793 resultados para Games with music.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Includes instructions for performance.
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Bibliography: p.[267]-269.
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We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.
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We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
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We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.
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We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferableutilitygame with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferableutilitygame. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.
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We examine assignment games, wherematched pairs of firms and workers create some monetary value to distribute among themselves and the agents aim to maximize their payoff. In the majority of this literature, externalities - in the sense that a pair’s value depends on the pairing of the others - have been neglected. However, inmost applications a firm’s success depends on, say, the success of its rivals and suppliers. Thus, it is natural to ask how the classical results on assignment games are affected by the introduction of externalities? The answer is – dramatically. We find that (i) a problem may have no stable outcome, (ii) stable outcomes can be inefficient (not maximize total value), (iii) efficient outcomes can be unstable, and (iv) the set of stable outcomes may not form a lattice. We show that stable outcomes always exist if agents are "pessimistic." This is a knife-edge result: there are problems in which the slightest optimism by a single pair erases all stable outcomes.
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In this LBD, we present several Apps for playing while learning music or for learning music while playing. The core of all the games is based on the good performance of the real-time audio interaction algorithms developed by the ATIC group at Universidad de Ma ́laga (SPAIN).
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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Shi shu wei Riben Shantian Yuanyilang, Gaoqiao Zhongcilang er ren yuan zhu ... yi yi wo guo zhi ge ci.
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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
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No clear evidence is available in the literature regarding the acute effect of different styles of music on cardiac autonomic control. The present study aimed to evaluate the acute effects of classical baroque and heavy metal musical auditory stimulation on Heart Rate Variability (HRV) in healthy men. In this study, HRV was analyzed regarding time (SDNN, RMSSD, NN50, and pNN50) and frequency domain (LF, HF, and LF / HF) in 12 healthy men. HRV was recorded at seated rest for 10 minutes. Subsequently, the participants were exposed to classical baroque or heavy metal music for five minutes through an earphone at seated rest. After exposure to the first song, they remained at rest for five minutes and they were again exposed to classical baroque or heavy metal music. The music sequence was random for each individual. Standard statistical methods were used for calculation of means and standard deviations. Besides, ANOVA and Friedman test were used for parametric and non-parametric distributions, respectively. While listening to heavy metal music, SDNN was reduced compared to the baseline (P = 0.023). In addition, the LF index (ms(2) and nu) was reduced during exposure to both heavy metal and classical baroque musical auditory stimulation compared to the control condition (P = 0.010 and P = 0.048, respectively). However, the HF index (ms(2)) was reduced only during auditory stimulation with music heavy metal (P = 0.01). The LF/HF ratio on the other hand decreased during auditory stimulation with classical baroque music (P = 0.019). Acute auditory stimulation with the selected heavy metal musical auditory stimulation decreased the sympathetic and parasympathetic modulation on the heart, while exposure to a selected classical baroque music reduced sympathetic regulation on the heart.
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In this project we review the effects of reputation within the context of game theory. This is done through a study of two key papers. First, we examine a paper from Fudenberg and Levine: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989). We add to this a review Gossner’s Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation (2011). We look specifically at scenarios in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run opponents, and how the former may develop a reputation. In turn, we show how reputation leads directly to both lower and upper bounds on the long-run player’s payoffs.
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Text in German and English.