On AGM for Non-Classical Logics


Autoria(s): WASSERMANN, Renata
Contribuinte(s)

UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO

Data(s)

20/10/2012

20/10/2012

2011

Resumo

The AGM theory of belief revision provides a formal framework to represent the dynamics of epistemic states. In this framework, the beliefs of the agent are usually represented as logical formulas while the change operations are constrained by rationality postulates. In the original proposal, the logic underlying the reasoning was supposed to be supraclassical, among other properties. In this paper, we present some of the existing work in adapting the AGM theory for non-classical logics and discuss their interconnections and what is still missing for each approach.

Identificador

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, v.40, n.2, Special Issue, p.271-294, 2011

0022-3611

http://producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/30420

10.1007/s10992-011-9178-2

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9178-2

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

SPRINGER

Relação

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Direitos

closedAccess

Copyright SPRINGER

Palavras-Chave #Belief change #Partial meet contraction #Non-classical logics #AGM #REVISION FUNCTIONS #CONTRACTION #Philosophy
Tipo

article

original article

publishedVersion