Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Teorías y algunas experiencias internacionales en el financiamiento de la educación superior: lecciones para Colombia

Se analizan diferentes alternativas para la financiación de la educación superior, teniendo en cuenta que la presencia de fallas de mercado -tanto por el lado de la demanda como por el de la oferta- hace de éste un sector muy particular. Las primeras se relacionan con las decisiones privadas en términos de educación de la población estudiantil, y las segundas con las asimetrías de información que caracterizan el lado de la oferta en el financiamiento de la educación. El documento hace una revisión de literatura académica y de algunas experiencias internacionales sobre las diferentes fuentes de financiación en este sector, así como sus potenciales efectos sobre ciertas variables. Así, esta revisión arroja luces sobre las alternativas para el caso Colombiano.

Competition between HMO and PPO: A Two-Sided Market Approach

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholderson one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during the last decade in the US.

Modelos de presupuestación de capital en finanzas corporativas y utilidad de los mismos

La siguiente investigación describe una aproximación teórica al tema de los modelos de presupuestación de capital, el objetivo fundamental se basa en comprender su enfoque e importancia al momento de tomar decisiones de inversión por parte de los directores de una empresa, así como de prever los efectos de esta en un futuro. Al respecto, y sobre la base de que los modelos de presupuestación de capital son herramientas para analizar posibles erogaciones de capital por parte de una empresa, es necesario para efectos del presente proyecto de investigación, definir sus diferentes modelos desde lo teórico y metodológico, explicando los diferentes conceptos relacionados con el tema. Así mismo, se explican algunos de los indicadores financieros utilizados en las compañías para medir y estimar la “salud financiera” de la empresa, además de puntualizar su impacto en la perdurabilidad de las entidades, lo cual permite dar una visión más general sobre la importancia que trasciende de los indicadores financieros, generando un impacto positivo en la evolución o crecimiento de la organización. En complemento, la investigación aborda la presupuestación de capital de manera particular aplicado en la gestión empresarial, sean estas privadas o públicas (estatal y gubernamental). En este sentido, se abordan conceptos elaborados por diferentes académicos en los que se exponen algunas aproximaciones respecto al posible mejoramiento de la presupuestación para los sectores a los que pertenecen determinadas entidades. Finalmente, se presenta de manera explícita las conclusiones que surgieron a lo largo de la construcción del documento de investigación, con el fin de dar cumplimiento concreto al objetivo general del trabajo, el cual constituye una respuesta a la pregunta de investigación que se enunciará en el desarrollo del documento.

Entrepreneurial opportunities, implicit contracts and market making for complex consumer goods

This article extends the theory of entrepreneurial opportunity exploitation, outlining how under certain conditions, opportunity exploitation is dependent on market making innovations. Where adverse selection and moral hazard characterize markets, consumers are likely to withdraw regardless of product quality. In order to overcome consumer resistance, entrepreneurs must signal credible commitments. But because consumers purchase without fully specifying requirements, entrepreneurs' commitments take the partial form of implicit contracts, creating strong mutual commitments to repeated transactions. These commitments enable novel markets to function, but introduce additional costs. This article illustrates the theory with the historic case of Singer in sewing machines

Hot and cold IPO markets : the case of the stock exchange of Mauritius

The aim of this study is to assess the characteristics of the hot and cold IPO markets on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM). The results show that the hot issues exhibit, on average, a greater degree of underpricing than the cold issues, although the hot issue phenomenon is not a significant driving force in explaining this short-run underpricing. The results are consistent with the predictions of the changing risk composition hypothesis in suggesting that firms going public during hot markets are on average relatively more risky. The findings also support the time adverse selection hypothesis in that the firms’ quality dispersion is statistically different between hot and cold markets. Finally, the study concludes that firms which go public during hot markets do not underperform those going public in cold markets over the longer term.

Call auction transparency and market liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper uses the natural experiment offered by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to investigate the impact of opening call auction transparency on market liquidity. We find that the dissemination of indicative trade information during the pre-open call auction session leads to an overall improvement in stock liquidity in the continuous trading session. Bid-ask spreads narrow in the first trading hour because adverse selection risk fell significantly and there is less price volatility in the continuous market. This effect is greater for actively traded securities than illiquid securities. Our findings are robust for different lengths of sample period, different lengths of trading hours after market open, and stocks that had (and had not) reformed the share split structure during our research period.

The role of optimistic news stories in IPO pricing

This study investigates the influence of optimistic news stories on first-day pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia between 1995 and 2005. Unlike the United States, Australia has no quiet-period regulation limiting the dissemination of information from media before IPO listing dates. We find that optimistic news stories are negatively associated with IPO underpricing. Results from a relative valuation model show that IPOs which received positive news stories ahead of the first trading day are not overpriced relative to their industry benchmarks. These results suggest that optimistic news stories mitigate information asymmetry and adverse selection problems. However, optimistic news stories do not appear to inflate the share price on the first day of trading. Our findings suggest that regulation mandating a 'quiet period' before the commencement of trading in IPOs is neither necessary nor desirable in the Australian environment.

