An unexpected role for visual feedback in vehicle steering control

Some motor tasks can be completed, quite literally, with our eyes shut. Most people can touch their nose without looking or reach for an object after only a brief glance at its location. This distinction leads to one of the defining questions of movement control: is information gleaned prior to starting the movement sufficient to complete the task (open loop), or is feedback about the progress of the movement required (closed loop)? One task that has commanded considerable interest in the literature over the years is that of steering a vehicle, in particular lane-correction and lane-changing tasks. Recent work has suggested that this type of task can proceed in a fundamentally open loop manner [1 and 2], with feedback mainly serving to correct minor, accumulating errors. This paper reevaluates the conclusions of these studies by conducting a new set of experiments in a driving simulator. We demonstrate that, in fact, drivers rely on regular visual feedback, even during the well-practiced steering task of lane changing. Without feedback, drivers fail to initiate the return phase of the maneuver, resulting in systematic errors in final heading. The results provide new insight into the control of vehicle heading, suggesting that drivers employ a simple policy of “turn and see,” with only limited understanding of the relationship between steering angle and vehicle heading.

Enriched behavioral prediction equation and its impact on structured learning and the dynamic calculus

This theoretical note describes an expansion of the behavioral prediction equation, in line with the greater complexity encountered in models of structured learning theory (R. B. Cattell, 1996a). This presents learning theory with a vector substitute for the simpler scalar quantities by which traditional Pavlovian-Skinnerian models have hitherto been represented. Structured learning can be demonstrated by vector changes across a range of intrapersonal psychological variables (ability, personality, motivation, and state constructs). Its use with motivational dynamic trait measures (R. B. Cattell, 1985) should reveal new theoretical possibilities for scientifically monitoring change processes (dynamic calculus model; R. B. Cattell, 1996b), such as encountered within psycho therapeutic settings (R. B. Cattell, 1987). The enhanced behavioral prediction equation suggests that static conceptualizations of personality structure such as the Big Five model are less than optimal.

An affective approach to moral motivation

Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called "moral psychology", which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an "affective picture": 'picture' because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and 'affective' because it has an important role for affects and emotions. This affective picture is grounded on a number of plausible and empirically supported hypotheses. The main idea is that we should distinguish between various kinds of value judgements by focusing on the sort of state of mind people find themselves in while uttering a judgement. "Reasoned judgements" are products of rational considerations and are based on preliminary acceptance of norms and values. On the contrary, "basic value judgements" are affective, primitive and non-reflective ways of assessing the world. As we shall see, this analysis has some consequences for the traditional internalism-externalism debate in philosophy; it highlights the fact that motivation is primarily linked to "basic value judgements" and that the judgements we openly defend might not have a particular effect on our actions, unless we are inclined to have an emotional attitude that conforms to them.

Representations and the Corruption of Goods

The traditional view of the economic agent is of an individual who is self-interested, rational and perceives the world “correctly”. However, there is a lot of experimental and other evidence that undermines this view of agents. It is argued that an attempt to model these agents properly requires the cognitive science idea of a mental representation- a mental state with content. It is shown that this idea gives economists resources to discuss critiques of economics by Sandel (2012) and Grant (2012). In particular, it allows us to think clearly about the notion of goods being “corrupted” by a change in context from a non-market to a market situation.

Human biology: cibernética y biología humana en el nuevo discurso expositivo de la década de 1970

En este trabajo se explica cuáles fueron las estrategias utilizadas y los resultados obtenidos en la primera exposición del nuevo esquema museográfico del Museo de Historia Natural de Londres, concebido por Roger Miles, Jefe del Departamento de Servicios Públicos de esa prestigiada institución. Esta iniciativa pretendía atraer a un mayor número de visitantes a partir de exposiciones basadas en modelos y módulos interactivos que relegaban a los objetos de las colecciones a un segundo plano. La exposición se tituló Human Biology y fue inaugurada el 24 de mayo de 1977. El tema de la exposición fue la biología humana, pero como se argumenta en este trabajo, Human Biology sirvió también como medio para legitimar el discurso modernizador de la biología humana, en tanto disciplina más rigurosa por las herramientas y técnicas más precisas que las utilizadas por la antropología física tradicional. Se buscaba también generar una audiencia para reforzar el campo interdisciplinario de la ciencia cognitiva y en particular la inteligencia artificial. El equipo de asesores científicos de la exposición contó entre sus miembros con personalidades que jugaron un papel protagónico en el desarrollo de esas disciplinas, y necesitaban demostrar su validez y utilidad ante los no especialistas y el público en general.

