Solving Conflicting Beliefs with a Distributed Belief Revision Approach

The ability to solve conflicting beliefs is crucial for multi- agent systems where the information is dynamic, incomplete and dis- tributed over a group of autonomous agents. The proposed distributed belief revision approach consists of a distributed truth maintenance sy- stem and a set of autonomous belief revision methodologies. The agents have partial views and, frequently, hold disparate beliefs which are au- tomatically detected by system’s reason maintenance mechanism. The nature of these conflicts is dynamic and requires adequate methodolo- gies for conflict resolution. The two types of conflicting beliefs addressed in this paper are Context Dependent and Context Independent Conflicts which result, in the first case, from the assignment, by different agents, of opposite belief statuses to the same belief, and, in the latter case, from holding contradictory distinct beliefs. The belief revision methodology for solving Context Independent Con- flicts is, basically, a selection process based on the assessment of the cre- dibility of the opposing belief statuses. The belief revision methodology for solving Context Dependent Conflicts is, essentially, a search process for a consensual alternative based on a “next best” relaxation strategy.

Beliefs and Conflicts in a Real World Multi-Agent System

In a real world multiagent system, where the agents are faced with partial, incomplete and intrinsically dynamic knowledge, conflicts are inevitable. Frequently, different agents have goals or beliefs that cannot hold simultaneously. Conflict resolution methodologies have to be adopted to overcome such undesirable occurrences. In this paper we investigate the application of distributed belief revision techniques as the support for conflict resolution in the analysis of the validity of the candidate beams to be produced in the CERN particle accelerators. This CERN multiagent system contains a higher hierarchy agent, the Specialist agent, which makes use of meta-knowledge (on how the con- flicting beliefs have been produced by the other agents) in order to detect which beliefs should be abandoned. Upon solving a conflict, the Specialist instructs the involved agents to revise their beliefs accordingly. Conflicts in the problem domain are mapped into conflicting beliefs of the distributed belief revision system, where they can be handled by proven formal methods. This technique builds on well established concepts and combines them in a new way to solve important problems. We find this approach generally applicable in several domains.

The perception, beliefs and practices toward genitourinary schistosomiasis by inhabitants of selected endemic areas (Edo/Delta States) in south-eastern Nigeria

Well-structured questionnaire on the perception, impression and response to genitourinary bilharziasis (Genitourinary schistosomiasis) was administered and explained in local languages: 'Igbo' 'Esan' 'Ezon' Itshekiri and Bini to 33815 inhabitants of selected endemic areas in south-eastern Nigeria from January, 1999 to December, 2001. Out of this number, 3815 (11.3%) were properly filled and returned. About 42.0% of the inhabitants admitted knowledge of the disease, while 14 (0.4%) knew about the aetiologic agent. About 181 (5.0%) who responded, admitted procuring treatment, while 100 (5.0%) declined to seek treatment of any sort. The relationships between water-bodies and human activities, and infection were well discussed. Amongst those who admitted knowledge of the disease but no knowledge of its etiologic agent, declined seeking treatment of any kind, but believe the disease is a natural phenomenon in ones developmental stage and therefore of no morbidity and mortality. Laboratory analysis of urine, faeces, semen and HVS was employed to assess questionnaire responses, and in some cases, physical examination was utilized to augment laboratory analysis in confirming urinal diagnosis. Haematuria was only directly related to egg count in the early part of life. Females were significantly haematuric and excreted more ova than males (p < 0.05). Headache (43.0%) and fever (31.0%) were major clinical signs while sexual pains (22.0%) were the least.

Mothers' beliefs concerning severity and need for intervention in child maltreatment

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Psicologia Clínica e da Saúde

Beliefs in Koordinationsspielen : eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum besseren Verständnis der Gleichgewichtsauswahl

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Scepticism Revisited

Liberalism claims that for a subject S to be justified in believing p, a proposition about the external world, on the basis of his senses it is not necessary to be antecedently justified in believing propositions as there is an external world. On the other hand, conservatism claims that to be justified in believing that p on the basis of one’s perception, one must have antecedent justification to believe that p. Intuitively, we are inclined to think that liberalism about the structure of perceptual justification fits better with our epistemic practices. We acknowledge that, although we cannot produce warrant for the background belief in the external world, our empirical beliefs can be perceptually justified. However, I am interested in arguing that conservatism is theoretically better supported than liberalism. The first reason to defend this is based on the fact that in embracing liberalism dogmatism is affected by pervasive problems. The second one comes from recognizing the strength of the argument based on the thesis that experience is theory-laden. But not all are advantages for conservatism. Conservatism is presupposed in contemporary formulations of scepticism through the requirement of prior justification for background assumptions, and this fact compels anti-sceptical conservatives to conceive a non-evidential form of warrant, entitlement, to contest the sceptical threat My main worry is that, although the path of entitlement has some prospects to succeed, this new notion of justification seems to be posed ad hoc for conservatives to solve the sceptical problem. These contents are organized along the three chapters. The result of chapter 1 is a pattern of sceptical argument formed by two premises: P1*, a conservative principle, and P2*. In chapter 2 and chapter 3 two anti-sceptical proposals against the argument sketched in chapter 1 are described. Chapter 2 is devoted to explain and assess a first anti-sceptical proposal that denies P1*: dogmatism. Moreover, in chapter 3, another anti-sceptical strategy is described (the route of entitlement) that contests scepticism denying the plausibility of P2*.

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

Young People and Food: Adolescent Dietary Beliefs and Understandings

This research provides fresh insight into the dichotomy between young people's knowledge of food safety and nutrition, and their behaviour.

Can health beliefs help in explaining attendance to follow-up care? The Swiss childhood cancer survivor study.

Objective: Improved treatment has increased the survival of childhood cancer patients in recent decades, but follow-up care is recommended to detect and treat late effects. We investigated relationships between health beliefs and follow-up attendance in adult childhood cancer survivors.Methods: Childhood cancer survivors aged younger than 16 years when diagnosed between 1976 and 2003, who had survived for more than 5 years and were currently aged 20+ years, received a postal questionnaire. We asked survivors whether they attended follow-up in the past year. Concepts from the Health Belief Model (perceived susceptibility and severity of future late effects, potential benefits and barriers to follow-up, general health value and cues to action) were assessed. Medical information was extracted from the Swiss Childhood Cancer Registry.Results: Of 1075 survivors (response rate 72.3%), 250 (23.3%) still attended regular follow-up care. In unadjusted analyses, all health belief concepts were significantly associated with follow-up (p < 0.05). Adjusting for other health beliefs, demographic, and medical variables, only barriers (OR = 0.59; 95% CI: 0.43-0.82) remained significant. Younger survivors, those with lower educational background, diagnosed at an older age, treated with chemotherapy, radiotherapy, or bone marrow transplantation and with a relapse were more likely to attend follow-up care.Conclusions: Our study showed that more survivors at high risk of cancer-and treatment-related late effects attend follow-up care in Switzerland. Patient-perceived barriers hinder attendance even after accounting for medical variables. Information about the potential effectiveness and value of follow-up needs to be available to increase the attendance among childhood cancer survivors. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.