The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia’s future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process. On 16 March 2012, an Exposure Draft and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum outlining the proposed amendments to implement the first stage of the transfer pricing reforms were released. Within the proposed changes is the explicit embedding of the use of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations to help determine the arm’s length price. Does this mean that Australia engages in an international tax regime?

Australia's adoption of an international tax regime : to engage or not to engage?

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia's future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process.

Small business entity tax concessions : through the eyes of the practitioner

Australia’s small business sector has pursued often-competing imperatives of simplicity, equity and efficiency in the income tax regime (particularly focusing on the notion of simplicity) over the last decade. In 2001, there was an attempt to provide such simplification and reduce the compliance burden faced by Australian small businesses through the ‘simplified tax system’ (‘STS’). However, despite amendments over the years, the regime is much criticised. This article explores how the STS (now known as the ‘small business entity’ regime or ‘SBE’) is utilised from the perspective of tax practitioners, by analysing their recommendations to small business clients in respect of the regime. The results indicate that practitioners believe the regime did nothing to simplify the tax system for small businesses or reduce tax compliance costs. Indeed, the practitioners believed that the introduction of small business concessions had actually achieved the opposite result — it had increased tax compliance costs for their small business clients. However, tax practitioners still recommend the regime highly because it minimises their client’s tax liability.

Tax Expenditure Management : A Critical Assessment

A tax expenditure is a 'tax break' allowed to a taxpayer or group of taxpayers, for example, by way of concession, deduction, deferral or exemption. The tax expenditure concept, as it was first identified, was designed to demonstrate the similarity between direct government spending on the one hand and spending through the tax system on the other. The identification of benefits provided through the tax system as tax expenditures allows analysts to consider the fiscal significant of those parts of the tax system which do not contribute to the primary purpose of raising revenue. Although a seemingly simple concept, it has generated a range of complex definitional and practical issues, and this book identifies and critical assesses the controversial aspects of tax expenditure and tax expenditure management.

Powering innovation through tax concessions: The changing research & development tax incentives

The changes to the R&D tax concession in 2011 were touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. Three years later, as part of the 2014 Federal Budget, a reduction in the concession rates was announced. While the most recent of the pro-posed changes are designed to align with the reduction in company tax rate, the Australian Federal Government also indicated that the gain to revenue from the reduction in the incentive scheme will be redirected by the Government to repair the Budget and fund policy priori-ties. The consequence is that the R&D concessions, while designed to encourage innovation, are clearly linked with the tax system. As such, the first part of this article considers whether the R&D concession is a changing tax for changing times. Leading on from part one, this article also addresses a second question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it’? To answer this question, the article argues that, rather than ever being substantive tax reform, the constantly changing measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity, whatever that amount is. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, all R&D tax concessions should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably merely the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the article concludes that the answer is: very little.

Emerging from the shadows: Tax as a research discipline (Editorial)

More than ever, research is playing an important part in supporting proposed tax reforms and finding solutions to Australia’s tax system. Also, for tax academics the importance of quality research is critical in an increasingly competitive tertiary environment. However, life for an academic can be an isolating experience at time, especially if one’s expertise is in an area that many of their immediate colleagues do not share an interest in. Collegiately and the ability to be able to discuss research is seen as critical in fostering the next generation of academics. It is with this in mind that on the 5th of July 2010 the Inaugural Queensland Tax Teachers’ Symposium was hosted by Griffith University at its Southbank campus. The aim was to bring together for one day tax academics in Queensland, and further afield, to present their current research projects and encourage independent tax research. If was for this reason that the symposium was later re-named the Queensland Tax Researchers’ Symposium (QTRS) to reflect its emphasis. The Symposium has been held annually mid-year on four occasions with in excess of 120 attendees over this period. The fifth QTRS is planned for June 2014 to be hosted by James Cook University.

G20 tax reform plan should prevent another Lux leaks

The G20 Communique is good news on the international tax reform front. As part of the G20 commitment to boost economic resilience the Communique commits G20 nations to taking action to ensure fairness in the international tax system. This means they are looking at ways to ensure profits are taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created.

Not all corporate tax avoiders will be snared by new rules

Hockey’s budget announcement of two major tax integrity measures was flagged before the budget was handed down, but even that came as no surprise. Integrity, or lack thereof, in our tax system is a hot topic and an easy target for a Treasurer looking to sell a federal budget. The first of the proposed changes is to our GST regime. No-one likes hearing that they will be paying more tax. But, the charging of GST on supplies of digital products and services in Australia by an off-shore supplier will at least make sense to the general public. With the inherent unfairness in the current system and a revenue raising prediction of A$350 million over the next four years, most are likely to accept the logic of such a measure. The second of the proposed changes are new laws to be included in Australia’s general anti-avoidance provision. New laws, which will apply from 1 January 2016, are aimed at multinational companies engaged in aggressive tax practices. The proposed anti-avoidance law is designed to stop multinationals that artificially avoid a taxable presence in Australia. It is difficult to see how this strategy of addressing specific behaviour through what is considered a general provision will work. And, it is these changes that are already causing confusion.

