Extrait de la Pétition adressée aux deux Chambres, par le commissaire de police Renou... pour obtenir la liquidation de sa pension de retraite à raison de la durée de ses services

Comprend : Lettre

Les déterminants des faillites bancaires dans les pays en développement: le cas des pays de l'Union économique et monétaire Ouest-africaine (UEMOA)

L’objectif de ce papier est de déterminer les facteurs susceptibles d’expliquer les faillites bancaires au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) entre 1980 et 1995. Utilisant le modèle logit conditionnel sur des données en panel, nos résultats montrent que les variables qui affectent positivement la probabilité de faire faillite des banques sont : i) le niveau d’endettement auprès de la banque centrale; ii) un faible niveau de comptes disponibles et à vue; iii) les portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux par rapport au total des crédits; iv) le faible montant des dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le ratio actifs liquides sur actifs totaux. En revanche, les variables qui contribuent positivement sur la vraisemblance de survie des banques sont les suivantes : i) le ratio capital sur actifs totaux; ii) les bénéfices nets par rapport aux actifs totaux; iii) le ratio crédit total sur actifs totaux; iv) les dépôts à terme à 2 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le niveau des engagements sous forme de cautions et avals par rapport aux actifs totaux. Les ratios portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux et actifs liquides par rapport aux actifs totaux sont les variables qui expliquent la faillite des banques commerciales, alors que ce sont les dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans qui sont à l’origine des faillites des banques de développement. Ces faillites ont été considérablement réduites par la création en 1989 de la commission de réglementation bancaire régionale. Dans l’UEMOA, seule la variable affectée au Sénégal semble contribuer positivement sur la probabilité de faire faillite.

Credit Default Swaps (CDS) y Collateral Debt Obligation (CDO) derivados financieros responsables de la crisis sub-prime de 2008 en Estados Unidos y una guía para el desarrollo del mercado de derivados exóticos en Colombia

La crisis financiera hipotecaria de 2008 en la que se declaró en quiebra el banco de inversión Lehman Brothers, se desarrolló en un ambiente que contemplaba apalancamientos financieros excesivos y el uso de derivados financieros de crédito innovadores. Razón por la cual, a partir del estudio de caso de quiebra de este banco de inversión y el análisis de las causas y consecuencias del ambiente desregulatorio que surgió en Estados Unidos desde la década de los 30 hasta el 2000, se orienta la investigación a indagar sobre lo que sucede en términos regulatorios y empresariales en el mercado de valores colombiano y así lograr definir objetivos que permitan el crecimiento del mercado de derivados exóticos en Colombia bajo un marco de responsabilidad financiera y ética empresarial.

Multimodal semantic-associative collateral labelling and indexing of still images

A novel framework for multimodal semantic-associative collateral image labelling, aiming at associating image regions with textual keywords, is described. Both the primary image and collateral textual modalities are exploited in a cooperative and complementary fashion. The collateral content and context based knowledge is used to bias the mapping from the low-level region-based visual primitives to the high-level visual concepts defined in a visual vocabulary. We introduce the notion of collateral context, which is represented as a co-occurrence matrix, of the visual keywords, A collaborative mapping scheme is devised using statistical methods like Gaussian distribution or Euclidean distance together with collateral content and context-driven inference mechanism. Finally, we use Self Organising Maps to examine the classification and retrieval effectiveness of the proposed high-level image feature vector model which is constructed based on the image labelling results.

Semi-automatic knowledge extraction, representation and context-sensitive intelligent retrieval of video content using collateral context modelling with scalable ontological networks

Automatic indexing and retrieval of digital data poses major challenges. The main problem arises from the ever increasing mass of digital media and the lack of efficient methods for indexing and retrieval of such data based on the semantic content rather than keywords. To enable intelligent web interactions, or even web filtering, we need to be capable of interpreting the information base in an intelligent manner. For a number of years research has been ongoing in the field of ontological engineering with the aim of using ontologies to add such (meta) knowledge to information. In this paper, we describe the architecture of a system (Dynamic REtrieval Analysis and semantic metadata Management (DREAM)) designed to automatically and intelligently index huge repositories of special effects video clips, based on their semantic content, using a network of scalable ontologies to enable intelligent retrieval. The DREAM Demonstrator has been evaluated as deployed in the film post-production phase to support the process of storage, indexing and retrieval of large data sets of special effects video clips as an exemplar application domain. This paper provides its performance and usability results and highlights the scope for future enhancements of the DREAM architecture which has proven successful in its first and possibly most challenging proving ground, namely film production, where it is already in routine use within our test bed Partners' creative processes. (C) 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V.

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentivecompatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.

Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Bubbles, collateral and monetary equilibrium

Consider an economy where infinite-lived agents trade assets collateralized by durable goods. We obtain results that rule out bubbles when the additional endowments of durable goods are uniformly bounded away from zero, regardless of whether the asset’s net supply is positive or zero. However, bubbles may occur, even for state-price processes that generate finite present value of aggregate wealth. First, under complete markets, if the net supply is being endogenously reduced to zero as a result of collateral repossession. Secondly, under incomplete markets, for a persistent positive net supply, under the general conditions guaranteeing existence of equilibrium. Examples of monetary equilibria are provided.