Essays on coordination problems in economics

No estudo da economia, há diversas situações em que a propensão de um indivíduo a tomar determinada ação é crescente na quantidade de outras pessoas que este indivíduo acredita que tomarão a mesma ação. Esse tipo de complementaridade estratégica geralmente leva à existência de múltiplos equilíbrios. Além disso, o resultado atingido pelas decisões decentralizadas dos agentes pode ser ineficiente, deixando espaço para intervenções de política econômica. Esta tese estuda diferentes ambientes em que a coordenação entre indivíduos é importante. O primeiro capítulo analisa como a manipulação de informação e a divulgação de informação afetam a coordenação entre investidores e o bem-estar em um modelo de corridas bancárias. No modelo, há uma autoridade reguladora que não pode se comprometer a revelar a verdadeira situação do setor bancário. O regulador observa informações idiossincráticas dos bancos (através de um stress test, por exemplo) e escolhe se revela essa informação para o público ou se divulga somente um relatório agregado sobre a saúde do sistema financeiro como um todo. O relatório agregado pode ser distorcido a um custo – um custo mais elevado significa maior credibilidade do regulador. Os investidores estão cientes dos incentivos do regulador a esconder más notícias do mercado, mas a manipulação de informação pode, ainda assim, ser efetiva. Se a credibilidade do regulador não for muito baixa, a política de divulgação de informação é estado-contingente, e existe sempre um conjunto de estados em que há manipulação de informação em equilíbrio. Se a credibilidade for suficientemente baixa, porém, o regulador opta por transparência total dos resultados banco-específicos, caso em que somente os bancos mais sólidos sobrevivem. Uma política de opacidade levaria a uma crise bancária sistêmica, independentemente do estado. O nível de credibilidade que maximiza o bem-estar agregado do ponto de vista ex ante é interior. O segundo e o terceiro capítulos estudam problemas de coordenação dinâmicos. O segundo capítulo analisa o bem-estar em um ambiente em que agentes recebem oportunidades aleatórias para migrar entre duas redes. Os resultados mostram que sempre que a rede de pior qualidade (intrínseca) prevalece, isto é eficiente. Na verdade, um planejador central estaria ainda mais inclinado a escolher a rede de pior qualidade. Em equilíbrio, pode haver mudanças ineficientes que ampliem a rede de qualidade superior. Quando indivíduos escolhem entre dois padrões ou redes com níveis de qualidade diferentes, se todos os indivíduos fizessem escolhas simultâneas, a solução eficiente seria que todos adotassem a rede de melhor qualidade. No entanto, quando há fricções e os agentes tomam decisões escalonadas, a solução eficiente difere ix do senso comum. O terceiro capítulo analisa um problema de coordenação dinâmico com decisões escalonadas em que os agentes são heterogêneos ex ante. No modelo, existe um único equilíbrio, caracterizado por thresholds que determinam as escolhas para cada tipo de agente. Apesar da heterogeneidade nos payoffs, há bastante conformidade nas ações individuais em equilíbrio. Os thresholds de diferentes tipos de agentes coincidem parcialmente contanto que exista um conjunto de crenças arbitrário que justifique esta conformidade. No entanto, as estratégias de equilíbrio de diferentes tipos nunca coincidem totalmente. Além disso, a conformidade não é ineficiente. A solução eficiente apresentaria estratégias ainda mais similares para tipos distintos em comparação com o equilíbrio decentralizado.

Economics and health promotion

Health promotion activities consume a growing proportion of health sector spending in most developed countries. Yet, there is still considerable debate in the non-economic literature about exactly what health promotion constitutes and precisely how its role is to be conceived. This paper provides one economic answer to such questions. It sets out an argument that health promotion may be viewed, through the lens of traditional welfare economics, as a response to problems of market failure. A Grossman-type health investment model is invoked to analyse individual deviations from equilibrium and the possible instruments and targets of health promotion policy. The paper concludes by suggesting some of the alternative conceptual approaches that might be brought to bear, as well as some ideas for empirical research.

Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology

(Magill, M., Quinzii, M., 2002. Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 149-190) showed that, in a stockmarket economy with private information, the moral hazard problem may be resolved provided that a spanning overlap condition is satisfed. This result depends on the assumption that the technology is given by a stochastic production function with a single scalar input. The object of the present paper is to extend the analysis of Magill and Quinzii to the case of multiple inputs. We show that their main result extends to this general case if and only if, for each firm, the number of linearly independent combinations of securities having payoffs correlated with, but not dependent on, the firms output is equal to the number of degrees of freedom in the firm's production technology.

Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

Az egyensúlyi ráták unicitása és a bérráta pozitivitása a Neumann-modell általánosításaiban (Uniqueness of equilibrium rates and the positive value of the wage rate in generalizations from the Neumann model)

Cikkünk arról a paradox jelenségről szól, hogy a fogyasztást explicit módon megjelenítő Neumann-modell egyensúlyi megoldásaiban a munkabért meghatározó létszükségleti termékek ára esetenként nulla lehet, és emiatt a reálbér egyensúlyi értéke is nulla lesz. Ez a jelenség mindig bekövetkezik az olyan dekomponálható gazdaságok esetén, amelyekben eltérő növekedési és profitrátájú, alternatív egyensúlyi megoldások léteznek. A jelenség sokkal áttekinthetőbb formában tárgyalható a modell Leontief-eljárásra épülő egyszerűbb változatában is, amit ki is használunk. Megmutatjuk, hogy a legnagyobbnál alacsonyabb szintű növekedési tényezőjű megoldások közgazdasági szempontból értelmetlenek, és így érdektelenek. Ezzel voltaképpen egyrészt azt mutatjuk meg, hogy Neumann kiváló intuíciója jól működött, amikor ragaszkodott modellje egyértelmű megoldásához, másrészt pedig azt is, hogy ehhez nincs szükség a gazdaság dekomponálhatóságának feltételezésére. A vizsgált téma szorosan kapcsolódik az általános profitráta meghatározásának - Sraffa által modern formába öntött - Ricardo-féle elemzéséhez, illetve a neoklasszikus növekedéselmélet nevezetes bér-profit, illetve felhalmozás-fogyasztás átváltási határgörbéihez, ami jelzi a téma elméleti és elmélettörténeti érdekességét is. / === / In the Marx-Neumann version of the Neumann model introduced by Morishima, the use of commodities is split between production and consumption, and wages are determined as the cost of necessary consumption. In such a version it may occur that the equilibrium prices of all goods necessary for consumption are zero, so that the equilibrium wage rate becomes zero too. In fact such a paradoxical case will always arise when the economy is decomposable and the equilibrium not unique in terms of growth and interest rate. It can be shown that a zero equilibrium wage rate will appear in all equilibrium solutions where growth and interest rate are less than maximal. This is another proof of Neumann's genius and intuition, for he arrived at the uniqueness of equilibrium via an assumption that implied that the economy was indecomposable, a condition relaxed later by Kemeny, Morgenstern and Thompson. This situation occurs also in similar models based on Leontief technology and such versions of the Marx-Neumann model make the roots of the problem more apparent. Analysis of them also yields an interesting corollary to Ricardo's corn rate of profit: the real cause of the awkwardness is bad specification of the model: luxury commodities are introduced without there being a final demand for them, and production of them becomes a waste of resources. Bad model specification shows up as a consumption coefficient incompatible with the given technology in the more general model with joint production and technological choice. For the paradoxical situation implies the level of consumption could be raised and/or the intensity of labour diminished without lowering the equilibrium rate of the growth and interest. This entails wasteful use of resources and indicates again that the equilibrium conditions are improperly specified. It is shown that the conditions for equilibrium can and should be redefined for the Marx-Neumann model without assuming an indecomposable economy, in a way that ensures the existence of an equilibrium unique in terms of the growth and interest rate coupled with a positive value for the wage rate, so confirming Neumann's intuition. The proposed solution relates closely to findings of Bromek in a paper correcting Morishima's generalization of wage/profit and consumption/investment frontiers.

A fizikai matematika legújabb eredményei mint a közgazdaság-tudomány lehetséges vizsgálati eszközei (The newest results of physical mathematics as the possible investigation tools of economics)

