Can technology provide a glimmer of hope for economic growth in the midst of chaos? A case of Zimbabwe

In this paper we examine the effect of technology on economic growth in Zimbabwe over the period 1975–2014 whilst accounting for structural breaks. We use the extended Cobb–Douglas type Solow (Q J Econ 70(1):65–94, 1956) framework and the ARDL bounds procedure to examine cointegration and short run and long run effects. Using unit root tests, we note that structural changes in Zimbabwe are generally marked by the period 1982 onwards. We find that mobile technology has a positive short-run (0.09 %) and long-run (0.08 %) impact on the output per capita. The structural changes post-1982 periods show positive impact in the short-run (0.06) and the long-run (0.09), whereas the coefficient of trend in the short-run (−0.03) and the long-run (−0.04) is negative. The Granger non-causality test shows a unidirectional causality from capital stock (investment) per capita to output per capita and a bi-directional causality between mobile cellular technology and output per capita. The plausible reasons for estimated magnitude effects and the direction of causality are explained for policy deliberation.

Essays on Illegal Activities, Institutions and Economic Growth

In public economics, two extremist views on the functions of a government compete: one emphasizes government working for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. Moreover, as the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to define the rules and laws as well as to enforce them. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely suffocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet Union). In this thesis I scrutinize the government s interventionist policies and evaluate the question of how to best promote economic well-being. The first two essays assume that the government s policies promote illegal activity. The first paper evaluates the interaction between the government and the mafia, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground production. We show that the revenue-maximizing government will always monitor the shadow economy, as monitoring contributes to the government s revenue. In general, both legal and illegal firms are hurt by the entry of the mafia. It is, however, plausible that legal firms might benefit by the entry of the mafia if it competes with the government. The second paper tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow economy. To formulate policies it is essential to know what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely cultural factors as manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. According to our findings, Catholic and Protestant countries do not differ in their tax morale. The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the government in promoting economic and productivity growth. Our main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been beneficial in terms of growth. The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth in stages.

Essays on Finnish Economic Growth and Productivity, 1860-2005

This study examines Finnish economic growth. The key driver of economic growth was productivity. And the major engine of productivity growth was technology, especially the general purpose technologies (GPTs) electricity and ICT. A new GPT builds on previous knowledge, yet often in an uncertain, punctuated, fashion. Economic history, as well as the Finnish data analyzed in this study, teaches that growth is not a smooth process but is subject to episodes of sharp acceleration and deceleration which are associated with the arrival, diffusion and exhaustion of new general purpose technologies. These are technologies that affect the whole economy by transforming both household life and the ways in which firms conduct business. The findings of previous research, that Finnish economic growth exhibited late industrialisation and significant structural changes were corroborated by this study. Yet, it was not solely a story of manufacturing and structural change was more the effect of than the cause for economic growth. We offered an empirical resolution to the Artto-Pohjola paradox as we showed that a high rate of return on capital was combined with low capital productivity growth. This result is important in understanding Finnish economic growth 1975-90. The main contribution of this thesis was the growth accounting results on the impact of ICT on growth and productivity, as well as the comparison of electricity and ICT. It was shown that ICT s contribution to GDP growth was almost twice as large as electricity s contribution over comparable periods of time. Finland has thus been far more successful as an ICT producer than a producer of electricity. Unfortunately in the use of ICT the results were still more modest than for electricity. During the end of the period considered in this thesis, Finland switched from resource-based to ICT-based growth. However, given the large dependency on the ICT-producing sector, the ongoing outsourcing of ICT production to low wage countries provides a threat to productivity performance in the future. For a developed country only change is constant and history teaches us that it is likely that Finland is obliged to reorganize its economy once again in the digital era.

