The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Pseudomarkets with priorities in large random assignment economies

I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the final assignment. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I define a new concept of fairness, called no unjustified lower chances: priorities with respect to one object type cannot justify different achievable chances regarding another object type. This concept, which applies to the assignment mechanism rather than to the assignment itself, implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the same priority type. I propose a variation of Hylland and Zeckhauser' (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustified lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents of the same priority type. Assuming enough richness in preferences and priorities, the converse is also true: any random assignment with these properties could be achieved through an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities are acyclical (the ordering of agents is the same for each object type), this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante efficient random assignments.

A simulation-based algorithm for solving the resource-assignment problem in satellite telecommunication networks

This paper proposes an heuristic for the scheduling of capacity requests and the periodic assignment of radio resources in geostationary (GEO) satellite networks with star topology, using the Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) protocol in the link layer, and Multi-Frequency Time Division Multiple Access (MF-TDMA) and Adaptive Coding and Modulation (ACM) in the physical layer.

Women Sports Journalists in Switzerland: Between Assignment and Negotiation of Roles

In this paper, we analyze working experiences of female sports journalists in the French-speaking Swiss daily press. We draw on Bourdieu's theory of habitus and field to examine how structures of power shape these journalists' lives. Based on 27 semistructured interviews and observations in the field, we found that women journalists' work experiences depend on the relationship between their position in the field and their ethos and hexis. We identified three main strategies through which the women journalists negotiated their experiences: (1) conforming to the dominant male ethos (2) threatening the orthodoxy (3) resisting while hijacking the assigned role.

From Support to Control : A Configurational Perspective on Conjugal Quality

The topic of conjugal quality provides an empirical illustration of the relevance of the configurational perspective on families. Based on a longitudinal sample of 1,534 couples living in Switzerland drawn from the study "Social Stratification, Cohesion and Conflict in Contemporary Families", we show that various types of interdependencies with relatives and friends promote distinct conflict management strategies for couples as well as unequal levels of conjugal quality. We find that configurations characterized by supportive and non-interfering relationships with relatives and friends for both partners are associated with higher conjugal quality, while configurations characterized by interference are associated with lower conjugal quality.

On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks

We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.

Assignment strategies for large proteins by magic-angle spinning NMR: the 21-kDa disulfide-bond-forming enzyme DsbA.

We present strategies for chemical shift assignments of large proteins by magic-angle spinning solid-state NMR, using the 21-kDa disulfide-bond-forming enzyme DsbA as prototype. Previous studies have demonstrated that complete de novo assignments are possible for proteins up to approximately 17 kDa, and partial assignments have been performed for several larger proteins. Here we show that combinations of isotopic labeling strategies, high field correlation spectroscopy, and three-dimensional (3D) and four-dimensional (4D) backbone correlation experiments yield highly confident assignments for more than 90% of backbone resonances in DsbA. Samples were prepared as nanocrystalline precipitates by a dialysis procedure, resulting in heterogeneous linewidths below 0.2 ppm. Thus, high magnetic fields, selective decoupling pulse sequences, and sparse isotopic labeling all improved spectral resolution. Assignments by amino acid type were facilitated by particular combinations of pulse sequences and isotopic labeling; for example, transferred echo double resonance experiments enhanced sensitivity for Pro and Gly residues; [2-(13)C]glycerol labeling clarified Val, Ile, and Leu assignments; in-phase anti-phase correlation spectra enabled interpretation of otherwise crowded Glx/Asx side-chain regions; and 3D NCACX experiments on [2-(13)C]glycerol samples provided unique sets of aromatic (Phe, Tyr, and Trp) correlations. Together with high-sensitivity CANCOCA 4D experiments and CANCOCX 3D experiments, unambiguous backbone walks could be performed throughout the majority of the sequence. At 189 residues, DsbA represents the largest monomeric unit for which essentially complete solid-state NMR assignments have so far been achieved. These results will facilitate studies of nanocrystalline DsbA structure and dynamics and will enable analysis of its 41-kDa covalent complex with the membrane protein DsbB, for which we demonstrate a high-resolution two-dimensional (13)C-(13)C spectrum.

Adaptive approach heuristics for the generalized assignment problem

The Generalized Assignment Problem consists in assigning a setof tasks to a set of agents with minimum cost. Each agent hasa limited amount of a single resource and each task must beassigned to one and only one agent, requiring a certain amountof the resource of the agent. We present new metaheuristics forthe generalized assignment problem based on hybrid approaches.One metaheuristic is a MAX-MIN Ant System (MMAS), an improvedversion of the Ant System, which was recently proposed byStutzle and Hoos to combinatorial optimization problems, and itcan be seen has an adaptive sampling algorithm that takes inconsideration the experience gathered in earlier iterations ofthe algorithm. Moreover, the latter heuristic is combined withlocal search and tabu search heuristics to improve the search.A greedy randomized adaptive search heuristic (GRASP) is alsoproposed. Several neighborhoods are studied, including one basedon ejection chains that produces good moves withoutincreasing the computational effort. We present computationalresults of the comparative performance, followed by concludingremarks and ideas on future research in generalized assignmentrelated problems.

Configurational statistical model for the damaged structure of silicon oxide after ion implantation

A configurational model for silicon oxide damaged after a high-dose ion implantation of a nonreactive species is presented. Based on statistics of silicon-centered tetrahedra, the model takes into account not only the closest environment of a given silicon atom, but also the second neighborhood, so it is specified whether the oxygen attached to one given silicon is bridging two tetrahedra or not. The frequencies and intensities of infrared vibrational bands have been calculated by averaging over the distributions and these results are in agreement with the ones obtained from infrared experimental spectra. Likewise, the chemical shifts obtained from x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) analysis are similar to the reported values for the charge-transfer model of SiOx compounds.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.