Sobre a integração indefinida de funções racionais complexas: teoria e implementação de algoritmos racionais

We present indefinite integration algorithms for rational functions over subfields of the complex numbers, through an algebraic approach. We study the local algorithm of Bernoulli and rational algorithms for the class of functions in concern, namely, the algorithms of Hermite; Horowitz-Ostrogradsky; Rothstein-Trager and Lazard-Rioboo-Trager. We also study the algorithm of Rioboo for conversion of logarithms involving complex extensions into real arctangent functions, when these logarithms arise from the integration of rational functions with real coefficients. We conclude presenting pseudocodes and codes for implementation in the software Maxima concerning the algorithms studied in this work, as well as to algorithms for polynomial gcd computation; partial fraction decomposition; squarefree factorization; subresultant computation, among other side algorithms for the work. We also present the algorithm of Zeilberger-Almkvist for integration of hyperexpontential functions, as well as its pseudocode and code for Maxima. As an alternative for the algorithms of Rothstein-Trager and Lazard-Rioboo-Trager, we yet present a code for Benoulli’s algorithm for square-free denominators; and another for Czichowski’s algorithm, although this one is not studied in detail in the present work, due to the theoretical basis necessary to understand it, which is beyond this work’s scope. Several examples are provided in order to illustrate the working of the integration algorithms in this text

An algebraic operator approach to the analysis of Gerber-Shiu functions

We introduce an algebraic operator framework to study discounted penalty functions in renewal risk models. For inter-arrival and claim size distributions with rational Laplace transform, the usual integral equation is transformed into a boundary value problem, which is solved by symbolic techniques. The factorization of the differential operator can be lifted to the level of boundary value problems, amounting to iteratively solving first-order problems. This leads to an explicit expression for the Gerber-Shiu function in terms of the penalty function.

A simple and systematic approach to assigning Denavit-Hartenberg Parameters

This paper presents a simple and intuitive approach to determining the kinematic parameters of a serial-link robot in Denavit– Hartenberg (DH) notation. Once a manipulator’s kinematics is parameterized in this form, a large body of standard algorithms and code implementations for kinematics, dynamics, motion planning, and simulation are available. The proposed method has two parts. The first is the “walk through,” a simple procedure that creates a string of elementary translations and rotations, from the user-defined base coordinate to the end-effector. The second step is an algebraic procedure to manipulate this string into a form that can be factorized as link transforms, which can be represented in standard or modified DH notation. The method allows for an arbitrary base and end-effector coordinate system as well as an arbitrary zero joint angle pose. The algebraic procedure is amenable to computer algebra manipulation and a Java program is available as supplementary downloadable material.

Algebraic analysis of small scale LEX-BES

This paper examines the algebraic cryptanalysis of small scale variants of the LEX-BES. LEX-BES is a stream cipher based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher. LEX is a generic method proposed for constructing a stream cipher from a block cipher, initially introduced by Biryukov at eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher project in 2005. The Big Encryption System (BES) is a block cipher introduced at CRYPTO 2002 which facilitates the algebraic analysis of the AES block cipher. In this paper, experiments were conducted to find solution of the equation system describing small scale LEX-BES using Gröbner Basis computations. This follows a similar approach to the work by Cid, Murphy and Robshaw at FSE 2005 that investigated algebraic cryptanalysis on small scale variants of the BES. The difference between LEX-BES and BES is that due to the way the keystream is extracted, the number of unknowns in LEX-BES equations is fewer than the number in BES. As far as the author knows, this attempt is the first at creating solvable equation systems for stream ciphers based on the LEX method using Gröbner Basis computations.

Improved algebraic cryptanalysis of QUAD, Bivium and Trivium via graph partitioning on equation systems

We present a novel approach for preprocessing systems of polynomial equations via graph partitioning. The variable-sharing graph of a system of polynomial equations is defined. If such graph is disconnected, then the corresponding system of equations can be split into smaller ones that can be solved individually. This can provide a tremendous speed-up in computing the solution to the system, but is unlikely to occur either randomly or in applications. However, by deleting certain vertices on the graph, the variable-sharing graph could be disconnected in a balanced fashion, and in turn the system of polynomial equations would be separated into smaller systems of near-equal sizes. In graph theory terms, this process is equivalent to finding balanced vertex partitions with minimum-weight vertex separators. The techniques of finding these vertex partitions are discussed, and experiments are performed to evaluate its practicality for general graphs and systems of polynomial equations. Applications of this approach in algebraic cryptanalysis on symmetric ciphers are presented: For the QUAD family of stream ciphers, we show how a malicious party can manufacture conforming systems that can be easily broken. For the stream ciphers Bivium and Trivium, we nachieve significant speedups in algebraic attacks against them, mainly in a partial key guess scenario. In each of these cases, the systems of polynomial equations involved are well-suited to our graph partitioning method. These results may open a new avenue for evaluating the security of symmetric ciphers against algebraic attacks.

