138 resultados para Follower


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In the standard Schumpeterian-growth models only follower firms invest in R&D activities and larger economies grow faster. Since these results are counterfactual, this paper reveals that leader firms often support R&D activities and economic growth can be independent of the market size. In particular, the maintenance of R&D leadership increases with: (i) the technological-knowledge gap between leader and followers, since a firm-specific learning effect of accumulated technological knowledge from past R&D is considered, (ii) the leaders’ strategies that delay the next successful R&D supported by some follower firm, (iii) the market size, and (iv) the up-grade of each innovation.

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Dissertação apresentada à Escola Superior de Comunicação Social como parte dos requisitos para obtenção de grau de mestre em Publicidade e Marketing.

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We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the leader does not exist.

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Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

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On a symmetric differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by leading and follower firms, we show that the leading firm does not necessarily have advantage over the following one. The reason for this is that the second mover can adjust its output level after observing the realized demand, while the first mover chooses its output level only with the knowledge of demand distribution.

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We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.

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We consider a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty, only for the first mover. We study the advantages of leadership and flexibility with the variation of the demand uncertainty. Liu proved for demand uncertainty parameter greater than three that the follower firm can have an advantage with respect to the leading firm for some realizations of the demand intercept. Here, we prove that for demand uncertainty parameter less than three the leading firm is always in advantage.

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We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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Purpose: This work project should be inevitably deemed as a practical approach to a marketing problem; “How to engage low category users through the social media – the case of the make-up sector in Portugal”. Design/methodology/approach: Online structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews were used. The questionnaire was answered by 110 women aged from 15 to 45 years old and the interviews were conducted with 14 women of the same age. The interviews provided key insights for the questionnaire formulation. Findings: Women are poorly informed on make-up properties and characteristics, feeling a genuine concern in regard to this subject. Lack of time, occasional usage and skin damage are the main barriers for make-up usage by low category users. Overcoming these aspects pass by demystifying the association of make-up with skin damage and emphasise the functional and emotional benefits of make-up. Further, brands need to create contents more consumer-oriented and ask directly to fans/followers suggestions and other insights. Resort to Portuguese “common” women for greater empathy in campaigns, promote online meetings between followers and make-up professionals on social media; and finally take advantage of the hybrid condition of Facebook, which incorporates multiple forms of content presentation, including videos, the most appealing format of make-up presentation for women. Research limitations/implications: Further studies addressing this topic, by using larger samples and study of specific make-up brands and campaign programs, over social media to reach a solid growth potential of make-up market evidences in Portugal. Originality/ value: Make-up brands are emphasising their interest in linking social media and marketing their promotional mix around social marketing.

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The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

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ABSTRACT Samuel Bendahan, John Antonakis, Christian Zehnder, and François Pralong The relationship between power and immoral decisions has been discussed extensively by scientists and philosophers alike. Although the exercise of power is ubiquitous in social hierarchies, direct evidence on the impact of power on decision making is scarce. We use laboratory experiments to study whether more power leads to corruption. We manipulate power in the context of leader decision-making authority involving monetary stakes. Prior to the experiment, we also gathered extensive data on psychological and endocrinological individual differences. We find that an increase of power caused leaders to be more likely to engage in destructive, selfish behaviour, although the same subjects did not behave in this manner before their level of power was increased. We also show how individual differences affect the initial level of destructive behaviour and the corruption process. WHAT'S RIGHT FOR THE LEFT MAY NOT BE RIGHT FOR THE RIGHT: VALUE CONGRUENCE AND CHARISMA IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP Samuel Bendahan ABSTRACT Value congruence between leaders and followers is important not only for follower commitment but also as part of the attributions followers make of leaders. I theorized that transformational leadership, which often is referred to as being value driven and having strong moral foundations, has differential effects depending on the values of the follower and whether these values are congruent with what the leader espouses. I designed an experiment to analyze how the political values of followers and leaders can influence followers' attributions regarding leaders. Within the context of political leadership, I found that transformational leaders were seen as more prototypical. Value congruence predicted prototypicality, which was strongly related to follower intentions to vote for the leader. Furthermore, followers with left-wing political values were more influenced by prototypical leaders than were followers with right-wing political values, presumably because of moral overtones of both left-wing ideology and transformational leadership. JUDGING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL IN AN INTERVIEW: MODERATING EFFECT OF INTERVIEWER INTELLIGENCE ON INTERVIEWER COGNITIVE BUSYNESS, CANDIDATE PERFORMANCE-CUES EFFECTS, AND CANDIDATE ETHNICITY Samuel Bendahan, Philippe Jacquart, and John Antonakis ABSTRACT A large body of literature suggests that interviewers do not accurately rate candidates when using unstructured interviews and evaluation procedures that affect pre-interview expectations; however, the process by which these biases are produced is not well understood. We theorized several reasons for the sub-par performance of the unstructured interview. These factors, which we manipulated in the context of a videotaped interview of a candidate applying for a leadership position, include evaluator cognitive load, pre-interview performance cues regarding the candidate, and the ethnicity of the candidate. We also controlled for the intelligence of the evaluator. We found a significant four-way interaction between the manipulated factors and evaluators' cognitive abilities. The effects of the manipulated factors were all significantly less for evaluators who were high on general intelligence.

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Desarrollo de un robot seguidor de líneas, en el que se implementan diversas soluciones de las áreas de sistemas embebidos e inteligencia artificial.

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We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.