O Réu sem rosto: a importância da audiência de custódia no processo penal sob a ótica da economia comportamental

Neste artigo são discutidas formas de promover a melhoria da política pública prisional brasileira especialmente no que tange o preso provisório, com enfoque nas contribuições que a economia comportamental pode fornecer ao direito. A questão central do debate é como o modelo processual atualmente adotado não cria um ambiente favorável à liberdade, na medida em que não promove o diálogo entre o acusado e seu julgador. Os estudos econômicos, assim, podem nos fornecer importantes lições de como reverter a curva ascendente do número de presos provisórios no país e o impacto da instituição da audiência de custódia no processo penal brasileiro.

An essay on impression management: three randomized experiments with financial analysts

This thesis aims to explore the concept of impression management from the financial analysts’ point of view. Impression management is the definition of the act of an agent manipulating an impression that another person have of this agent, in the context of this thesis it happens when a company make graphics to disclosure financial-accounting information in order to manipulate the market’s perception of their performance. Three types of impression management were analyzed: presentation enhancement (color manipulation), measurement distortion (scale manipulation) and selectivity (the disclosure of positive information only). While presentation enhancement improved only the most impulsive financial analysts’ perception of firm’s performance, the measurement distortion improved the perception of performance for both groups of financial analysts (impulsive and reflective). Finally, selectivity improved the financial analysts’ perception of firm’s performance for both groups (impulsive and reflective), although impulsive financial analysts assigned lower ratings when compared to their reflective peers, on average, to a hypothetical company.

A regulação da previdência complementar fechada sob a perspectiva da economia comportamental: e a adesão automática como proposta para a mitigação de vieses cognitivos

A presente dissertação investiga a utilização de medidas como a adesão automática pela regulação da previdência complementar fechada a partir da flexibilização do conceito de racionalidade, tendo como base a Análise Econômica e Comportamental do Direito. Inicia-se o trabalho pela evolução histórica da regulação da previdência no Brasil, avaliando os impactos sistêmicos das alterações ocorridas no primeiro pilar previdenciário (regimes básicos). Em virtude dessas alterações e do crescimento da relevância do segundo pilar de previdência social (Previdência Complementar Fechada) para a manutenção do bem-estar, analisa-se a possibilidade de ocorrência de vieses cognitivos que implicam desvios de racionalidade dos indivíduos nas decisões relativas à previdência complementar. Esses vieses cognitivos podem fazer com que indivíduos escolham alternativas que não maximizam seu bem-estar, por razões como inércia, procrastinação e superotimismo, ao contrário do que aponta o pressuposto de racionalidade da Economia Neoclássica. Os resultados analisados conduzem à necessidade de adoção de medidas regulatórias capazes de mitigar esses desvios de racionalidade, na forma de adoção de arquitetura de escolhas que induzam à maximização do bem-estar individual, sem limitar a liberdade individual dos envolvidos. Essas medidas, entretanto, especialmente a adesão automática aos planos de benefícios, destinam-se à mitigação de vieses cognitivos, sendo criticável sua adoção em planos de previdência onde observa-se predominância de outras razões para baixos níveis de adesão, como desconfiança em relação à gestão do plano. Ademais, faz-se necessário respeitar certos critérios para sua implementação, a fim de garantir que esse instrumento somente seja utilizado quando se observar vieses cognitivos que prejudiquem significativamente o bem-estar, bem como que a opção à qual os indivíduos estão sendo induzidos é vantajosa, ao menos na grande maioria das vezes. Ao final, verifica-se a juridicidade dessas medidas, à luz da proporcionalidade, norma que permite identificar os limites para a intensidade regulatória.

Die Debatte über die Ziele des Vierten Kreuzzugs : ein Beitrag zur Lösung geschichtswissenschaftlich umstrittener Fragen mit Hilfe sozialwissenschaftlicher Instrumente

Der Rational-Choice-Ansatz (RCA) hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten eine weite Ver-rnbreitung in vielen sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen erfahren. Insbesondere in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten gab es wiederholte Bemühungen, den RCA auchrnauf geschichtswissenschaftliche Fragestellungen und Themen anzuwenden. Ein interssanter Ansatz dafür ist eine integrative Methodik, die unter der Bezeichnung „Analytic Narrative“ bekannt wurde. Damit wird versucht, die klassische narrative Form der Erklärung historischer Phänomene mit spieltheoretischen Modellierungen zu verbinden. Inspiriert durch diesen Ansatz geht die vorliegende Untersuchung der Frage nach, in welcher Form und unter welchen Umständen der RCA als analytische Grundlage für historische Themenfelder und Fragestellungen geeignet sein mag. Dies wird nicht nur theoretisch, sondern an einem historischen Beispiel untersucht. Konkreter Betrachtungsgegenstand der Arbeit ist der Vierte Kreuzzug. Vor über 800 Jahren endete dieser mit der Eroberung und Plünderung Konstantinopels sowie der Zerschlagung des Byzantinischen Reichs. Seit mehr als 150 Jahren streiten Historiker über die Ursachen für diese Ereignisse. Die theoretischenrnGrundpositionen, die innerhalb dieser Debatte durch einzelne Historiker einge-rnnommen wurden, dienen als Ausgangspunkt für die hier verfolgte Untersuchung.rnEs wird gezeigt, dass die Daten, die uns über den Vierten Kreuzzug vorliegen,rndie Möglichkeit eröffnen, verschiedene auf dem RCA basierende Analyseverfah-rnren zur Anwendung zu bringen. Das zentrale Ziel der Analyse besteht darin, ausrnden vorhandenen Quellen neue Einsichten in die strategischen Handlungsoptionen der für den Verlauf des Kreuzzugs relevanten Akteure zu generieren undrnüberdies ein Höchstmaß an Überprüfbarkeit zu gewährleisten.

