Nation building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Cooperation, coordination and collaboration

Cross-sectoral interorganizational relationships in post-conflict situations occur regularly. Whether formal task forces, advisory groups or other ad hoc arrangements, these relations take place in chaotic and dangerous situations with urgent and turbulent political, economic and social environments. Furthermore, they typically involve a large number of players from many different nations, operating across sectors, and between multiple layers of bureaucracy and diplomacy. The organizational complexity staggers many participants and observers, as do the tasks they are charged with completing. Reform efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in 1995 may serve as the archetype model of conflict, transition and development for the 21st century. It wins this honor due not to its particular programmatic successes and failures, rather to the interorganizational complexity of the International Community. From the massive response to the crisis, to the modern nation-building policies it spawned, and the development assistance practices and institutional arrangements it created, the Bosnian development experience has much to offer by way of lessons learned. This manuscript frames the unique Bosnian development situation, and provides lessons learned from the experience of nation building given local realities. Pettigrew (1992) called this "contextualizing." While network and/or organizational structure, strategy and process explain many interorganizational relationship issues, the development variables identified in this manuscript prove equally important, yet elusive and difficult to measure despite their very real and overt presence.

Flash in the Pan: Cross-Class Cooperation in 1916 Iron Range Strike

In the Iron Range Strike of 1916, working-class wives picketed alongside their husbands in a conflict-ridden and dangerous setting. Mine deputies abused immigrant women on the picket lines and in their homes, with several disquieting reports receiving statewide attention in Minnesota. Many middle-class reformers in the Twin Cities grew sympathetic to the plight of northern mining families and became controversially involved the labor struggle. Some middleclass women worked alongside working-class wives and radical organizers from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). At the center of this gendered analysis is the cross-class cooperation between an upper-middle class woman, Lenora Austin Hamlin, a radical reformer, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and the story of a working-class housewife, Mikla Masonovich. This study will ask how authentic, prevalent, and unproblematic their stories of cross-class cohesive action actually were. In answering this, it will address and identify those factors that impeded women’s potential for unity. “Flash in the Pan” argues that as a result of both real and perceived differences, these networks of women remained isolated, inhibiting each from gaining sufficient power to work cohesively, and marginalizing their influence. Drawing upon a variety of sources, including media representations in newspapers, and archives of social, labor and women’s organizations, this regional study lends state-level insight into the larger gender-labor historiography.

The coevolution of cooperation and dispersal in social groups and its implications for the emergence of multicellularity

Background Recent work on the complexity of life highlights the roles played by evolutionary forces at different levels of individuality. One of the central puzzles in explaining transitions in individuality for entities ranging from complex cells, to multicellular organisms and societies, is how different autonomous units relinquish control over their functions to others in the group. In addition to the necessity of reducing conflict over effecting specialized tasks, differentiating groups must control the exploitation of the commons, or else be out-competed by more fit groups. Results We propose that two forms of conflict – access to resources within groups and representation in germ line – may be resolved in tandem through individual and group-level selective effects. Specifically, we employ an optimization model to show the conditions under which different within-group social behaviors (cooperators producing a public good or cheaters exploiting the public good) may be selected to disperse, thereby not affecting the commons and functioning as germ line. We find that partial or complete dispersal specialization of cheaters is a general outcome. The propensity for cheaters to disperse is highest with intermediate benefit:cost ratios of cooperative acts and with high relatedness. An examination of a range of real biological systems tends to support our theory, although additional study is required to provide robust tests. Conclusion We suggest that trait linkage between dispersal and cheating should be operative regardless of whether groups ever achieve higher levels of individuality, because individual selection will always tend to increase exploitation, and stronger group structure will tend to increase overall cooperation through kin selected benefits. Cheater specialization as dispersers offers simultaneous solutions to the evolution of cooperation in social groups and the origin of specialization of germ and soma in multicellular organisms.

CONMICOM – conflict mitigation in communities: LforS learning and simulation game

Three extended families live around a lake. One family are rice farmers, the second family are vegetable farmers, and the third are a family of livestock herders. All of them depend on the use of lake water for their production, and all of them need large quantities of water. All are dependent on the use of the lake water to secure their livelihood. In the game, the families are represented by their councils of elders. Each of the councils has to find means and ways to increase production in order to keep up with the growth of its family and their demands. This puts more and more pressure on the water resources, increasing the risk of overuse. Conflicts over water are about to emerge between the families. Each council of elders must try to pursue its families interests, while at the same time preventing excessive pressure on the water resources. Once a council of elders is no longer able to meet the needs of its family, it is excluded from the game. Will the parties cooperate or compete? To face the challenge of balancing economic well-being, sustainable resource management, and individual and collective interests, the three parties have a set of options for action at hand. These include power play to safeguard their own interests, communication and cooperation to negotiate with neighbours, and searching for alternatives to reduce pressure on existing water resources. During the game the players can experience how tensions may arise, increase and finally escalate. They realise what impact power play has and how alliances form, and the importance of trust-building measures, consensus and cooperation. From the insights gained, important conflict prevention and mitigation measures are derived in a debriefing session. The game is facilitated by a moderator, and lasts for 3-4 hours. Aim of the game: Each family pursues the objective of serving its own interests and securing its position through appropriate strategies and skilful negotiation, while at the same time optimising use of the water resources in a way that prevents their degradation. The end of the game is open. While the game may end by one or two families dropping out because they can no longer secure their subsistence, it is also possible that the three families succeed in creating a situation that allows them to meet their own needs as well as the requirements for sustainable water use in the long term. Learning objectives The game demonstrates how tension builds up, increases, and finally escalates; it shows how power positions work and alliances are formed; and it enables the players to experience the great significance of mutual agreement and cooperation. During the game and particularly during the debriefing and evaluation session it is important to link experiences made during the game to the players’ real-life experiences, and to discuss these links in the group. The resulting insights will provide a basis for deducing important conflict prevention and transformation measures.

