On AGM for Non-Classical Logics
Contribuinte(s) |
UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO |
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Data(s) |
20/10/2012
20/10/2012
2011
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Resumo |
The AGM theory of belief revision provides a formal framework to represent the dynamics of epistemic states. In this framework, the beliefs of the agent are usually represented as logical formulas while the change operations are constrained by rationality postulates. In the original proposal, the logic underlying the reasoning was supposed to be supraclassical, among other properties. In this paper, we present some of the existing work in adapting the AGM theory for non-classical logics and discuss their interconnections and what is still missing for each approach. |
Identificador |
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, v.40, n.2, Special Issue, p.271-294, 2011 0022-3611 http://producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/30420 10.1007/s10992-011-9178-2 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
SPRINGER |
Relação |
Journal of Philosophical Logic |
Direitos |
closedAccess Copyright SPRINGER |
Palavras-Chave | #Belief change #Partial meet contraction #Non-classical logics #AGM #REVISION FUNCTIONS #CONTRACTION #Philosophy |
Tipo |
article original article publishedVersion |