The Effect Of Conformity On Economic Decision Making

Inspired by research in the field of behavioral economics as well as social psychology, this study aimed to explore if conformity plays a role in the occurrence of herd behavior in the financial market. Participants received one of nine different versions of a survey either online or on paper. They answered questions related to riskiness when making decisions, dependency on others when making decisions, and investment preferences among other questions. In experimental conditions, participants were told the majority of investors, either sixty percent or eighty percent, invested in a certain stock or won a game. It was predicted that individuals would conform to the group behavior in both experimental conditions with the highest level of conformity in the high pressure to conform condition. Results of experiments revealed that when the overwhelming majority of other investors behaved a certain way (80%), participants were more likely to behave that same way. Results of the third experiment supported previous research stating that emotion affects economic decision-making and facilitates herd behavior.

Management Challenges in Nurturing a Safe Work Environment

As engineers, we are trained to use logical, rational problem solving to insure our mines operate at maximum efficiency. We tend to use the same technical approach to design safety into all mining systems. This works well for machines, but not so much for the human component. Recent insights in the field of behavioral economics provide useful ideas for addressing the fact that we are driven by emotions more often than by rational thought. Understanding the nonrational aspect of human behavior is an important piece of any safety system design.

Diminishing parochialism in intergroup conflict by disrupting the right temporo-parietal junction.

Individuals react to violation of social norms by outgroup members differently than to transgressions of those same norms by ingroup members: namely outgroup perpetrators are punished much more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. This parochial punishment pattern has been observed and extensively studied in social psychology and behavioral economics. Despite progress in recent years, however, little is known about the neural underpinnings of this intergroup bias. Here, we demonstrate by means of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) that the transient disruption of the right, but not the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), reduces parochial punishment in a third-party punishment paradigm with real social groups. Moreover, we show that this observed TMS effect on parochial punishment is mediated by a classical punishment motive, i.e. retaliation. Finally, our data suggests that a change in perspective-taking might be the underlying mechanism that explains the impact of right TPJ disruption on retaliation motivation and parochial punishment. These findings provide the first causal evidence that the right TPJ plays a pivotal role in the implementation of parochial behaviors.

A model of factors determining levels of public support for health care policy in the United States

Public preferences for policy are formed in a little-understood process that is not adequately described by traditional economic theory of choice. In this paper I suggest that U.S. aggregate support for health reform can be modeled as tradeoffs among a small number of behavioral values and the stage of policy development. The theory underlying the model is based on Samuelson, et al.'s (1986) work and Wilke's (1991) elaboration of it as the Greed/Efficiency/Fairness (GEF) hypothesis of motivation in the management of resource dilemmas, and behavioral economics informed by Kahneman and Thaler's prospect theory. ^ The model developed in this paper employs ordered probit econometric techniques applied to data derived from U.S. polls taken from 1990 to mid-2003 that measured support for health reform proposals. Outcome data are four-tiered Likert counts; independent variables are dummies representing the presence or absence of operationalizations of each behavioral variable, along with an integer representing policy process stage. Marginal effects of each independent variable predict how support levels change on triggering that variable. Model estimation results indicate a vanishingly small likelihood that all coefficients are zero and all variables have signs expected from model theory. ^ Three hypotheses were tested: support will drain from health reform policy as it becomes increasingly well-articulated and approaches enactment; reforms appealing to fairness through universal health coverage will enjoy a higher degree of support than those targeted more narrowly; health reforms calling for government operation of the health finance system will achieve lower support than those that do not. Model results support the first and last hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, universal health care proposals did not provide incremental support beyond those targeted to “deserving” populations—children, elderly, working families. In addition, loss of autonomy (e.g. restrictions on choice of care giver) is found to be the “third rail” of health reform with significantly-reduced support. When applied to a hypothetical health reform in which an employer-mandated Medical Savings Account policy is the centerpiece, the model predicts support that may be insufficient to enactment. These results indicate that the method developed in the paper may prove valuable to health policy designers. ^

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.

Accessing talent : the foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps strategy /

This is the fourth of six monographs focused upon officer talent management in the U.S. Army. In it, the authors continue their examination of how the U.S. Army accesses, develops, retains, and employs officer talent. In particular, they focus upon the ways in which dynamic labor market conditions and generational preferences have shaped service propensity among potential officer prospects.

The Role of Social Cognition and Person Perception in Economic Social Decision-Making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make social inferences about another person in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes. However, until recently, much research in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics has examined social decision-making while failing to take into account the importance of the social context and social cognitive processes that are engaged when viewing another person. Using social psychological theory to guide our hypotheses, four research studies investigate the role of social cognition and person perception in guiding economic decisions made in social contexts. The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that only specific types of social information engage brain regions implicated in social cognition and hinder learning in social contexts. Study 2 (Chapter 3) extends these findings and examines contexts in which this social information is used to generalize across contexts to form predictions about another person’s behavior. Study 3 (Chapter 4) demonstrates that under certain contexts these social cognitive processes may be withheld in order to more effectively complete the task at hand. Last, Study 4 (Chapter 5) examines how this knowledge of social cognitive processing can be used to change behavior in a prosocial group context. Taken together, these studies add to the growing body of literature examining decision-making in social contexts and highlight the importance of social cognitive processing in guiding these decisions. Although social cognitive processing typically facilitates social interactions, these processes may alter economic decision-making in social contexts.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.

Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Decision-Making about Acquisitions at Community Historical Organizations

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06