Algebraic attacks on clock-controlled stream ciphers

Stream ciphers are encryption algorithms used for ensuring the privacy of digital telecommunications. They have been widely used for encrypting military communications, satellite communications, pay TV encryption and for voice encryption of both fixed lined and wireless networks. The current multi year European project eSTREAM, which aims to select stream ciphers suitable for widespread adoptation, reflects the importance of this area of research. Stream ciphers consist of a keystream generator and an output function. Keystream generators produce a sequence that appears to be random, which is combined with the plaintext message using the output function. Most commonly, the output function is binary addition modulo two. Cryptanalysis of these ciphers focuses largely on analysis of the keystream generators and of relationships between the generator and the keystream it produces. Linear feedback shift registers are widely used components in building keystream generators, as the sequences they produce are well understood. Many types of attack have been proposed for breaking various LFSR based stream ciphers. A recent attack type is known as an algebraic attack. Algebraic attacks transform the problem of recovering the key into a problem of solving multivariate system of equations, which eventually recover the internal state bits or the key bits. This type of attack has been shown to be effective on a number of regularly clocked LFSR based stream ciphers. In this thesis, algebraic attacks are extended to a number of well known stream ciphers where at least one LFSR in the system is irregularly clocked. Applying algebriac attacks to these ciphers has only been discussed previously in the open literature for LILI-128. In this thesis, algebraic attacks are first applied to keystream generators using stop-and go clocking. Four ciphers belonging to this group are investigated: the Beth-Piper stop-and-go generator, the alternating step generator, the Gollmann cascade generator and the eSTREAM candidate: the Pomaranch cipher. It is shown that algebraic attacks are very effective on the first three of these ciphers. Although no effective algebraic attack was found for Pomaranch, the algebraic analysis lead to some interesting findings including weaknesses that may be exploited in future attacks. Algebraic attacks are then applied to keystream generators using (p; q) clocking. Two well known examples of such ciphers, the step1/step2 generator and the self decimated generator are investigated. Algebraic attacks are shown to be very powerful attack in recovering the internal state of these generators. A more complex clocking mechanism than either stop-and-go or the (p; q) clocking keystream generators is known as mutual clock control. In mutual clock control generators, the LFSRs control the clocking of each other. Four well known stream ciphers belonging to this group are investigated with respect to algebraic attacks: the Bilateral-stop-and-go generator, A5/1 stream cipher, Alpha 1 stream cipher, and the more recent eSTREAM proposal, the MICKEY stream ciphers. Some theoretical results with regards to the complexity of algebraic attacks on these ciphers are presented. The algebraic analysis of these ciphers showed that generally, it is hard to generate the system of equations required for an algebraic attack on these ciphers. As the algebraic attack could not be applied directly on these ciphers, a different approach was used, namely guessing some bits of the internal state, in order to reduce the degree of the equations. Finally, an algebraic attack on Alpha 1 that requires only 128 bits of keystream to recover the 128 internal state bits is presented. An essential process associated with stream cipher proposals is key initialization. Many recently proposed stream ciphers use an algorithm to initialize the large internal state with a smaller key and possibly publicly known initialization vectors. The effect of key initialization on the performance of algebraic attacks is also investigated in this thesis. The relationships between the two have not been investigated before in the open literature. The investigation is conducted on Trivium and Grain-128, two eSTREAM ciphers. It is shown that the key initialization process has an effect on the success of algebraic attacks, unlike other conventional attacks. In particular, the key initialization process allows an attacker to firstly generate a small number of equations of low degree and then perform an algebraic attack using multiple keystreams. The effect of the number of iterations performed during key initialization is investigated. It is shown that both the number of iterations and the maximum number of initialization vectors to be used with one key should be carefully chosen. Some experimental results on Trivium and Grain-128 are then presented. Finally, the security with respect to algebraic attacks of the well known LILI family of stream ciphers, including the unbroken LILI-II, is investigated. These are irregularly clock- controlled nonlinear filtered generators. While the structure is defined for the LILI family, a particular paramater choice defines a specific instance. Two well known such instances are LILI-128 and LILI-II. The security of these and other instances is investigated to identify which instances are vulnerable to algebraic attacks. The feasibility of recovering the key bits using algebraic attacks is then investigated for both LILI- 128 and LILI-II. Algebraic attacks which recover the internal state with less effort than exhaustive key search are possible for LILI-128 but not for LILI-II. Given the internal state at some point in time, the feasibility of recovering the key bits is also investigated, showing that the parameters used in the key initialization process, if poorly chosen, can lead to a key recovery using algebraic attacks.