Mise en oeuvre de protocoles spatiaux pour analyser la modulation de processus cognitifs en fonction de la dimension émotionnelle chez le rongeur

Résumé : Emotion et cognition sont deux termes généralement employés pour désigner des processus psychiques de nature opposée. C'est ainsi que les sciences cognitives se sont longtemps efforcées d'écarter la composante «chaude »des processus «froids »qu'elles visaient, si ce n'est pour montrer l'effet dévastateur de la première sur les seconds. Pourtant, les processus cognitifs (de collecte, maintien et utilisation d'information) et émotioAnels (d'activation subjective, physiologique et comportementale face à ce qui est attractif ou aversif) sont indissociables. Par l'approche neuro-éthologique, à l'interface entre le substrat biologique et les manifestations comportementales, nous nous sommes intéressés à une fonction cognitive essentielle, la fonction mnésique, classiquement exprimée chez le rongeur par l'orientation spatiale. Au niveau du substrat, McDonald et White (1993) ont montré la dissociation de trois systèmes de mémoire, avec les rôles de l'hippocampe, du néostriatum et de l'amygdale dans l'encodage des informations respectivement épisodiques, procédurales et émotionnelles. Nous nous sommes penchés sur l'interaction entre ces systèmes en fonction de la dimension émotionnelle par l'éclairage du comportement. L'état émotionnel de l'animal dépend de plusieurs facteurs, que nous avons tenté de contrôler indirectement en comparant leurs effets sur l'acquisition, dans diverses conditions, de la tâche de Morris (qui nécessite la localisation dans un bassin de la position d'une plate-forme submergée), ainsi que sur le style d'exploration de diverses arènes, ouvertes ou fermées, plus ou moins structurées par la présence de tunnels en plexiglas transparent. Nous avons d'abord exploré le rôle d'un composant du système adrénergique dans le rapport à la difficulté et au stress, à l'aide de souris knock-out pour le récepteur à la noradrénaline a-1 B dans un protocole avec 1 ou 4 points de départ dans un bassin partitionné. Ensuite, nous nous sommes penchés, chez le rat, sur les effets de renforcement intermittent dans différentes conditions expérimentales. Dans ces conditions, nous avons également tenté d'analyser en quoi la situation du but dans un paysage donné pouvait interférer avec les effets de certaines formes de stress. Finalement, nous avons interrogé les conséquences de perturbations passées, y compris le renforcement partiel, sur l'organisation des déplacements sur sol sec. Nos résultats montrent la nécessité, pour les souris cont~ô/es dont l'orientation repose sur l'hippocampe, de pouvoir varier les trajectoires, ce qui favoriserait la constitution d'une carte cognitive. Les souris a->B KO s'avèrent plus sensibles au stress et capables de bénéficier de la condition de route qui permet des réponses simples et automatisées, sous-tendues par l'activité du striatum. Chez les rats en bassin 100% renforcé, l'orientation apparaît basée sur l'hippocampe, relayée par le striatum pour le développement d'approches systématiques et rapides, avec réorientation efficace en nouvelle position par réactivation dépendant de l'hippocampe. A 50% de renforcement, on observe un effet du type de déroulement des sessions, transitoirement atténué par la motivation Lorsque les essais s'enchaînent sans pause intrasession, les latences diminuent régulièrement, ce qui suggère une prise en charge possible par des routines S-R dépendant du striatum. L'organisation des mouvements exploratoires apparaît dépendante du niveau d'insécurité, avec différents profils intermédiaires entre la différentiation maximale et la thigmotaxie, qui peuvent être mis en relation avec différents niveaux d'efficacité de l'hippocampe. Ainsi, notre travail encourage à la prise en compte de la dimension émotionnelle comme modulatrice du traitement d'information, tant