A közgazdaság-tudomány számos problémája a fizika analóg modelljeinek segítségével nyert megoldást. A közgazdászok körében erőteljesen megoszlanak a vélemények, hogy a közgazdasági modellek mennyire redukálhatók a fizika, vagy más természettudományok eredményeire. Vannak,akik pontosan ezzel magyarázzák,hogy a mai mainstream közgazdasági elmélet átalakult alkalmazott matematikává,ami a gazdasági kérdéseket csak a társadalom-tudományi vonatkozásaitól eltekintve képes vizsgálni. Mások, e tanulmányszerzője is, viszont úgy vélekednek, hogy a közgazdasági problémák egy része, ahol lehetőség van a mérésre, jól modellezhetők a természettudományok technikai arzenáljával. A másik része, amelyekben nem lehet mérni,s tipikusan ilyenek a társadalomtudományi kérdések, ott sokkal komplexebb technikákra lesz szükség. Etanulmány célkitűzése, hogy felvázolja a fizika legújabb, az irreverzibilis dinamika, a relativitáselmélet és a kvantummechanika sztochasztikus matematikai összefüggéseit, amelyekből a közgazdászok választhatnak egy-egy probléma megfogalmazásában és megoldásában. Például az időoperátorok pontos értelmezése jelentős fordulatot hozhat a makroökonómiai elméletekben; vagy az eddigi statikus egyensúlyi referencia pontokat felválthatják a dinamikus,időben változó sztochasztikus egyensúlyi referenciafüggvények, ami forradalmian új megvilágításba helyezhet számos társadalomtudományi, s főleg nemegyensúlyi közgazdasági kérdést.A termodinamika és a biológiai evolúció fogalmait és definícióit Paul A. Samuelson (1947) már adaptálta a közgazdaságtanban, viszont a kvantummechanika legújabb eredményeit, az időoperátorokat stb. nem érintette. E cikk azokat a legújabb fizikai, kémiai és biológiai matematikai összefüggéseket foglalja össze,amelyek hasznosak lehetnek a közgazdasági modellek komplexebb megfogalmazásához. ___________________ The aim of this paper is to out line the newest results of physics,i.e.,the stochastic mathematical relations of relativity theory and quantum mechanics as well as irreversible dynamics which can be applied for some economic problems.For example,the correct interpretation of time operators using for the macroeconomic theories may provide a serious improvement in approach to the reality.The stochastic dynamic equilibrium reference functions will take over the role of recent static equilibrium reference points,which may also reveal some nonequilibrium questions of macroeconomics.The concepts and definitions of thermodynamics and biological evolution have been adopted in economics by Paul A. Samuelson, but he did not concern the newest results of quantum mechanics, e.g., the time operators. Now we do it.In addition, following Samuelson,we show that von Neumann growth model cannot be explained as a peculiar extension of thermodynamic irreversibility.

From Anti-equilibrium to The Socialist System and Beyond

This essay attempts to understand János Kornai’s works from a political economy perspective. It argues that Kornai has significantly contributed to the formation of a new paradigm of political economy. The main endeavor of Kornai has been the combination of analytical concepts of economics with the empirical description of real economies. After a certain period of theoretical experimentation János Kornai formulated his research program that can be called the shortage economy explanation of the socialist system. The Economics of Shortage and The Socialist System have created a new theoretical paradigm in a framework in which it has become possible to establish a connection between the analytical and empirical, universal and historical aspects of the theory studying the socialist system as a real economic entity. János Kornai has built his analysis of the socialist system on the primary role of politics in the creation of economic institutions. In his present work on capitalism he has extended this thesis to the capitalist system. This seems to be an important contribution of his to a new political economy paradigm that is just in the process of formation.

Kornai’s DRSE Theory Versus General Equilibrium Theory

János Kornai’s DRSE theory (Kornai, 2014) follows the ex post model philosophy which radically rejects the ex ante set of conditions laid down by the dominant neoclassical school and the stringent limits of equilibrium, and defines its own premises for the functioning of capitalist economy. In other words, the DRSE theory represents an extremely novel trend among the various schools of economics. The theory is still only a verbal model with the following supporting pillars as the immanent features of the capitalist system: dynamism, rivalry and the surplus economy. (The English name of the theory uses the initial letters of the terms Dynamism, Rivalry, Surplus Economy). The dominance of the surplus economy, that is, oversupply is replaced by monopolistic competition, uncertainty over the volume of demand, Schumpeterian innovation, dynamism, technological progress, creative destruction and increasing return to scale with rivalry between producers and service providers for markets. This paper aims to examine whether the DRSE theory can be formulated as a formal mathematical model. We have chosen a special route to do this: first we explore the unreal ex ante assumptions of general equilibrium theory (Walras, 1874; Neumann, 1945), and then we establish some of the possible connections between the premises of DRSE, which include the crucial condition that just like in biological evolution, there is no fixed steady state in the evolutionary processes of market economy, not even as a point of reference. General equilibrium theory and DRSE theory are compared in the focus of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics.