Algebraic analysis of small Scale LEX-BES

This work examines the algebraic cryptanalysis of small scale variants of the LEX-BES. LEX-BES is a stream cipher based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher. LEX is a generic method proposed for constructing a stream cipher from a block cipher, initially introduced by Biryukov at eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher project in 2005. The Big Encryption System (BES) is a block cipher introduced at CRYPTO 2002 which facilitates the algebraic analysis of the AES block cipher. In this article, experiments were conducted to find solutions of equation systems describing small scale LEX-BES using Gröbner Basis computations. This follows a similar approach to the work by Cid, Murphy and Robshaw at FSE 2005 that investigated algebraic cryptanalysis on small scale variants of the BES. The difference between LEX-BES and BES is that due to the way the keystream is extracted, the number of unknowns in LEX-BES equations is fewer than the number in BES. As far as the authors know, this attempt is the first at creating solvable equation systems for stream ciphers based on the LEX method using Gröbner Basis computations.

A geometric approach to trajectory design for an autonomous underwater vehicle : surveying the bulbous bow of a ship

In this paper, we present a control strategy design technique for an autonomous underwater vehicle based on solutions to the motion planning problem derived from differential geometric methods. The motion planning problem is motivated by the practical application of surveying the hull of a ship for implications of harbor and port security. In recent years, engineers and researchers have been collaborating on automating ship hull inspections by employing autonomous vehicles. Despite the progresses made, human intervention is still necessary at this stage. To increase the functionality of these autonomous systems, we focus on developing model-based control strategies for the survey missions around challenging regions, such as the bulbous bow region of a ship. Recent advances in differential geometry have given rise to the field of geometric control theory. This has proven to be an effective framework for control strategy design for mechanical systems, and has recently been extended to applications for underwater vehicles. Advantages of geometric control theory include the exploitation of symmetries and nonlinearities inherent to the system. Here, we examine the posed inspection problem from a path planning viewpoint, applying recently developed techniques from the field of differential geometric control theory to design the control strategies that steer the vehicle along the prescribed path. Three potential scenarios for surveying a ship?s bulbous bow region are motivated for path planning applications. For each scenario, we compute the control strategy and implement it onto a test-bed vehicle. Experimental results are analyzed and compared with theoretical predictions.

A geometrical approach to the motion planning problem for a submerged rigid body

The main focus of this paper is the motion planning problem for a deeply submerged rigid body. The equations of motion are formulated and presented by use of the framework of differential geometry and these equations incorporate external dissipative and restoring forces. We consider a kinematic reduction of the affine connection control system for the rigid body submerged in an ideal fluid, and present an extension of this reduction to the forced affine connection control system for the rigid body submerged in a viscous fluid. The motion planning strategy is based on kinematic motions; the integral curves of rank one kinematic reductions. This method is of particular interest to autonomous underwater vehicles which can not directly control all six degrees of freedom (such as torpedo shaped AUVs) or in case of actuator failure (i.e., under-actuated scenario). A practical example is included to illustrate our technique.

A different algebraic analysis of the ZUC stream cipher

Existing algebraic analyses of the ZUC cipher indicate that the cipher should be secure against algebraic attacks. In this paper, we present an alternative algebraic analysis method for the ZUC stream cipher, where a combiner is used to represent the nonlinear function and to derive equations representing the cipher. Using this approach, the initial states of ZUC can be recovered from 2^97 observed words of keystream, with a complexity of 2^282 operations. This method is more successful when applied to a modified version of ZUC, where the number of output words per clock is increased. If the cipher outputs 120 bits of keystream per clock, the attack can succeed with 219 observed keystream bits and 2^47 operations. Therefore, the security of ZUC against algebraic attack could be significantly reduced if its throughput was to be increased for efficiency.

