines

An Expert Panel of the Royal Society of Canada and a Select Committee of the Québec National Assembly both recently recommended the issuance of permissive guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide and “medical aid in dying” respectively. It seems timely, therefore, to propose a set of offence-specific guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canadian provinces and territories. We take as our starting point the only existing guidelines of this sort currently in force in the world (i.e. the British Columbia Guidelines, and the England and Wales Guidelines). In light of certain concerns we have with these guidelines, we outline an approach to constructing guidelines for Canadian jurisdictions that begins with identifying three guiding principles we argue are appropriate for this purpose (respect for autonomy, the need for high-quality prosecutorial decision making, and the importance of public confidence in that decision making), and ends with a concrete and detailed set of proposed guidelines. The paper is consistent with, but also extends, the work of the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End of Life Decision Making. Un panel d’expert de la Société Royale du Canada et une Commission spéciale de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec ont tous les deux récemment recommandé que soit émises des directives permettant exercice d’un pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire concernant l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté et « l’assistance médicale pour mourir », respectivement. Il semble donc à propos de proposer une série de directives spécifiques aux offenses sur la façon dont le pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire dans les territoires et provinces canadiennes serait appliqué dans les cas d’euthanasie et de suicide assisté. Nous avons pris comme point de départ les seules directives de la sorte existant déjà (c’est-à-dire celle de la Colombie-Britannique et de l’Angleterre et du Pays de Galles). Par contre, compte tenu de certaines de nos réserves concernant ces directives, nous avons ensuite établi les grandes lignes d’une approche permettant de mettre sur pied des directives pour les juridictions canadiennes, qui débute par l’identification de trois principes de base qui sont selon nous appropriées à cette fin (respect de l’autonomie, besoin pour une grande qualité de prise de prise de décision du poursuivant et la confiance du public envers cette prise de décision) pour se terminer par une série de directives concrètes et détaillées. Le présent document est compatible avec le travail de la Société royale du Canada tout en en augmentant la portée.

The Role of the Judiciary in Earth Jurisprudence : An Analysis of Judicial Approaches to Standing in Climate Change and Environmental Justice Litigation

The role of the judiciary in common law systems is to create law, interpret law and uphold the law. As such decisions by courts on matters related to ecologically sustainable development, natural resource use and management and climate change make an important contribution to earth jurisprudence. There are examples where judicial decisions further the goals of earth jurisprudence and examples where decisions go against the principles of earth jurisprudence. This presentation will explore judicial approaches to standing in Australia and America. The paper will explore two trends in each jurisdiction. Approaches by American courts to standing will be examined in reference to climate change and environmental justice litigation. While Australian approaches to standing will be examined in the context of public interest litigation and environmental criminal negligence cases. The presentation will draw some conclusions about the role of standing in each of these cases and implications of this for earth jurisprudence.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Judicial intervention in the affairs of unincorporated religious associations in New South Wales

