Economic voting and electoral volatility in Turkish provinces

Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters.

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.

Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation: A Structured, Focused Analysis of Vote-Pooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998-2011

This research project examines the role of electoral system rules in affecting the extent of conciliatory behavior and cross-ethnic coalition making in Northern Ireland. It focuses on the role of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system in shaping party and voter incentives in a post-conflict divided society. The research uses a structured, focused comparison of the four electoral cycles since the Belfast Agreement of 1998. This enables a systematic examination of each electoral cycle using a common set of criteria focused on conciliation and cross-ethnic coalition making. Whilst preference voting is assumed to benefit moderate candidates, in Northern Ireland centrist and multi-ethnic parties outside of the dominant ethnic communities have received little electoral success. In Northern Ireland the primary effect of STV has not been to encourage inter-communal voting but to facilitate intra-community and intra-party moderation. STV has encouraged the moderation of the historically extreme political parties in each of the ethnic bloc. Patterns across electoral cycles suggest that party elites from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein have moderated their policy positions due to the electoral system rules. Therefore they have pursued lower-preference votes from within their ethnic bloc but in doing so have marginalized parties of a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic orientation.

Immigration and free movement in an unusual electoral race: what implications for the next political cycle? EPC Policy Brief, 20 May 2014

Immigration and freedom of movement of EU citizens are among the main issues debated throughout the European Parliament election campaign and have some potential in determining who tomorrow’s EU leaders will be. This Policy Brief looks at how the two policies are debated at national level – in France, Germany and the UK – and at EU level between the ‘top candidates’ for European Commission Presidency – Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP), Ska Keller (Greens), Martin Schulz (PES) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE) – who have participated in several public debates. Two different campaigns have been unfolding in front of EU citizens’ eyes. The tense debate that can be identified at national level on these issues, is not transferred to the EU level, where immigration and free movement are less controversial topics. Furthermore, although participating in European elections, national parties present agendas responding exclusively to the economic and social challenges of their Member State, while the candidates for the Commission Presidency bring forward ‘more European’ programmes. Hence, several aspects need to be reflected upon: What will the consequences of this discontinuity be? How will this impact the future European agenda in terms of immigration and free movement? What institutional consequences will there be? Answering these questions is not a simple task, however, this paper aims to identify the parameters that need to be taken into account and the political landscape which will determine the future EU agenda in terms of immigration and free movement.

A Pan-European District for the European Elections? The Rise and Fall of the Duff Proposal for the Electoral Reform of the European Parliament. Bruges Political Research Papers 44/2015.

The aim of the present article is to understand the dynamics underlying the birth, the development and the eventual failure of the Duff proposal of 2009-2012, an ambitious attempt to change the provisions governing the elections for the European Parliament. In particular, the way agenda-setting on electoral reform is shaped in the European Union will be analysed, trying to understand if the current stalemate on the issue can be explained in light of factors specific to the EU. The report presented by liberal MEP Andrew Duff at the beginning of the seventh legislature called on Member States to gather a Convention, in order to introduce fundamental improvements in the way Members of the European Parliament are elected. Among the envisaged changes, the creation of a pan-European constituency to elect twenty-five Members on transnational lists represented the most controversial issue. After having analysed its main elements, the path of the Duff report from the committee of Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) to the plenary will be analysed. It will be concluded that a sharp contrast exists between the way electoral issues are raised in the AFCO committee and the way the Parliament as a whole deals with them. Moreover, diverging interests between national delegations inside groups seem to play a decisive role in hampering electoral reform. While further research is needed to corroborate the present findings, the analysis of the Duff proposal appears to shed light on the different barriers that ensure electoral reform is taken off the agenda of the Union, and on the relative weight each of them carries.

Psychological analysis of economic behavior.

Bibliography: p. 335-340.

Sexual behavior in penguins

Mode of access: Internet.

State legislative term limits and the law of unintended consequences: An examination of member behavior, power structures, and legislative organization in Florida

The implementation of term limits on state legislators has provided a wealth of data for study. Florida, the second largest state in the Union with term limits, has not been comprehensively studied. This research examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, member composition, legislator career paths, legislative leadership, and intra- and inter-governmental influences on Florida's legislature. This study looks at the Florida legislature from 1992 when term limits were enacted through 2004, three electoral cycles in which term limits have been in effect. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data where appropriate. Electoral data is used to assess electoral and demographic effects, as well as member career trajectories. Interview data with current and former legislators, lobbyists, and executive branch officials is used to analyze both changes in legislative organization and intra- and inter-governmental influences on the legislative process. Term limits has only created greater competition when a legislative seat opens and has actually created a greater advantage for incumbents. Women and minorities have only made minimal gains in winning seats post-term limits. Newly elected legislators are not political novices with a vast majority having previous elective experience. Leadership is more centralized under term limits and the Senate has gained an advantage over the more inexperienced House. Lastly, the influence of staff, lobbyists, and most importantly, the governor has greatly increased under term limits. This research finds that term limits have not produced the consequences that proponents had envisioned.^