Latency reduction and market quality: the case of the Australian Stock Exchange

This study investigates the role of latency in market quality in the Australia Securities Exchange following the introduction of the Integrated Trading Platform (ITS) and ASXTrade. We find that the reduction in system latency from 70. ms to 30. ms (ITS) improved liquidity. However, the lower latency has not had a long-lasting downward effect on spreads, as there was no discernible reduction in trading costs when institutional traders already had access to lower-latency co-locations. We contribute to the literature by reporting that low latency improves market liquidity, but privileged participants that have access to trading information prior to others may induce greater information asymmetry and adverse selection.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Essays on asymmetric information problems without the single-crossing property: applications to corporate finance

The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.

Underpricing of equity offerings in Brazil

We examine the underpricing of twenty-seven IPOs and twenty-nine SEOs issued in Brazil from January 1999 to March 2006. Determinants on pre-market demand, underwriting activities and information asymmetry were discussed. Common characteristics seem to exist between all issues. 94% have been on premium market corporate level and 93% were realized via bookbuilding. Underpricing for IPOs and SEOs has been recorded at 9.6% and 3.6%, respectively. IPOs are more underpriced when (i) more informed investors receive shares, (ii)better ranked underwriters lead the offer, and (iii) there is positive revision in the final price compared to the initial price range defined before information disclosure. SEOs are more underpriced when (i) shares presents higher appreciation in pre-offer period, and (ii) the proportion of primary offers are larger, supporting adverse selection costs theory.

Parcerias público-privadas na presença de seleção adversa: uma análise numérica

Esta dissertação propõe-se a analisar a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas (PPP) em um ambiente de seleção adversa. Mais especi calmente, analiso se as tarefas de construir e operar uma infraestrutura para serviços públicos deve ser realizada por um consórcio ou se devem ser realizadas por fi rmas contratadas separadamente. Para tal, diferentemente da literatura existente para o problema, focadas nos problemas de contratos incompletos e moral hazard, construo um modelo de seleção adversa multidimensional, onde as firrmas possuem informação privada e podem exercer um esforço não observável em cada atividade, com a existência de externalidade entre as tarefas, em uma extensão do modelo de La¤ont e Tirole (1986). Após defi nir algumas condições sob as quais PPP domina os meios usuais de contratação, utilizo de uma análise numérica para melhor compreender a solução do modelo, que se mostra altamente dependente da correlação entre os parâmetros de informação privada das firmas.

Comitês de investimento em fundos de investimento em participações utilizados como veículos para a indústria de Private Equity

A análise sobre se a existência de comitês de investimentos que concedam poderes de ingerência aos cotistas é uma variável levada em consideração pelos potenciais investidores de fundos de investimento em participação (“FIPs”) utilizados como veículos de investimento em Private Equity (“FIPs PE”) no mercado brasileiro é o objeto do presente trabalho, cujo objetivo é verificar se há competição entre gestores de FIPs PE pela inclusão de tais comitês em seus regulamentos, com vistas a prospectar um maior número de cotistas. Por meio da realização de pesquisa empírica, na qual serão analisados os regulamentos de FIPs PE que foram registrados desde o ano de 2006 até o ano de 2011 perante a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (“CVM”), com vistas a examinar se houve aumento no número de regulamentos que previssem comitês de investimento e no número de gestores que adotam comitês de investimento usualmente nos fundos que gerem, se pretende comprovar a hipótese de que os comitês de investimento são uma variável que interfere na decisão dos investidores sobre em qual FIP PE investirão seus recursos e, portanto, que os gestores de FIPs PE tendem a estabelecer este mecanismo nos regulamentos dos fundos que gerem. Os pressupostos teóricos que justificam a adoção de mecanismos de governança pelos FIPs PE, com base na literatura sobre a teoria da agência – enfatizando-se os temas da assimetria de informação, risco moral, seleção adversa e custos de agência - e, ainda, os mecanismos de governança mais usuais na indústria de FIPs PE são apresentados de forma a conferir ao tema o devido embasamento teórico. A relevância deste trabalho decorre da importância que a indústria de Private Equity possui na economia, por atuar em determinado estágio de um empreendimento onde o acesso ao financiamento é via de regra escasso. Além disso, o tema se revela atual, já que houve, apenas no ano de 2011, captações recordes de fundos de Private Equity no Brasil, que somaram um montante de US$ 8,1 bilhões.

Citizens vs. banks: institutional drivers of financial market litigiousness in Brazil

This article analyzes the institutional drivers of Brazil’s alarmingly high levels of litigation between clients and financial institutions. Most of the policy oriented literature that explores that phenomenon discusses the impacts of a perceived debtor-friendly bias of Brazilian courts on generating feedback loops of litigation that further increases interest rates and creates adverse selection within the pool of potential debtors. This literature therefore addresses the way courts behave once disputes reach their doorstep; conversely, we take a step back to understand the underlying reasons for why such a large number of disputes end up in courts in the first place. We accordingly attribute endemic litigation in Brazilian financial markets to a framework of political, economic and legal institutions and circumstances, which this article aims to unbound and explain.