en phase d'exploration de l'environnement que d'exploitation des connaissances spatiales. Abstract : Emotion and cognition are terms widely used to refer to opposite mental processes. Hence, cognitive science research has for a long time pushed "hot" components away from "cool" targeted processes, except for assessing devastating effects of the former upon the latter. However, cognitive processes (of information collection, preservation, and utilization) and emotional processes (of subjective, physiological, and behavioral activation roue to attraction or aversion) are inseparable. At the crossing between biological substrate and behavioral expression, we studied a chief cognitive function, memory, classically shown in animals through spatial orientation. At the substrate level, McDonald et White (1993) have shown a dissociation between three memory systems, with the hippocampus, neostriatum, and amygdala, encoding respectively episodic, habit, and emotional information. Through the behavior of laboratory rodents, we targeted the interaction between those systems and the emotional axis. The emotional state of an animal depends on different factors, that we tried to check in a roundabout way by the comparison of their effects on acquisition, in a variety of conditions, of the Morris task (in which the location of a hidden platform in a pool is required), as well as on the exploration profile in different apparatus, open-field and closed mazes, more or less organized by clear Plexiglas tunnels. We first tracked the role, under more or less difficult and stressful conditions, of an adrenergic component, with knock-out mice for the a-1 B receptor in a partitioned water maze with 1 or 4 start positions. With rats, we looked for the consequences of partial reinforcement in the water maze in different experimental conditions. In those conditions, we further analyzed how the situation of the goal in the landscape could interfere with the effect of a given stress. At last, we conducted experiments on solid ground, in an open-field and in radial mazes, in order to analyze the organization of spatial behavior following an aversive life event, such as partial reinforcement training in the water maze. Our results emphasize the reliance of normal mice to be able to vary approach trajectories. One of our leading hypotheses is that such strategies are hippocampus-dependent and are best developed for of a "cognitive map like" representation. Alpha-1 B KO mice appear more sensitive to stress and able to take advantage of the route condition allowing simple and automated responses, most likely striatum based. With rats in 100% reinforced water maze, the orientation strategy is predominantly hippocampus dependent (as illustrated by the impairment induced by lesions of this structure) and becomes progressively striatum dependent for the development of systematic and fast successful approaches. Training towards a new platform position requires a hippocampus based strategy. With a 50% reinforcement rate, we found a clear impairment related to intersession disruption, an effect transitorily minimized by motivation enhancement (cold water). When trials are given without intrasession interruption, latencies consistently diminish, suggesting a possibility for striatum dependent stimulus-response routine to occur. The organization of exploratory movements is shown to depend on the level of subjective security, with different intermediary profiles between maximum differentiation and thigmotaxy, which can be considered in parallel with different efficiency levels of the hippocampus dependent strategies. Thus, our work fosters the consideration of emotion as a cognitive treatment modulator, during spatial exploration as well as spatial learning. It leads to a model in which the predominance of hippocampus based exploration is challenged by training conditions of various nature.