The link between foreign aid, public investment and economic growth

Länsimaat ovat rahoittaneet kehitysyhteistyöhankkeita jo lähes kuuden vuosikymmenen ajan, mutta kehitysavun tehokkuudesta ei olla edelleenkään päästy yksimielisyyteen. Yksi avunantajamaiden tapa vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen, eli avun vaikutukseen vastaanottajamaan taloudellisen kasvun kiihdyttäjänä, on sitoa ne julkisen sektorin infrastruktuurihankkeisiin. Joissain tapauksissa tämä vaikuttaa avun vastaanottajan käytökseen ja asenteisiin kehitysapua kohtaan. Tutkielmassa käsitellään kehitysavun tehokkuutta tilanteessa, jossa se on sidottu julkisen sektorin investointeihin kehitysmaassa. Tutkimus pohjaa Kalaitzidakisin ja Kalyvitisin (2008) malliin, jossa osa kehitysmaan julkisen talouden investoinneista rahoitetaan kehitysavulla. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (rent- seeking) vaikutusta kehitysavun tehokkuuteen pohjaten Economidesin, Kalyvitisin ja Philippopoulosin (2008) malliin. Tutkielmassa referoidaan lisäksi tutkimuskysymystä sivuavia empiirisiä tutkimuksia, esitellään aluksi tavallisimmat kehitysyhteistyön muodot, sekä esitellään talousteoreettisia näkökulmia kehitysyhteistyön tehokkuuden määrittelylle. Tutkielma perustuu puhtaasti teoreettisiin malleihin ja niissä sovelletut menetelmät ovat matemaattisia. Tutkielmassa käsitellään ensin tapaus, jossa kehitysyhteistyöllä rahoitetaan julkisen sektorin investointihankkeita. Jossain tapauksissa kehitysavun kasvu lasku siirtää vastaanottajamaan kulutusta julkisista investoinneista kulutukseen, jolloin kehitysyhteistyövaroin osittain rahoitettujen hankkeiden koko pienenee, ja suhteellinen tehokkuus laskee. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan tilannetta, jossa kehitysyhteistyövaroista vain osa päätyy hankkeen rahoittamiseen, ja todetaan, että kehitysavun tehokkuus ja vaikutus maan kansantulon kasvuun vähenee talouden toimijoiden ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (mukaan lukien korruptio) myötä entisestään. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että kehitysapu vaikuttaa kehittyvän maan talouden kasvuun tapauksessa, jossa julkisia infrastruktuurihankkeita rahoitetaan osittain maan omin verovaroin ja osittain kehitysyhteistyövaroin. Ylijäämää tavoitteleva käyttäytyminen vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen negatiivistesti vähentäen kehitysavun positiivisia kasvuvaikutuksia.

Appropriate Institutions and Economic Growth - one size fits no-one

Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that ”non-desirable” or “second-best” institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.

The Sustainability of `Sustainable´ Energy Use: Historical Evidence on the Relationship between Economic Growth and Renewable Energy

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Choose Life not Economic Growth: Critical Social Theory for People, Planet and Flourishing in the ‘Age of Nature’

Choose a fucking big television Choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players, and electrical tin openers... Choose leisure wear and matching luggage. Choose a three piece suite on hire purchase in a range of fucking fabrics. Choose DIY and wondering who you are on a Sunday morning. Choose sitting on that couch watching mind-numbing sprit-crushing game shows Stuffing fucking junk food into your mouth. Choose your future. Choose life. (Irvine Welsh, Trainspotting, 1996) Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist (Kenneth Boulding)

Will attracting the creative class boost economic growth in old industrial regions? A case study of Scotland

Attracting in-migration of the creative class has been argued by Florida (2002) to be a route to higher economic growth in the era of the knowledge economy. This paper critically evaluates this proposition in relation to old industrial regions using the example of Scotland. The paper presents an assessment of, in the first instance, to what extent there is a shortage of skilled, talented and entrepreneurial individuals and, in the second instance, whether a talent attraction strategy alone can hope to attract such people to Scotland. It is proposed that for most migrants the availability of appropriate economic opportunities is a prerequisite for mobility. However, despite uncertain evidence that place attractiveness is a catalyst to mobility among the so-called creative class, this is not a reason for dismissing talent attraction programmes. Instead it is argued that talent attraction programmes have the potential to contribute to old industrial economies, but their success will be greatest when talent attraction is carefully targeted and based on economic realities rather than the marketing of ethereal conceptions of place attractiveness.

Green Political Economy: beyond orthodox undifferentiated economic growth as a permanent feature of the economy

This chapter outlines the main features of green political economy and the principal ways in which it differs from dominant mainstream or orthodox neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics is critiqued on the grounds of denying its normative and ideological commitments in its false presentation of itself as ‘objective’ and ‘value neutral’. It is also critiqued for its ecologically irrational commitment to the imperative of orthodox economic growth as a permanent feature of the economy, compromising its ability to offer realistic or normatively compelling guides to how we might make the transition to a sustainable economy. Green political economy is presented as an alternative or heterodox form of economic thinking but one which explicitly expresses its normative/ideological value bases (hence it represents a return to ‘political economy’, the origins of modern economics). Green political economy also challenges the commitment to undifferentiated economic growth as a permanent objective of the human economy. In its place, green political economy promotes ‘economic security’ as a better objective for a sustainable, post-growth economy. The latter includes the transition to a low-carbon energy economy, and is also one which maximises quality of life (as oppose to formal employment, income and wealth), and actively seeks to lower socio-economic inequality. Green political economy views orthodox economic growth as having passed the threshold in most ‘advanced’ capitalist societies beyond which it has undermined quality of life and at best manages rather than reduces socially and ecologically damaging inequalities.