Electoral rules and elite recruitment: A comparative analysis of the Bundestag and the U.S. House of Representatives

In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my dissertation is comparative by design.^ The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment, and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the economic behavior of politicians.^ Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture, institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected office.^

Formación de cuadros y frentes populares : Relaciones de clase y género en el Partido Comunista de Argentina, 1935-1951

Este artículo se enfoca en el estudio del período que corre entre 1935 y 1951 para destacar una de las empresas más importantes del PC a nivel mundial, con substanciales réditos en Argentina: la organización de las mujeres. En particular, nuestro interrogante es de qué modo un partido tradicionalmente considerado de estructuración directa y unitaria, profesional, eminentemente concentrado en la línea de formación ideológica por sobre la electoral, caracterizado por un perfil obrero y fuerte en términos de organización administrativa interna -particularmente, debido a su característica celular-, encuentra límites a esa propia caracterización organizacional en tanto delinea una política de intervención coyuntural que lo coloca en alianzas con otros actores y modifica, con ello, sus propios caracteres. El corpus documental de esta investigación incluye documentos y prensa partidaria (comunista y de otras agrupaciones políticas o sociales); archivos personales, autobiografías y entrevistas. La codificación permitió un ordenamiento de los datos extraídos de los documentos relevados, agrupándolos, según similitudes o diferencias relevantes en categorías que hicieron posible su análisis

Formación de cuadros y frentes populares : Relaciones de clase y género en el Partido Comunista de Argentina, 1935-1951

Este artículo se enfoca en el estudio del período que corre entre 1935 y 1951 para destacar una de las empresas más importantes del PC a nivel mundial, con substanciales réditos en Argentina: la organización de las mujeres. En particular, nuestro interrogante es de qué modo un partido tradicionalmente considerado de estructuración directa y unitaria, profesional, eminentemente concentrado en la línea de formación ideológica por sobre la electoral, caracterizado por un perfil obrero y fuerte en términos de organización administrativa interna -particularmente, debido a su característica celular-, encuentra límites a esa propia caracterización organizacional en tanto delinea una política de intervención coyuntural que lo coloca en alianzas con otros actores y modifica, con ello, sus propios caracteres. El corpus documental de esta investigación incluye documentos y prensa partidaria (comunista y de otras agrupaciones políticas o sociales); archivos personales, autobiografías y entrevistas. La codificación permitió un ordenamiento de los datos extraídos de los documentos relevados, agrupándolos, según similitudes o diferencias relevantes en categorías que hicieron posible su análisis

Formación de cuadros y frentes populares : Relaciones de clase y género en el Partido Comunista de Argentina, 1935-1951

Este artículo se enfoca en el estudio del período que corre entre 1935 y 1951 para destacar una de las empresas más importantes del PC a nivel mundial, con substanciales réditos en Argentina: la organización de las mujeres. En particular, nuestro interrogante es de qué modo un partido tradicionalmente considerado de estructuración directa y unitaria, profesional, eminentemente concentrado en la línea de formación ideológica por sobre la electoral, caracterizado por un perfil obrero y fuerte en términos de organización administrativa interna -particularmente, debido a su característica celular-, encuentra límites a esa propia caracterización organizacional en tanto delinea una política de intervención coyuntural que lo coloca en alianzas con otros actores y modifica, con ello, sus propios caracteres. El corpus documental de esta investigación incluye documentos y prensa partidaria (comunista y de otras agrupaciones políticas o sociales); archivos personales, autobiografías y entrevistas. La codificación permitió un ordenamiento de los datos extraídos de los documentos relevados, agrupándolos, según similitudes o diferencias relevantes en categorías que hicieron posible su análisis

Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.

Civil conflict and voting behavior : evidence from Colombia

¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados electorales. Sin embargo, los grupos usan diferentes estrategias para alterar estos resultados. Este artículo argumenta que los efectos diferenciales de la violencia sobre los resultados electorales son el resultado de estrategias deliberadas de los grupos ilegales, que a su turno, son consecuencia de las condiciones militares que difieren entre ellos. Usando datos panel de las elecciones al Senado de 1994 a 2006 y una aproximación por variables instrumentales para resolver posibles problemas de endogenidad, este artículo muestra que la violencia guerrillera disminuye la participación electoral, mientras que la violencia paramilitar no tiene ningún efecto sobre la participación pero reduce la competencia electoral y beneficia a nuevos partidos no-tradicionales. Esto es consistente con la hipótesis de que la estrategia de la guerrilla es sabotear las elecciones, mientras que los paramiltares establecen alianzas con ciertos candidatos.