La dinàmica de les práctiques científiques des del punt de vista de l'experiencialisme

La tesi doctoral titulada "La Dinàmica de les Pràctiques Científiques des d'un punt de vista experiencialista" té com a objectiu oferir una alternativa a les tesis de Kuhn defensades a l'"Estructura de les Revolucions Científiques". En aquest sentit, s'utilitzaran diferents experiments i models teòrics actuals en l'àmbit de les ciències cognitives per tal de superar la teoria estructuralista de la cognició, quee Kuhn proposa com la base de la seva filosofia de la ciència. Contràriament a aquesta teoria, l'experiencialisme se situa lluny de les tesis estructuralistes, en la mesura en què assumeix que la cognició humana emergeix des de la dinàmica interactiva dels agents cognitius humans entre ells en un entorn material, en tant que agents corporals. A partir d'aquesta interacció dinàmica, l'ésser humà genera un horitzó de sentit. Ja que la interacció entre els éssers humans en un entorn cultural i material és complex, dinàmic i canviant, la generació de sentit emergent no és com una estructura semàntica, coherent i sistemàtica, sinó que ha de ser considerada com un conjunt asistemàtic de perspectives exploratòries que se succeeixen en el temps, en funció dels diferents contextos i propòsits que un agent corporal porta a terme al llarg de la seva interacció dinàmica i temporal amb l'entorn. Com a resultat de tot això, els èssers humans apliquen diferents criteris interactius que donen lloc a diferents perspectives per categoritzar o estructurar el món material i cultural. Aquest punt de vista és completament diferent del kuhnià, donat que el segon argumenta que cada èsser humà té la seva pròpia Gestalt o estructura semàntica que projecta "a priori" sobre la realitat. Aquesta diferència serà molt important no només des d'un punt de vista teòric, sinó també des d'un punt de vista pràctic. Per exemple, s'argumentarà que en l'àmbit de la didàctica de les ciències empíriques, es poden produir canvis beneficiosos significatius si s'utilitzen tesis extretes del model experiencialista de la cognició humana, i es deixen de banda el cognitivisme i el teoreticisme, que són actualment les bases teòriques de la manera en qué funciona l'educació científica. Finalment, conclourem afirmant que la visió experiencialista de la cognició implica assumir una forta relació entre l'ètica i la ciència, puix que els èssers humans són capaços d'utilitzar diferents criteris interactius per explorar la realitat i, per tant, sempre poden buscar millors estragègies per entendre's els uns amb els altres.

La Inefabilidad de la metáfora. Breve reflexión sobre la significación metafórica en la cultura como conversación

El debate sobre qué significan las metáforas es una constante en diversas áreas del pensamiento contemporáneo. Desde los estudios literarios hasta la ciencia cognitiva o la lingüística, la metáfora se ha interpretado como una instancia del lenguaje fundamental para comprender no sólo cómo nos comunicamos, sino cómo funciona nuestra mente. Por su parte, la idea de una contingencia del lenguaje y la acción comunicativa, en la que los individuos de una comunidad lingüística sientan las bases de sudesarrollo, gana terreno para una comprensión más práctica y veraz del progreso social. Desde estos supuestos, la reflexión desarrollada en estas páginas tendrá como propósito rediscutir algunas nociones y teorías sobre la metáfora y sus relaciones con los conceptos de «verdad» y «significado», tratando deubicarla en los marcos del uso y la conversación cultural en la contingencia de nuestro lenguaje.

Filosofia, ciencia social y cognición humana

Tradicionalmente, las ciencias sociales se han fundado en categorías de sentido común para describir la realidad, de modo que aceptan tácitamente el principio de la folk psychology, según el cual las personas actúan para conseguir aquello que desean, dadas unas creencias. Sin embargo, aunque los deseos y las creencias puedan ser causas de la acción, no hay modo de definir de forma conceptualmente independiente cada uno de estos elementos con el fin de elaborar leyes de la acción que sean informativas y empíricamente corregibles o ajustables. Se hace necesario substituir este sistema explicativo por otro que «divida la naturaleza por sus articulaciones». Alejada del fallido programa de investigación conductista, la ciencia social puede explorar nuevas vías para convertirse en una disciplina rigurosa equipada con un conjunto de teorías que permitan reorganizar las valiosas observaciones disponibles y sugerir nuevas hipótesis interdisciplinariamente integradas. Sin embargo, esto no ocurrirá en la medida en que no haya forma de escapar a las limitaciones de la folk psychology. El presente artículo trata de mostrar cómo la psicología evolucionaria, centrada en los mecanismos evolucionados de procesamiento de información presentes en la mente humana, proporcionaría la conexión causal necesaria entre la biología evolucionaria y los complejos e irreductibles fenómenos sociales y culturales estudiados por sociólogos, economistas, antropólogos e historiadores.

