British torture in the 'war on terror'

Despite longstanding allegations of UK involvement in prisoner abuse during counterterrorism operations as part of the US-led ‘war on terror’, a consistent narrative emanating from British government officials is that Britain neither uses, condones nor facilitates torture or other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and punishment. We argue that such denials are untenable. We have established beyond reasonable doubt that Britain has been deeply involved in post-9/11 prisoner abuse, and we can now provide the most detailed account to date of the depth of this involvement. We argue that it is possible to identify a peculiarly British approach to torture in the ‘war on terror’, which is particularly well-suited to sustaining a narrative of denial. To explain the nature of UK involvement, we argue that it can be best understood within the context of how law and sovereign power have come to operate during the ‘war on terror’. We turn here to the work of Judith Butler, and explore the role of Britain as a ‘petty sovereign’, operating under the state of exception established by the US Executive. UK authorities have not themselves suspended the rule of law so overtly, and indeed have repeatedly insisted on their commitment to it. They have nevertheless been able to construct a rhetorical, legal and policy ‘scaffold’ that has enabled them to demonstrate at least procedural adherence to human rights norms, while at the same time allowing UK officials to acquiesce in the arbitrary exercise of sovereignty over individuals who are denied any access to appropriate representation or redress in compliance with the rule of law.

Militant Bodies: Policing Race, Religion, and Violence in the U.S. Sikh Diaspora

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-07

GIS-integrated mathematical modeling of social phenomena at macro- and micro- levels—a multivariate geographically-weighted regression model for identifying locations vulnerable to hosting terrorist safe-houses: France as case study

Adaptability and invisibility are hallmarks of modern terrorism, and keeping pace with its dynamic nature presents a serious challenge for societies throughout the world. Innovations in computer science have incorporated applied mathematics to develop a wide array of predictive models to support the variety of approaches to counterterrorism. Predictive models are usually designed to forecast the location of attacks. Although this may protect individual structures or locations, it does not reduce the threat—it merely changes the target. While predictive models dedicated to events or social relationships receive much attention where the mathematical and social science communities intersect, models dedicated to terrorist locations such as safe-houses (rather than their targets or training sites) are rare and possibly nonexistent. At the time of this research, there were no publically available models designed to predict locations where violent extremists are likely to reside. This research uses France as a case study to present a complex systems model that incorporates multiple quantitative, qualitative and geospatial variables that differ in terms of scale, weight, and type. Though many of these variables are recognized by specialists in security studies, there remains controversy with respect to their relative importance, degree of interaction, and interdependence. Additionally, some of the variables proposed in this research are not generally recognized as drivers, yet they warrant examination based on their potential role within a complex system. This research tested multiple regression models and determined that geographically-weighted regression analysis produced the most accurate result to accommodate non-stationary coefficient behavior, demonstrating that geographic variables are critical to understanding and predicting the phenomenon of terrorism. This dissertation presents a flexible prototypical model that can be refined and applied to other regions to inform stakeholders such as policy-makers and law enforcement in their efforts to improve national security and enhance quality-of-life.

Teaching about terrorism in the United Kingdom: How it is done and what problems it causes

This article presents some of the findings of research on issues surrounding teaching terrorism and political violence at UK higher education institutions. It reports the results of a survey of UK institutions of higher education on their responses to government and other pressures in relation to terrorism. The data show a minority of universities have developed systems, policies or procedures for ‘preventing violent extremism’, while a significant number have developed close cooperation and collaboration with state counterterrorism policies raising potential issues of academic freedom. This article then examines three high-profile cases – incidents where universities, lecturers and students have come under political and legal pressures over the content of terrorism courses or accusations of ‘radicalisation’ on campus. It suggests that these pressures can be and sometimes are resisted, but that they have on occasion effectively narrowed the scope of academic freedom in practise with the danger that a further chilling effect follows in their wake.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.

Análisis de mujeres cachemires como sujetos subalternos en la representación institucional de India y Paquistán a partir del fenómeno de desaparición forzada (1989-2008)

El interés de esta monografía es analizar las consecuencias de la representación institucional de India y Paquistán en la disputa territorial por Cachemira durante el periodo de 1989 a 2008. Puntualmente, se analiza y explica cómo la representación institucional prestada individualmente por India y Paquistán validó sus intereses como agentes de poder en la región, pasó por alto las necesidades de la población cachemir y fomentó la práctica de la desaparición forzada, lo que en consecuencia convirtió a las mujeres cachemires en un grupo subalterno. Para tal objetivo, se hará uso de la teoría postcolonialista, específicamente el enfoque subalternista de la autora Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak ya que permite explicar adecuadamente el proceso mediante el cual las mujeres cachemires se convirtieron en un grupo subalterno.

La institucionalización de la lucha contra el terrorismo transnacional a través del derecho internacional

Hasta hace casi una década, la guerra contra el terrorismo fue una lucha solitaria de los Estados. Actualmente y debido a las implicaciones globales de este fenómeno, las acciones contra este flagelo han adquirido connotación internacional. Gran parte de los países miembros de las Naciones Unidas han acogido esta guerra –contra un enemigo común, pero indefinido- como un compromiso político en favor de la paz y seguridad internacional. La producción constante de instrumentos internacionales que condenan el terrorismo y que exigen tomar medidas para combatirlo, demuestran que esa intención política originaria se ha decantado en el ordenamiento internacional como una obligación autónoma, de carácter consuetudinario; que hace que actualmente no haya país en el mundo que pueda excusarse de combatir al terrorismo (interno o transnacional) independientemente de las justificaciones que se puedan aludir para el no cumplimiento.

Entre el terrorismo y el terrorismo en red, un debate a propósito de los lobos solitarios en Estados Unidos (2001-2014)

El interés de esta disertación es otorgar una respuesta a la fenomenología del Lobo Solitario, que se alza como amenaza frente a los Estados, y es necesaria su correcta comprensión para poder contrarrestar sus efectos sobre la sociedad. De esta manera, se propone un debate entre los conceptos de terrorismo expuesto por un lado por Bruce Hoffman, y por el otro por Luis de la Corte Ibáñez, quienes aportarán herramientas de análisis para lograr entender la fenomenología. Para terminar proponiendo la teoría de redes, expuesta por Arquilla y Ronfeldt y Charles Perrow, como mecanismo de solución a la brecha conceptual existente, definiendo a los lobos solitarios a nivel operacional como nodos sin red, y a nivel de adoctrinamiento como redes de débil acople.