Algebraic analysis of Trivium-like ciphers

Trivium is a bit-based stream cipher in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM project. In this paper, we apply the approach of Berbain et al. to Trivium-like ciphers and perform new algebraic analyses on them, namely Trivium and its reduced versions: Trivium-N, Bivium-A and Bivium-B. In doing so, we answer an open question in the literature. We demonstrate a new algebraic attack on Bivium-A. This attack requires less time and memory than previous techniques which use the F4 algorithm to recover Bivium-A's initial state. Though our attacks on Bivium-B, Trivium and Trivium-N are worse than exhaustive keysearch, the systems of equations which are constructed are smaller and less complex compared to previous algebraic analysis. Factors which can affect the complexity of our attack on Trivium-like ciphers are discussed in detail.

Algebraic analysis of Trivium-like ciphers

Trivium is a bit-based stream cipher in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM project. In this paper, we apply the algebraic attack approach of Berbain et al. to Trivium-like ciphers and perform new analyses on them. We demonstrate a new algebraic attack on Bivium-A. This attack requires less time and memory than previous techniques to recover Bivium-A's initial state. Though our attacks on Bivium-B, Trivium and Trivium-N are worse than exhaustive keysearch, the systems of equations which are constructed are smaller and less complex compared to previous algebraic analyses. We also answer an open question posed by Berbain et al. on the feasibility of applying their technique on Trivium-like ciphers. Factors which can affect the complexity of our attack on Trivium-like ciphers are discussed in detail. Analysis of Bivium-B and Trivium-N are omitted from this manuscript. The full paper is available on the IACR ePrint Archive.

Reduction of amplitude equations by the renormalization group approach

This article elucidates and analyzes the fundamental underlying structure of the renormalization group (RG) approach as it applies to the solution of any differential equation involving multiple scales. The amplitude equation derived through the elimination of secular terms arising from a naive perturbation expansion of the solution to these equations by the RG approach is reduced to an algebraic equation which is expressed in terms of the Thiele semi-invariants or cumulants of the eliminant sequence { Zi } i=1 . Its use is illustrated through the solution of both linear and nonlinear perturbation problems and certain results from the literature are recovered as special cases. The fundamental structure that emerges from the application of the RG approach is not the amplitude equation but the aforementioned algebraic equation. © 2008 The American Physical Society.

An eigenproblem approach to classical screw theory

This paper presents a novel algebraic formulation of the central problem of screw theory, namely the determination of the principal screws of a given system. Using the algebra of dual numbers, it shows that the principal screws can be determined via the solution of a generalised eigenproblem of two real, symmetric matrices. This approach allows the study of the principal screws of the general two-, three-systems associated with a manipulator of arbitrary geometry in terms of closed-form expressions of its architecture and configuration parameters. We also present novel methods for the determination of the principal screws for four-, five-systems which do not require the explicit computation of the reciprocal systems. Principal screws of the systems of different orders are identified from one uniform criterion, namely that the pitches of the principal screws are the extreme values of the pitch.The classical results of screw theory, namely the equations for the cylindroid and the pitch-hyperboloid associated with the two-and three-systems, respectively have been derived within the proposed framework. Algebraic conditions have been derived for some of the special screw systems. The formulation is also illustrated with several examples including two spatial manipulators of serial and parallel architecture, respectively.

An algebraic algorithm for the design and analysis of linear dynamical systems

In an earlier paper [1], it has been shown that velocity ratio, defined with reference to the analogous circuit, is a basic parameter in the complete analysis of a linear one-dimensional dynamical system. In this paper it is shown that the terms constituting velocity ratio can be readily determined by means of an algebraic algorithm developed from a heuristic study of the process of transfer matrix multiplication. The algorithm permits the set of most significant terms at a particular frequency of interest to be identified from a knowledge of the relative magnitudes of the impedances of the constituent elements of a proposed configuration. This feature makes the algorithm a potential tool in a first approach to a rational design of a complex dynamical filter. This algorithm is particularly suited for the desk analysis of a medium size system with lumped as well as distributed elements.