Essays on exchange rate economics

Exchange rate economics has achieved substantial development in the past few decades. Despite extensive research, a large number of unresolved problems remain in the exchange rate debate. This dissertation studied three puzzling issues aiming to improve our understanding of exchange rate behavior. Chapter Two used advanced econometric techniques to model and forecast exchange rate dynamics. Chapter Three and Chapter Four studied issues related to exchange rates using the theory of New Open Economy Macroeconomics. ^ Chapter Two empirically examined the short-run forecastability of nominal exchange rates. It analyzed important empirical regularities in daily exchange rates. Through a series of hypothesis tests, a best-fitting fractionally integrated GARCH model with skewed student-t error distribution was identified. The forecasting performance of the model was compared with that of a random walk model. Results supported the contention that nominal exchange rates seem to be unpredictable over the short run in the sense that the best-fitting model cannot beat the random walk model in forecasting exchange rate movements. ^ Chapter Three assessed the ability of dynamic general-equilibrium sticky-price monetary models to generate volatile foreign exchange risk premia. It developed a tractable two-country model where agents face a cash-in-advance constraint and set prices to the local market; the exogenous money supply process exhibits time-varying volatility. The model yielded approximate closed form solutions for risk premia and real exchange rates. Numerical results provided quantitative evidence that volatile risk premia can endogenously arise in a new open economy macroeconomic model. Thus, the model had potential to rationalize the Uncovered Interest Parity Puzzle. ^ Chapter Four sought to resolve the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly, which refers to the inability of most international macro models to generate negative cross-correlations between real exchange rates and relative consumption across two countries as observed in the data. While maintaining the assumption of complete asset markets, this chapter introduced endogenously segmented asset markets into a dynamic sticky-price monetary model. Simulation results showed that such a model could replicate the stylized fact that real exchange rates tend to move in an opposite direction with respect to relative consumption. ^

Essays on Exchange Rate Economics

Exchange rate economics has achieved substantial development in the past few decades. Despite extensive research, a large number of unresolved problems remain in the exchange rate debate. This dissertation studied three puzzling issues aiming to improve our understanding of exchange rate behavior. Chapter Two used advanced econometric techniques to model and forecast exchange rate dynamics. Chapter Three and Chapter Four studied issues related to exchange rates using the theory of New Open Economy Macroeconomics. Chapter Two empirically examined the short-run forecastability of nominal exchange rates. It analyzed important empirical regularities in daily exchange rates. Through a series of hypothesis tests, a best-fitting fractionally integrated GARCH model with skewed student-t error distribution was identified. The forecasting performance of the model was compared with that of a random walk model. Results supported the contention that nominal exchange rates seem to be unpredictable over the short run in the sense that the best-fitting model cannot beat the random walk model in forecasting exchange rate movements. Chapter Three assessed the ability of dynamic general-equilibrium sticky-price monetary models to generate volatile foreign exchange risk premia. It developed a tractable two-country model where agents face a cash-in-advance constraint and set prices to the local market; the exogenous money supply process exhibits time-varying volatility. The model yielded approximate closed form solutions for risk premia and real exchange rates. Numerical results provided quantitative evidence that volatile risk premia can endogenously arise in a new open economy macroeconomic model. Thus, the model had potential to rationalize the Uncovered Interest Parity Puzzle. Chapter Four sought to resolve the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly, which refers to the inability of most international macro models to generate negative cross-correlations between real exchange rates and relative consumption across two countries as observed in the data. While maintaining the assumption of complete asset markets, this chapter introduced endogenously segmented asset markets into a dynamic sticky-price monetary model. Simulation results showed that such a model could replicate the stylized fact that real exchange rates tend to move in an opposite direction with respect to relative consumption.

Essays on the Economics of Higher Education

At least since the seminal works of Jacob Mincer, labor economists have sought to understand how students make higher education investment decisions. Mincer’s original work seeks to understand how students decide how much education to accrue; subsequent work by various authors seeks to understand how students choose where to attend college, what field to major in, and whether to drop out of college.

Broadly speaking, this rich sub-field of literature contributes to society in two ways: First, it provides a better understanding of important social behaviors. Second, it helps policymakers anticipate the responses of students when evaluating various policy reforms.

While research on the higher education investment decisions of students has had an enormous impact on our understanding of society and has shaped countless education policies, students are only one interested party in the higher education landscape. In the jargon of economists, students represent only the `demand side’ of higher education---customers who are choosing options from a set of available alternatives. Opposite students are instructors and administrators who represent the `supply side’ of higher education---those who decide which options are available to students.

For similar reasons, it is also important to understand how individuals on the supply side of education make decisions: First, this provides a deeper understanding of the behaviors of important social institutions. Second, it helps policymakers anticipate the responses of instructors and administrators when evaluating various reforms. However, while there is substantial literature understanding decisions made on the demand side of education, there is far less attention paid to decisions on the supply side of education.

This dissertation uses empirical evidence to better understand how instructors and administrators make decisions and the implications of these decisions for students.