The leading Australian High Court case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 confirmed that associations which are 'social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in character’, and not formed ‘for private gain or material advantage’, are usually formed on a basis of mutual consent. Unless there is some clear, positive indication that the members wish to relate to each other in a legal fashion, the rules of the association will not be treated as an enforceable contract in contrast to the rules of incorporated bodies. Australian unincorporated associations experiencing internal disputes, like those in most other common law jurisdictions, have found courts reluctant to provide a remedy unless there is a proprietary interest or trust to protect. This is further compounded by the judicial view that an unincorporated association has no legal recognition as a ‘juristic person’. The right to hold property and the ability to sue and be sued are incidences of this recognition. By contrast, the law recognises ‘artificial’ legal persons such as corporations, who are given rights to hold property and to sue and be sued. However, when a number of individuals associate together for a non-commercial, lawful purpose, but not by way of a corporate structure, legal recognition ‘as a group’ is denied. Since 1934, a significant number of cases have distinguished or otherwise declined to follow this precedent of the High Court. A trenchant criticism is found in McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295, 298 where Wootten J said that ‘citizens are entitled to look to the courts for the same assistance in resolving disputes about the conduct of sporting, political and social organisations as they can expect in relation to commercial institutions’. According to Wootten J at 298, if disputes are not settled by the courts, this would create a ‘legal-no-man's land, in which disputes are settled not in accordance with justice and the fulfilment of deliberately undertaken obligations, but by deceit, craftiness, and an arrogant disregard of rights’. Cameron v Hogan was decided in 1934. There is an increasing volume of first instance cases which distinguish or, in the words of Palmer J, ‘just pay lip service’ to this High Court decision. (Coleman v Liberal Party of Australia (2007) 212 FLR 271, 278). The dissenting cases seem to call for a judicial policy initiative. This would require recognition by judges that voluntary associations play a significant role in society and that members have a legitimate, enforceable expectation that the rules of the association will be observed by members and in the last resort, enforced by the courts without the need to prove contractual intention, the existence of a trust or the existence of a right of a proprietary nature. This thesis asks: what legal, as distinct from political, redress does an ordinary member have, when a rule is made or a process followed which is contrary to the underlying doctrines and philosophies embodied in the constitutional documents of an unincorporated religious association? When, if at all, will a court intervene to ensure doctrinal purity or to supervise the daily life of a large unincorporated religious association? My research objective is to examine and analyse leading cases and relevant legislation on the enforceability of the constitutions of large, unincorporated, religious associations with particular reference to the Anglican Church in New South Wales. Given its numerical size, wide geographical spread and presence since the foundation of New South Wales, the Anglican Church in New South Wales, contains a sufficient variety of ‘real life’ situations to be representative of the legal issues posed by Cameron v Hogan which may be faced by other large, unincorporated, religious associations in New South Wales. In contemporary society, large, unincorporated, religious associations play an important community role. The resolution of internal disputes in such associations should not remain captive to legal doctrines of an earlier age.

The Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service : process corruption and the limits of judicial reflexivity

This paper will offer an examination of the Reports of the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service (Interim Report February 1996; Interim Report: Immediate Measures November 1996; Final Report Vol I: Corruption; Final Report Vol II: Reform; Final Report Vol III: Appendices May 1997) excluding the Report on Paedophilia, August 1997. The examination will be confined essentially to one question: to what extent do the published Reports consider the part played by the judiciary, prosecutors and lawyers, in the construction of a form of criminal justice revealed by the Commission itself, to be disfigured by serious process corruption? The examination will be conducted by way of a chronological trawl through the Reports of the Commission in an attempt to identify all references to the role of the judiciary, prosecutors and lawyers. The adequacy of any such treatment will then be considered. In order to set the scene a brief and generalised overview of the Wood Commission will be offered together with the Commission's definition of process corruption.

Default judgment - whether irregular - whether court has residual discretion not to set aside default judgment irregularly entered

In CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 399 McGill DCJ examined whether the court now has a discretion to set aside an irregularly entered default judgment.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in a patient's best interests : Australian judicial deliberations

•Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging. Judicial resolution may be needed in some of these cases. •A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision making in this area is a patient's “best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. •There is an emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient's best interests. •Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient's best interests. Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.

Environmental Crime and Specialist Courts: The case for a ‘One-Stop (Judicial) Shop’ in Queensland

The increasing international political, public and scientific engagement in matters of environmental sustainability and development has produced a rapidly expanding body of environmental law and policy. The advent of international protocols, directives, and multilateral agreements has occurred concomitantly with the harmonisation of widespread environmental regimes of governance and enforcement within numerous domestic settings. This has created an unprecedented need for environmental legal apparatuses to manage, regulate and adjudicate legislation seeking to protect, sustain and develop global natural habitats. The evolving literature in green criminology continues to explore these developments within discourses of power, harm and justice. Such critiques have emphasised the role of dedicated environmental courts to address environmental crimes and injustices. In this article, we examine the important role of specialist courts in responding to environmental crime, with specific reference to the State of Queensland. We offer a critique of existing processes and practices for the adjudication of environmental crime and propose new jurisdictional and procedural approaches for enhancing justice. We conclude that specialist environmental courts endowed with broad civil and criminal jurisdiction are an integral part of an effective response to environmental crime.