Government cracks down on tax avoidance through foreign investment rules

The Turnbull Government announced yet another measure aimed at addressing tax base erosion and profit shifting, placing additional requirements on new foreign investment under the existing national interest test. In the last 12 months Australia has seen various reforms within the tax system. However, this latest initiative is a shift as it links Australia’s tax regime with its foreign investment regime. It sends a broader signal to the market that Australia will look beyond the collection of tax revenues to a consideration of national interest.

Tax Reform and Payout Policy:Do Shareholder Clienteles or Payout Policy Adjust?

Changes in taxation of corporate dividends offer excellent opportunities to study dividend clientele effects. We explore payout policies and ownership structures around a major tax reform that took place in Finland in 2004. Consistent with dividend clienteles affecting firms’ dividend policy decisions, we find that Finnish firms altered their dividend policies based on the changed tax incentives of their largest shareholders. While firms adjust their payout policies, our results also indicate that ownership structures of Finnish firms also changed around the 2004 reform, consistent with shareholder clienteles adjusting to the new tax system.

Financing higher education : the case for a graduate tax

Article

The tax treatment of employee stock options : generous to a fault

In the 2000 budgets, both the federal and Ontario governments introduced changes to the tax treatment of employee stock options for the explicit purpose of making their tax treatment in Canada similar to or more favourable than that in the United States. The federal budget added a deferral, similar to that currently applicable to options granted by Canadian-controlled private corporations, for up to $100,000 per year of public company stock options. The Ontario budget introduced an exemption from tax for employees involved in research and development on the first $100,000 per year of employee benefits arising on the exercise of qualified stock options or on eligible capital gains arising from the sale of shares acquired by the exercise of eligible stock options. These proposals reflect the apparent acceptance by the two governments that there is a “brain drain” from Canada to the United States of knowledge workers in the “new” economy and that reductions in Canadian taxes should stem this drain. In the author’s view, the tax treatment of employee stock options, even without these changes, is overly generous. Both the federal and provincial proposals ignore the fact that most employee stock options are taxed more favourably in Canada than in the United States in any event. In particular, most employee stock option benefits in Canada are taxed at capital gains tax rates, whereas in the United States most are taxed at full rates. While the US Internal Revenue Code does provide capital gains tax treatment for certain employee stock option benefits, a number of preconditions must be met. Most important, the shares acquired pursuant to the options must be held for a minimum of one year after the option is exercised. In addition, there are monetary limits on the amount of options that qualify for capital gains treatment. In Canada, there are generally no holding period requirements or monetary limits that apply in order for the option holder to benefit from capital gains tax rates. Empirical evidence indicates that the vast majority of employees in the United States exercise their options and immediately sell the shares acquired. These “cashless exercises” do not benefit from capital gains treatment in the United States, whereas similar cashless exercises in Canada generally do. This empirical evidence suggests not only that the 2000 budget proposals are unwarranted, but also that the existing treatment of employee stock options in Canada is already more generous than that in the United States. This article begins with a theoretical “benchmark” for the taxation of employee stock options. The author suggests that employee stock options should be treated in the same manner as other income from employment. In theory, the value of the benefit should be included in income when the option is granted or vests. However, owing to the practical difficulty of valuing employee stock options, the theoretical benchmark proposed is that the value of the benefit (the difference between the fair market value of the shares acquired and the strike price under the option) be taxed when the shares are acquired, and the employer be entitled to a corresponding deduction. The employee stock option rules in Canada and the United States are then compared and contrasted with each other and the benchmark treatment. The article then examines the arguments that have been made for favourable treatment of employee stock options. Included in this critique is a review of the recent empirical work on the Canadian brain drain. Empirical studies suggest that the brain drain—if it exists at all—is small and that, despite what many newspapers and right-wing think-tanks would have us believe, lower taxes in the United States are not the cause. One study, concluding that taxes do have an effect on migration, suggests that even if Canada adopted a tax system identical to that in the United States, the brain drain would be reduced by a mere 10 percent. Indeed, even if Canada eliminated income tax altogether, it would not stop the brain drain. If governments here want to spend money in order to stem the brain drain, they should focus on other areas. For example, Canada produces fewer university graduates in the fields of mathematics, sciences, and engineering than any other G7 country except Italy. The short supply of university graduates in these fields, the apparent loss of top-calibre academics to US
universities, and the consequent lower levels of university research in these areas (an important spawning ground for new ideas in the “new” knowledge-based economy) suggest that Canada may be better served by devoting more resources to its university institutions, particularly in post-graduate programs, rather than continuing the current trend of budget cuts that universities have endured and may further endure if taxes are reduced.
As far as employee stock options are concerned, if Canada does want to look to the United States for guidance on tax reform (which it seems to do with increasing frequency of late), it should adopt the US rules applicable to nonstatutory options, which are close to the proposed benchmark treatment. In the absence of preferential tax treatment, employee stock options would still be included in compensation packages provided that there were sound business reasons for their use. No persuasive evidence has been put forward that the use of stock options, in the absence of tax incentives, is suboptimal. Indeed, the US experience suggests quite the opposite.