Belief change with noisy sensing in the situation calculus

Situation calculus has been applied widely in arti?cial intelligence to model and reason about actions and changes in dynamic systems. Since actions carried out by agents will cause constant changes of the agents’ beliefs, how to manage
these changes is a very important issue. Shapiro et al. [22] is one of the studies that considered this issue. However, in this framework, the problem of noisy sensing, which often presents in real-world applications, is not considered. As a
consequence, noisy sensing actions in this framework will lead to an agent facing inconsistent situation and subsequently the agent cannot proceed further. In this paper, we investigate how noisy sensing actions can be handled in iterated
belief change within the situation calculus formalism. We extend the framework proposed in [22] with the capability of managing noisy sensings. We demonstrate that an agent can still detect the actual situation when the ratio of noisy sensing actions vs. accurate sensing actions is limited. We prove that our framework subsumes the iterated belief change strategy in [22] when all sensing actions are accurate. Furthermore, we prove that our framework can adequately handle belief introspection, mistaken beliefs, belief revision and belief update even with noisy sensing, as done in [22] with accurate sensing actions only.

Base Revision for Ontology Debugging

Belief Revision deals with the problem of adding new information to a knowledge base in a consistent way. Ontology Debugging, on the other hand, aims to find the axioms in a terminological knowledge base which caused the base to become inconsistent. In this article, we propose a belief revision approach in order to find and repair inconsistencies in ontologies represented in some description logic (DL). As the usual belief revision operators cannot be directly applied to DLs, we propose new operators that can be used with more general logics and show that, in particular, they can be applied to the logics underlying OWL-DL and Lite.

Inconsistent-tolerant base revision through Argument Theory Change

Reasoning and change over inconsistent knowledge bases (KBs) is of utmost relevance in areas like medicine and law. Argumentation may bring the possibility to cope with both problems. Firstly, by constructing an argumentation framework (AF) from the inconsistent KB, we can decide whether to accept or reject a certain claim through the interplay among arguments and counterarguments. Secondly, by handling dynamics of arguments of the AF, we might deal with the dynamics of knowledge of the underlying inconsistent KB. Dynamics of arguments has recently attracted attention and although some approaches have been proposed, a full axiomatization within the theory of belief revision was still missing. A revision arises when we want the argumentation semantics to accept an argument. Argument Theory Change (ATC) encloses the revision operators that modify the AF by analyzing dialectical trees-arguments as nodes and attacks as edges-as the adopted argumentation semantics. In this article, we present a simple approach to ATC based on propositional KBs. This allows to manage change of inconsistent KBs by relying upon classical belief revision, although contrary to it, consistency restoration of the KB is avoided. Subsequently, a set of rationality postulates adapted to argumentation is given, and finally, the proposed model of change is related to the postulates through the corresponding representation theorem. Though we focus on propositional logic, the results can be easily extended to more expressive formalisms such as first-order logic and description logics, to handle evolution of ontologies.

Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

Revisiting logical imaging for information retrieval

Retrieval with Logical Imaging is derived from belief revision and provides a novel mechanism for estimating the relevance of a document through logical implication (i.e. P(q -> d)). In this poster, we perform the first comprehensive evaluation of Logical Imaging (LI) in Information Retrieval (IR) across several TREC test Collections. When compared against standard baseline models, we show that LI fails to improve performance. This failure can be attributed to a nuance within the model that means non-relevant documents are promoted in the ranking, while relevant documents are demoted. This is an important contribution because it not only contextualizes the effectiveness of LI, but crucially ex- plains why it fails. By addressing this nuance, future LI models could be significantly improved.

信念修正的实现方法

本文对信念修正的典型方法,如基于语法结构的方法,基于模型测试方法,修正理论,修正理论基础,重复方法等用我们的算法来实现,并且完成了其相关工作。

Background beliefs and evidence interpretation

In this paper we argue that it is often adaptive to use one’s background beliefs when interpreting information that, from a normative point of view, is incomplete. In both of the experiments reported here participants were presented with an item possessing two features and were asked to judge, in the light of some evidence concerning the features, to which of two categories it was more likely that the item belonged. It was found that when participants received evidence relevant to just one of these hypothesised categories (i.e. evidence that did not form a Bayesian likelihood ratio) they used their background beliefs to interpret this information. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, participants behaved in a broadly Bayesian manner when the evidence they received constituted a completed likelihood ratio. We discuss the circumstances under which participants, when making their judgements, consider the alternative hypothesis. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for an understanding of hypothesis testing, belief revision, and categorisation.

