Spread trading strategy for intraday short term interest rate futures markets

Neste trabalho analisaram-se estratégias de spread calendário de contratos futuros de taxa de juros de curto prazo (STIR – Short Term Interest Rate) em operações de intraday trade. O spread calendário consiste na compra e venda simultânea de contratos de STIR com diferentes maturidades. Cada um dos contratos individualmente se comporta de forma aleatória e dificilmente previsível. No entanto, no longo prazo, pares de contratos podem apresentar um comportamento comum, com os desvios de curto prazo sendo corrigidos nos períodos seguintes. Se este comportamento comum for empiricamente confirmado, há a possibilidade de desenvolver uma estratégia rentável de trading. Para ser bem sucedida, esta estratégia depende da confirmação da existência de um equilíbrio de longo prazo entre os contratos e a definição do limite de spread mais adequado para a mudança de posições entre os contratos. Neste trabalho, foram estudadas amostras de 1304 observações de 5 diferentes séries de spread, coletadas a cada 10 minutos, durante um período de 1 mês. O equilíbrio de longo prazo entre os pares de contratos foi testado empiricamente por meio de modelos de cointegração. Quatro pares mostraram-se cointegrados. Para cada um destes, uma simulação permitiu a estimação de um limite que dispararia a troca de posições entre os contratos, maximizando os lucros. Uma simulação mostrou que a aplicação deste limite, levando em conta custos de comissão e risco de execução, permitiria obter um fluxo de caixa positivo e estável ao longo do tempo.

An empirical comparison of forward-rate and spot-rate models for valuing interest-rate options

Our main goal is to investigate the question of which interest-rate options valuation models are better suited to support the management of interest-rate risk. We use the German market to test seven spot-rate and forward-rate models with one and two factors for interest-rate warrants for the period from 1990 to 1993. We identify a one-factor forward-rate model and two spot-rate models with two faetors that are not significant1y outperformed by any of the other four models. Further rankings are possible if additional cri teria are applied.

Aggregate vs disaggregate data analysis: a paradox in the estimation of money demand function of Japan under the low interest rate policy

We investigate the issue of whether there was a stable money demand function for Japan in 1990's using both aggregate and disaggregate time series data. The aggregate data appears to support the contention that there was no stable money demand function. The disaggregate data shows that there was a stable money demand function. Neither was there any indication of the presence of liquidity trapo Possible sources of discrepancy are explored and the diametrically opposite results between the aggregate and disaggregate analysis are attributed to the neglected heterogeneity among micro units. We also conduct simulation analysis to show that when heterogeneity among micro units is present. The prediction of aggregate outcomes, using aggregate data is less accurate than the prediction based on micro equations. Moreover. policy evaluation based on aggregate data can be grossly misleading.

Bahamas and Barbados: empirical evidence of interest rate pass-through

Includes bibliography

Exchange Rate Stabilization and IMF High Interest Rate Policy: A Critical Reconsideration Using a Dynamic Model

This paper examines whether the IMF high interest rate policy was suitable for crisis-ridden East Asian economies. Using an "overshoot" model similar to that of Dornbusch's (1976), it shows that this sort of policy might cause an unnecessary deflationary adjusting process and have no effect on containing the real depreciation of exchange rates in the long run. The study also demonstrates that Thai economic data coincides quite well with the model presented here. Finally, it points out that the high interest policy itself might provoke high risk-premium, the existence of which, in turn, justifies the policy. This means that the policy has a self-fulfilling property. In conclusion, a "one-size-fits-all" adaptation of high interest rate policy in a currency crisis is very dangerous in general, and was inappropriate for East Asia. The desirable policy would have been to let currencies depreciate and keep interest rates stable.

Larry Summers’ interest rate conundrum. CEPS Hi-level Brief, 16 January 2014

Larry Summers has attracted much attention recently for invoking old theories of secular stagnation to explain the persistence of low interest rates in the recent past. The German economist Carl Christian von Weizsäcker has pointed to a retirement savings glut as the cause for low rates. In the view of Thomas Mayer, however, as expressed in this High-Level Brief, these theses lack both theoretical and empirical support and he offers as an alternative explanation the fall-out from the recent credit boom-bust cycle.

Did quantitative easing affect interest rates outside the US? New evidence based on interest rate differentials. CEPS Working Document No. 416/January 2016

This paper explores the effects of non-standard monetary policies on international yield relationships. Based on a descriptive analysis of international long-term yields, we find evidence that long-term rates followed a global downward trend prior to as well as during the financial crisis. Comparing interest rate developments in the US and the eurozone, it is difficult to detect a distinct impact of the first round of the Fed’s quantitative easing programme (QE1) on US interest rates for which the global environment – the global downward trend in interest rates – does not account. Motivated by these findings, we analyse the impact of the Fed’s QE1 programme on the stability of the US-euro long-term interest rate relationship by using a CVAR (cointegrated vector autoregressive) model and, in particular, recursive estimation methods. Using data gathered between 2002 and 2014, we find limited evidence that QE1 caused the break-up or destabilised the transatlantic interest rate relationship. Taking global interest rate developments into account, we thus find no significant evidence that QE had any independent, distinct impact on US interest rates.

Amending the Financial institutions regulatory and interest rate control act : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on H.R. 1903 ... February 21, 1979.

"Serial 96-27."

The causes and consequences of recent interest rate movements : hearings before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, second session, June 8 and July 24, 1984.

Mode of access: Internet.

Interest rate levels of FmHA loan programs [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Credit and Rural Electrification and the Subcommittee on Rural Development of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, June 10, 1980.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.