Demanding a change : time to act on statutory demands

The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act. Despite this there has been a lack of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process. The purpose of this article is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency law in Australia. This paper argues that robust analysis of the statutory demand regime is overdue. The paper first sets out to discover if there is a policy justification for the process and to articulate what that may be. Second, it will briefly examine the current legislation and argue that the structure actually encourages litigation which is arguably undesirable in the context of insolvency. In particular we will ask if the current rigid legal regime is appropriate for dealing efficiently with the highly charged atmosphere of contested insolvency. Third, it will examine suggested reforms in this area as to whether they might be a way forward.

Does section 420A impose ‘strict liability’ upon controllers for acts or omissions of agents and experts?

This article addresses in depth the question of whether section 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) imposes ‘strict liability’ upon a controller for the failure of an agent or expert to take reasonable care. The weight of existing authority appears to suggest that controllers are liable under s 420A for the carelessness of their agents or expert advisers. However, a closer analysis of the text of the provision and relevant Australian and UK case law demonstrates that this aspect of the statutory construction of s 420A remains very much an open question. This article ultimately contends for a construction of s 420A which requires a controller to adequately supervise and scrutinise, but which does not render a blameless controller strictly liable for all careless acts and omissions of agents and expert advisers.

Director liability for uncommercial transactions : is s 588G(1A) impotent to provide liquidators the means to seek compensation for creditors?

In the 10 years since the addition of uncommercial transactions to the table of deemed “debts incurred” in s 588G(1A) of the Corporations Act, the sub-section has arguably achieved little. This article explains why this has been so, and what needs to be done to enable this aspect of Australia’s insolvent trading laws to operate effectively and as originally intended.

Debts “incurred” by receivers, administrators and liquidators : the case for a harmonised construction of ss 419, 443A and 556(1)(a) of the Corporations Act

This article analyses the inconsistent approaches taken by courts when interpreting provisions of the Corporations Act which address debts or expenses “incurred” by receivers, administrators and liquidators. The article contends for a consistent construction of these provisions which will enable the legislation to operate (as was intended) for the benefit of persons who supply goods, services or labour to companies in external administration. The article explains how and why debts can be “incurred” by insolvency practitioners continuing on pre-existing contracts. Specifically, the article contends for a construction of ss 419 and 443A of the Corporations Act which renders receivers and administrators personally liable for certain entitlements of employees (eg, wages and superannuation contributions) which become due and payable by reason of the decision of a receiver or administrator to continue a pre-existing contract rather than terminate it.

Bailing out the FEG : is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS) approaching its own fiscal cliff?

This article discusses what recent statistics and public reports reveal about the funding of GEERS (now the FEG) and its bottom line. The article examines (1) whether there has been a “blowout” in the scheme which guarantees the recovery of employee entitlements in liquidations and (2) what might be done to put the scheme on a firmer fiscal footing.

Demanding a change : time to act on statutory demands

The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act. Despite this there has been a lack of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process. The purpose of this article is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency law in Australia.

The Australian corporate rescue provisions : how do they compare?

A notable feature of corporate legislative development in western countries for the past 30 years is the various mechanisms introduced to facilitate the survival of company structures facing insolvency. Australia’s corporate rescue version, called a “voluntary administration”, is now contained in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), although first introduced in 1993. The Australian provisions apply to all corporate entities and commence with a short moratorium followed by a meeting of creditors. At the creditors’ meeting a “rescue” plan called a deed of company arrangement may be entered into, or, alternatively the company may be liquidated. The voluntary administration provisions have become a significant part of Australia’s corporate insolvency landscape and are critical to the operation of corporate law outside of insolvency. Australia does not have a specialist bankruptcy court, rather it utilises the English approach where insolvency practitioners are accountants and appointed to the insolvent company as administrators. In Australia, insolvency practitioners must be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”), the corporate and securities regulator. A voluntary administration is usually commenced by the board of directors appointing an insolvency practitioner to the company. There exists no opportunity for a voluntary administration to commence at the creditors’ or court’s behest. This chapter seeks to address the comparative necessity of Australia’s corporate regime.

Reconsidering the agency of a privately appointed receiver and manager in three specific circumstances

Where a secured lender elects to appoint a receiver and manager, the appointment document standardly provides for the receiver and manager to act as the agent of the debtor. This article considers the significance of this agency in the context of three specific issues that have the potential to arise in the receivership of a corporate borrower across all Australian jurisdictions.

Australian DOCAs versus UK pre-packs and CVAs : sifting through the ashes of comparative dividend returns

This article is something of a brief extension of recent research into deeds of company arrangement (DOCAs) under Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), conducted with the support of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association’s (ARITA’s) Terry Taylor Scholarship (TTS). This article presents some of the findings of that research (namely, the dividend outcomes delivered by sampled Australian DOCAs) in a manner consistent with reports which have recently emerged from similar research conducted in the UK. In so doing, a basic comparison can be made of the performance of Australian DOCAs against analogous UK procedures.

The conundrum of phoenix activity: Is further reform necessary?

Phoenix activity presents a conundrum for the law and its regulators. While there is economic cost associated with all phoenix activity, the underlying behaviour is not always illegal. A transaction with indicators of phoenix activity may be an entirely innocent and well-intentioned display of entrepreneurial spirit, albeit one that has ended in failure. Restructuring post business failure is not illegal per se. Recent reforms targeting phoenix activity fail to grapple with the vast range of behaviour that can be described as phoenix activity since they do not differentiate between legal and illegal activity. This article explores the importance of the distinction between legal and illegal phoenix activity, the extent to which the existing law captures a range of behaviour that can be described as illegal phoenix activity and the response of key regulators and governmental bodies to the absence of single law that attempts to define illegal phoenix activity.