Conflict and land tenure in Rwanda

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the historical relation between conflict and land tenure in Rwanda, a country that experienced a harsh civil war and genocide in the mid-1990s. The victory of the Tutsi-led rebel, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) at that time triggered a massive return of refugees and a drastic change in land tenure policy. These were refugees who had fled the country at around the time of independence, in 1962, due to the political turmoil and persecution (the "social revolution") and who shared the background of the core RPF members. The social revolution had dismantled the existent Tutsi-led political order, compelling many Tutsi families to seek refuge outside their homeland. Under the post-independence rule of a Hutu-led government, the Tutsi refugees were not allowed to return and the lands they left behind were often arbitrarily distributed by local authorities among Hutu peasants. After victory in the mid-1990s civil war, the newly established RPF-led government ordered the current inhabitants of the lands to divide the properties in order to allocate portions to the Tutsi returnees. Different patterns of land holding and land division will be explained in the paper from data gathered through the authors' fieldworks in the southern and eastern parts of Rwanda. Although overt resistance to land division has not been observed to date, the land rights of the Tutsi returnees must be considered unstable because their legitimacy depends primarily on the strength and political stability of the RPF-led government. If the authority of RPF were to weaken, the land rights will be jeopardized. Throughout Rwandan history, in which political exclusion has often led to serious conflict, macro-level politics have repeatedly influenced land holding. Promotion of an inclusive democracy, therefore, is indispensable to escape the vicious circle between political instability and land rights.

For whom do local peace processes function? : Maintaining control through conflict management

Peer reviewed

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

Afghan Opium and the EU: Fighting the War Economy through Development Cooperation. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 4, 2014

Opium is at the heart of the war economy in Afghanistan, involving a broad range of actors. It generates a sustainable violence cycle and, while international troops withdraw from the country, threatens the Afghan government’s reconstruction efforts. The European Union (EU) plays an important part in the debate on how to deal with this issue. Several counter-narcotics policies have been implemented since 2001 and have mostly failed. This paper looks at these failures and questions the European Union’s ability to help tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan. It argues that a comprehensive development response, backed by counter-narcotics incentives, could unfasten the spiral of the war economy. It also argues that the EU has developed relevant policies based on poverty alleviation and a structural approach to the opium issue but still lacks the means for action and for donor coordination in order to significantly influence the situation.

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

Post-Ottoman Coexistence : Sharing Space in the Shadow of Conflict /

"Post-Ottoman Coexistence", interrogates ways of living together and asks what practices enabled centuries of cooperation and sharing, as well as how and when such sharing was disrupted. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.

Inter-organizational co-operation, conflict and change

Relationships between organizations can be characterized by cooperation, conflict, and change. In this dissertation we study cooperation between organizations by investigating how norms in relationships can enhance innovativeness and subsequently impact relationship performance. We do so by incorporating both beneficial aspects of long term relationships as well as “dark side” factors that may decrease innovativeness. This provides a balanced assessment of the factors increasing and decreasing the performance of relationships. Next, we study conflict between organizations by taking a network view on conflict which helps explain why organizations react to conflict. We find stakeholders to have an effect on channel conflict responsiveness. Finally we study change by means of an organization’s ability to successfully add an Internet channel to their distribution system in order to sell its products or services directly to the end-user. We find that an Internet channel is best implemented by organizations that are flexible and we identify several circumstances under which this flexibility is highest.

Ethnic conflict and war crimes in the Balkans:the narratives of denial in post-conflict Serbia

In the years following the fall of Slobodan Milo evic, Serbian social, cultural and political responses to the wars of the 1990s have fallen under intense international scrutiny. But is this scrutiny justfied, and how can these responses be better understood? Jelena Obradovic engages with ideas about post-conflict societies, memory, cultural trauma, and national myths of victimhood and justified war to shed light upon Serbian denial and justification of war crimes - for example, Serbia's reluctant cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Rather than treating denial as a failure to come to terms with the past or as resurgent nationalism, Obradovic argues that the justification of atrocities are often the result of a societal need to understand and incorporate violent events within culturally acceptable boundaries.

King Democracy: Do Democratic Nations Mitigate Conflict Over Transboundary Freshwater Resources Better Than Other Nations?

The prospect of water wars and conflict over water are ideas that are frequently dramatized in media and also studied by scholars. It is well-established that bona fide wars are not started over water resources, but conflict over water does exist and is not well understood. One would suppose, as scholars often do, that dyads composed of two democratic nations would be the best at mitigating conflict and promoting cooperation over freshwater resources. General conflict research supports that supposition, as does the argument that democracies must be best at avoiding conflicts over resources because they excel at distributing public goods. This study provides empirical evidence showing how interstate dyads composed of various governance types conflict and cooperate over general water and water quantity issues relative to each other. After evaluating the water conflict mitigating ability of democratic-democratic, democratic-autocratic, and autocratic-autocratic dyads, this study found that democracy-autocracy dyads are less likely to cooperate over general water issues and water quantity issues than the other two dyad types. Nothing certain can be said about how the three dyad types compare to each other in terms of likelihood to conflict over water quantity issues. However, two-autocracy dyads seem to be most likely to cooperate over water quantity issues. These findings support the established belief that democratic-autocratic pairs struggle to cooperate while also encouraging greater scrutiny of the belief that democracies must be best at cooperating over water resources.