Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Multidimensional schemes for hyperbolic conservation laws on triangular meshes

Genuinely multidimensional schemes, hyperbolic systems, wave equations, Euler equations, evolution Galerkin schemes, space-time conservative methods, high order accuracy, shock solutions

Zoonomia; or, The Laws of Organic Life ... by Erasmus Darwin ...

2

Zoonomia; or, The Laws of Organic Life ... by Erasmus Darwin ...

1

Numerical methods for multiphase mixture conservation laws with phase transition

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2010

Minimal truncations of supersingular p-divisible groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Traverso's isogeny conjecture for p-divisible groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document adjunt."

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

Power laws and scaling of rain events and dry spells in the Catalonia region

We analyze the statistics of rain-event sizes, rain-event durations, and dry-spell durations in a network of 20 rain gauges scattered in an area situated close to the NW Mediterranean coast. Power-law distributions emerge clearly for the dryspell durations, with an exponent around 1.50 ± 0.05, although for event sizes and durations the power-law ranges are rather limited, in some cases. Deviations from power-law behavior are attributed to finite-size effects. A scaling analysis helps to elucidate the situation, providing support for the existence of scale invariance in these distributions. It is remarkable that rain data of not very high resolution yield findings in agreement with self-organized critical phenomena.

Pandemic influenza control in Europe and the constraints resulting from incoherent public health laws.

Background With the emergence of influenza H1N1v the world is facing its first 21st century global pandemic. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza H5N1 prompted development of pandemic preparedness plans. National systems of public health law are essential for public health stewardship and for the implementation of public health policy[1]. International coherence will contribute to effective regional and global responses. However little research has been undertaken on how law works as a tool for disease control in Europe. With co-funding from the European Union, we investigated the extent to which laws across Europe support or constrain pandemic preparedness planning, and whether national differences are likely to constrain control efforts. Methods We undertook a survey of national public health laws across 32 European states using a questionnaire designed around a disease scenario based on pandemic influenza. Questionnaire results were reviewed in workshops, analysing how differences between national laws might support or hinder regional responses to pandemic influenza. Respondents examined the impact of national laws on the movements of information, goods, services and people across borders in a time of pandemic, the capacity for surveillance, case detection, case management and community control, the deployment of strategies of prevention, containment, mitigation and recovery and the identification of commonalities and disconnects across states. Results Results of this study show differences across Europe in the extent to which national pandemic policy and pandemic plans have been integrated with public health laws. We found significant differences in legislation and in the legitimacy of strategic plans. States differ in the range and the nature of intervention measures authorized by law, the extent to which borders could be closed to movement of persons and goods during a pandemic, and access to healthcare of non-resident persons. Some states propose use of emergency powers that might potentially override human rights protections while other states propose to limit interventions to those authorized by public health laws. Conclusion These differences could create problems for European strategies if an evolving influenza pandemic results in more serious public health challenges or, indeed, if a novel disease other than influenza emerges with pandemic potential. There is insufficient understanding across Europe of the role and importance of law in pandemic planning. States need to build capacity in public health law to support disease prevention and control policies. Our research suggests that states would welcome further guidance from the EU on management of a pandemic, and guidance to assist in greater commonality of legal approaches across states.