In the first chapter, I use data from Duke University and a Bayesian model of correlated learning to measure the signal quality of grades across academic fields. The correlated feature of the model allows grades in one academic field to signal ability in all other fields allowing me to measure both ‘own category' signal quality and ‘spillover' signal quality. Estimates reveal a clear division between information rich Science, Engineering, and Economics grades and less informative Humanities and Social Science grades. In many specifications, information spillovers are so powerful that precise Science, Engineering, and Economics grades are more informative about Humanities and Social Science abilities than Humanities and Social Science grades. This suggests students who take engineering courses during their Freshman year make more informed specialization decisions later in college.

In the second chapter, I use data from the University of Central Arkansas to understand how universities decide which courses to offer and how much to spend on instructors for these courses. Course offerings and instructor characteristics directly affect the courses students choose and the value they receive from these choices. This chapter reveals the university preferences over these student outcomes which best explain observed course offerings and instructors. This allows me to assess whether university incentives are aligned with students, to determine what alternative university choices would be preferred by students, and to illustrate how a revenue neutral tax/subsidy policy can induce a university to make these student-best decisions.

In the third chapter, co-authored with Thomas Ahn, Peter Arcidiacono, and Amy Hopson, we use data from the University of Kentucky to understand how instructors choose grading policies. In this chapter, we estimate an equilibrium model in which instructors choose grading policies and students choose courses and study effort given grading policies. In this model, instructors set both a grading intercept and a return on ability and effort. This builds a rich link between the grading policy decisions of instructors and the course choices of students. We use estimates of this model to infer what preference parameters best explain why instructors chose estimated grading policies. To illustrate the importance of these supply side decisions, we show changing grading policies can substantially reduce the gender gap in STEM enrollment.

On the Economics and Politics of Mobility

Exit, Voice and Political Change: Evidence from Swedish Mass Migration to the United States. During the Age of Mass Migration, 30 million Europeans immigrated to the United States. We study the long-term political effects of this large-scale migration episode on origin communities using detailed historical data from Sweden. To instrument for emigration, we exploit severe local frost shocks that sparked an initial wave of emigration, interacted with within-country travel costs. Because Swedish emigration was highly path dependent, the initial shocks strongly predict total emigration over 50 years. Our estimates show that emigration substantially increased membership in local labor organizations, the strongest political opposition groups at the time. Furthermore, emigration caused greater strike participation, and mobilized voter turnout and support for left-wing parties in national elections. Emigration also had formal political effects, as measured by welfare expenditures and adoption of inclusive political institutions. Together, our findings indicate that large-scale emigration can achieve long-lasting effects on the political equilibrium in origin communities. Mass Migration and Technological Innovation at the Origin. This essay studies the effects of migration on technological innovations in origin communities. Using historical data from Sweden, we find that large-scale emigration caused a long-run increase in patent innovations in origin municipalities. Our IV estimate shows that a ten percent increase in emigration entails a 7 percent increase in a muncipality’s number of patents. Weighting patents by a measure of their economic value, the positive effects are further increased. Discussing possible mechanisms, we suggest that low skilled labor scarcity may be an explanation for these results.  Richer (and Holier) Than Thou? The Impact of Relative Income Improvements on Demand for Redistribution. We use a tailor-made survey on a Swedish sample to investigate how individuals' relative income affects their demand for redistribution. We first document that a majority misperceive their position in the income distribution and believe that they are poorer, relative to others, than they actually are. We then inform a subsample about their true relative income, and find that individuals who are richer than they initially thought demand less redistribution. This result is driven by individuals with prior right-of-center political preferences who view taxes as distortive and believe that effort, rather than luck, drives individual economic success. Wealth, home ownership and mobility. Rent controls on housing have long been thought to reduce labor mobility and allocative efficiency. We study a policy that allowed renters to purchase their rent-controlled apartments at below market prices, and examine the effects of home ownership and wealth on mobility. Treated individuals have a substantially higher likelihood of moving to a new home in a given year. The effect corresponds to a 30 percent increase from the control group mean. The size of the wealth shock predicts lower mobility, while the positive average effect can be explained by tenants switching from the previous rent-controlled system to market-priced condominiums. By contrast, we do not find that the increase in residential mobility leads to a greater probability of moving to a new place of work.

Equilibrium existence in the circle model with linear quadratic transport cost

We treat the problem of existence of a location-then-price equilibrium in the circle model with a linear quadratic type of transportation cost function which can be either convex or concave. We show the existence of a unique perfect equilibrium for the concave case when the linear and quadratic terms are equal and of a unique perfect equilibrium for the convex case when the linear term is equal to zero. Aside from these two cases, there are feasible locations by the firms for which no equilibrium in the price subgame exists. Finally, we provide a full taxonomy of the price equilibrium regions in terms of weights of the linear and quadratic terms in the cost function.