Social rules for managing attempted interpersonal domination in the workplace: Influence of status and gender.

The present study utilized a social rules approach to investigate the relative influence of gender and status on managers' self-evaluations of their effectiveness in handling a dominating subordinate. In the first study 84 White middle-class participants identified the prescriptive and proscriptive rules for socially appropriate responding to a stimulus situation involving a pushy subordinate. Four rule sets were identified for female and male managers and subordinates, respectively. Rule-sets shared a number of common rules and showed some variation according to gender roles. In the second study, 91 White middle-class participants rated the individual rules for importance and also rated their personal and managerial effectiveness when responding to the stimulus situation using gender- and status-consistent and gender-and status-inconsistent response strategies. Both men and women rated the female gender and status- consistent strategy as most effective, and rated the status-inconsistent strategy as less effective than a gender-inconsistent response. Results were interpreted as providing more support for a situational gender-related theory of workplace behavior, rather than a traditional gender role perspective.

Prática de ensino supervisionado no 1.º e 2.º ciclo do ensino básico: a desenvolvimento da consciência linguística num 1.º ano de escolaridade

Relatório de Estágio apresentado à Escola Superior de Educação de Lisboa para obtenção de grau de mestre em Ensino do 1.º e do 2.º Ciclo do Ensino Básico

Root-locus practical sketching rules for fractional-order system

For integer-order systems, there are well-known practical rules for RL sketching. Nevertheless, these rules cannot be directly applied to fractional-order (FO) systems. Besides, the existing literature on this topic is scarce and exclusively focused on commensurate systems, usually expressed as the ratio of two noninteger polynomials. The practical rules derived for those do not apply to other symbolic expressions, namely, to transfer functions expressed as the ratio of FO zeros and poles. However, this is an important case as it is an extension of the classical integer-order problem usually addressed by control engineers. Extending the RL practical sketching rules to such FO systems will contribute to decrease the lack of intuition about the corresponding system dynamics. This paper generalises several RL practical sketching rules to transfer functions specified as the ratio of FO zeros and poles. The subject is presented in a didactic perspective, being the rules applied to several examples.

Derivation methods for hybrid knowledge bases with rules and ontologies

Trabalho apresentado no âmbito do Mestrado em Engenharia Informática, como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática

Efficient paraconsistent reasoning with rules and ontologies for the semantic web

Ontologies formalized by means of Description Logics (DLs) and rules in the form of Logic Programs (LPs) are two prominent formalisms in the field of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. While DLs adhere to the OpenWorld Assumption and are suited for taxonomic reasoning, LPs implement reasoning under the Closed World Assumption, so that default knowledge can be expressed. However, for many applications it is useful to have a means that allows reasoning over an open domain and expressing rules with exceptions at the same time. Hybrid MKNF knowledge bases make such a means available by formalizing DLs and LPs in a common logic, the Logic of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure (MKNF). Since rules and ontologies are used in open environments such as the Semantic Web, inconsistencies cannot always be avoided. This poses a problem due to the Principle of Explosion, which holds in classical logics. Paraconsistent Logics offer a solution to this issue by assigning meaningful models even to contradictory sets of formulas. Consequently, paraconsistent semantics for DLs and LPs have been investigated intensively. Our goal is to apply the paraconsistent approach to the combination of DLs and LPs in hybrid MKNF knowledge bases. In this thesis, a new six-valued semantics for hybrid MKNF knowledge bases is introduced, extending the three-valued approach by Knorr et al., which is based on the wellfounded semantics for logic programs. Additionally, a procedural way of computing paraconsistent well-founded models for hybrid MKNF knowledge bases by means of an alternating fixpoint construction is presented and it is proven that the algorithm is sound and complete w.r.t. the model-theoretic characterization of the semantics. Moreover, it is shown that the new semantics is faithful w.r.t. well-studied paraconsistent semantics for DLs and LPs, respectively, and maintains the efficiency of the approach it extends.

Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.

Basel III liquidity rules : measuring the impact on portuguese small banks activity

Mestrado em Finanças

Partially supervised learning of fuzzy classification rules

Fuzzy classification, semi-supervised learning, data mining

Lexico-grammatical variation in the use of REQUEST strategies in Indian and British "letters to the editor" : a cross-cultural pragmatic study

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Geistes-, Sozial- und Erziehungswiss., Diss., 2009

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.