A framework for managing uncertain inputs: An axiomization of rewarding

The success postulate in belief revision ensures that new evidence (input) is always trusted. However, admitting uncertain input has been questioned by many researchers. Darwiche and Pearl argued that strengths of evidence should be introduced to determine the outcome of belief change, and provided a preliminary definition towards this thought. In this paper, we start with Darwiche and Pearl’s idea aiming to develop a framework that can capture the influence of the strengths of inputs with some rational assumptions. To achieve this, we first define epistemic states to represent beliefs attached with strength, and then present a set of postulates to describe the change process on epistemic states that is determined by the strengths of input and establish representation theorems to characterize these postulates. As a result, we obtain a unique rewarding operator which is proved to be a merging operator that is in line with many other works. We also investigate existing postulates on belief merging and compare them with our postulates. In addition, we show that from an epistemic state, a corresponding ordinal conditional function by Spohn can be derived and the result of combining two epistemic states is thus reduced to the result of combining two corresponding ordinal conditional functions proposed by Laverny and Lang. Furthermore, when reduced to the belief revision situation, we prove that our results induce all the Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates as well as the Recalcitrance postulate and the Independence postulate.

Can(Plan)+: Extending the Operational Semantics of the BDI Architecture to deal with Uncertain Information

The BDI architecture, where agents are modelled based on their beliefs, desires and intentions, provides a practical approach to develop large scale systems. However, it is not well suited to model complex Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems pervaded by uncertainty. In this paper we address this issue by extending the operational semantics of Can(Plan) into Can(Plan)+. We start by modelling the beliefs of an agent as a set of epistemic states where each state, possibly using a different representation, models part of the agent's beliefs. These epistemic states are stratified to make them commensurable and to reason about the uncertain beliefs of the agent. The syntax and semantics of a BDI agent are extended accordingly and we identify fragments with computationally efficient semantics. Finally, we examine how primitive actions are affected by uncertainty and we define an appropriate form of lookahead planning.

Intelligent Distributed Environmental Decision Support System

This article discusses the development of an Intelligent Distributed Environmental Decision Support System, built upon the association of a Multi-agent Belief Revision System with a Geographical Information System (GIS). The inherent multidisciplinary features of the involved expertises in the field of environmental management, the need to define clear policies that allow the synthesis of divergent perspectives, its systematic application, and the reduction of the costs and time that result from this integration, are the main reasons that motivate the proposal of this project. This paper is organised in two parts: in the first part we present and discuss the developed Distributed Belief Revision Test-bed — DiBeRT; in the second part we analyse its application to the environmental decision support domain, with special emphasis on the interface with a GIS.

Beliefs and Conflicts in a Real World Multi-Agent System

In a real world multiagent system, where the agents are faced with partial, incomplete and intrinsically dynamic knowledge, conflicts are inevitable. Frequently, different agents have goals or beliefs that cannot hold simultaneously. Conflict resolution methodologies have to be adopted to overcome such undesirable occurrences. In this paper we investigate the application of distributed belief revision techniques as the support for conflict resolution in the analysis of the validity of the candidate beams to be produced in the CERN particle accelerators. This CERN multiagent system contains a higher hierarchy agent, the Specialist agent, which makes use of meta-knowledge (on how the con- flicting beliefs have been produced by the other agents) in order to detect which beliefs should be abandoned. Upon solving a conflict, the Specialist instructs the involved agents to revise their beliefs accordingly. Conflicts in the problem domain are mapped into conflicting beliefs of the distributed belief revision system, where they can be handled by proven formal methods. This technique builds on well established concepts and combines them in a new way to solve important problems. We find this approach generally applicable in several domains.

On the iteration of Katsuno and Mendelzon update

In this dissertation we present a model for iteration of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s Update, inspired in the developments for iteration in AGM belief revision. We adapt Darwiche and Pearls’ postulates of iterated belief revision to update (as well as the independence postulate proposed in [BM06, JT07]) and show two families of such operators, based in natural [Bou96] and lexicographic revision [Nay94a, NPP03]. In all cases, we provide a possible worlds semantics of the models.

On AGM for Non-Classical Logics

The AGM theory of belief revision provides a formal framework to represent the dynamics of epistemic states. In this framework, the beliefs of the agent are usually represented as logical formulas while the change operations are constrained by rationality postulates. In the original proposal, the logic underlying the reasoning was supposed to be supraclassical, among other properties. In this paper, we present some of the existing work in adapting the AGM theory for non-classical logics and discuss their interconnections and what is still missing for each approach.

Argumentative systems in robots

Nowadays, the development of intelligent agents intends to be more refined, using improved architectures and reasoning mechanisms. Revise the beliefs of an agent is also an important subject, due to the consistency that agents should have about their knowledge. In this work we propose deliberative and argumentative agents using Lego Mindstorms robots, Argumentative NXT BDI-like Agents. These agents are built using the notions of the BDI model and they are capable to reason using the DeLP formalism. They update their knowledge base with their perceptions and revise it when necessary. Two variations are presented: the Single Argumentative NXT BDI-like Agent and the MAS Argumentative NXT BDI-like Agent.