Constraining ACT-R models of decision strategies: An experimental paradigm

It has been repeatedly debated which strategies people rely on in inference. These debates have been difficult to resolve, partially because hypotheses about the decision processes assumed by these strategies have typically been formulated qualitatively, making it hard to test precise quantitative predictions about response times and other behavioral data. One way to increase the precision of strategies is to implement them in cognitive architectures such as ACT-R. Often, however, a given strategy can be implemented in several ways, with each implementation yielding different behavioral predictions. We present and report a study with an experimental paradigm that can help to identify the correct implementations of classic compensatory and non-compensatory strategies such as the take-the-best and tallying heuristics, and the weighted-linear model.

Strategy selection: An introduction to the modeling challenge

Modeling the mechanisms that determine how humans and other agents choose among different behavioral and cognitive processes-be they strategies, routines, actions, or operators-represents a paramount theoretical stumbling block across disciplines, ranging from the cognitive and decision sciences to economics, biology, and machine learning. By using the cognitive and decision sciences as a case study, we provide an introduction to what is also known as the strategy selection problem. First, we explain why many researchers assume humans and other animals to come equipped with a repertoire of behavioral and cognitive processes. Second, we expose three descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive challenges that are common to all disciplines which aim to model the choice among these processes. Third, we give an overview of different approaches to strategy selection. These include cost‐benefit, ecological, learning, memory, unified, connectionist, sequential sampling, and maximization approaches. We conclude by pointing to opportunities for future research and by stressing that the selection problem is far from being resolved.

Rhétorique et cognition : perspectives théoriques et stratégies persuasives

D'une certaine manière, la rhétorique est un art cognitif. L'art de discourir en situation concrète dans l'espoir de faire adhérer l'auditoire à une thèse suppose une forte aptitude cognitive: celle de se représenter la façon dont l'auditoire lui-même se représente une situation rhétorique. Or, à partir du moment où agir sur les représentations d'autrui est facilité par des techniques rhétoriques ou sophistiques, la question de la tromperie verbale s'est immiscée dans des affaires de régulation sociale et, avec elle, des enjeux tant de crédibilité que de crédulité. Dans le cadre démocratique rendant encore plus aiguë une forme de dépendance à l'information d'autrui, la nécessité de croire tout comme la possibilité d'être leurré mettent à l'épreuve tant le fonctionnement social de la Cité que l'évaluation des informations et de leurs auteurs. Le but des contributions de cet ouvrage n'est pas de dénoncer les effets de certains schèmes argumentatifs que d'aucuns jugeraient fallacieux ni d'ajouter une couche nouvelle aux critiques des sophismes, mais d'étudier leur fonctionnement et leurs effets cognitifs hic et nunc. Quels sont les mécanismes langagiers et cognitifs qui expliquent la «performance» des arguments réputés fallacieux? Comment fonctionnent les stratégies rhétoriques à l'intersection entre cognition, sciences du langage et société? Cet ouvrage, issu du colloque Communication et Cognition: manipulation, persuasion et biais dans le langage, tenu à Neuchâtel du 26 au 28 janvier 2011, propose plusieurs propositions originales ou hypothèses stimulantes dans l'espoir qu'elles inspireront tant les chercheurs spécialisés en rhétorique et sciences du langage à aller voir du côté de la psychologie cognitive que les spécialistes de ce domaine à mettre en évidence la rhétoricité de leurs recherches. English version: In a way, rhetoric is a cognitive art. The art of speaking in concrete situations in the hope of gaining the audience's consent on a given issue requires the operation of a cognitive ability: that of being able to represent the way an audience represents itself a rhetorical situation. Nonetheless, once we consider that rhetorical or sophistic techniques influence people's representations, verbal deception becomes a matter of social regulation, together with issues of credibility and credulity. In a democratic context fostering a form of dependence towards other people's information, the necessity of believing everything and the possibility of being duped are challenges for both the social management of the City and the evaluation of information and of its sources. The contribution of the chapters of this volume is neither to be found in the condemnation of the fallacious effects of specific argument schemes nor in the addition of yet another layer to fallacy criticism, but in the study of how fallacies work, hic et nunc. What are the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms at play behind the "performance" of fallacious arguments? How do rhetorical strategies work at the interface of cognition, language science and society? This book gathers papers that were presented during the international conference Communication & Cognition: manipulation, persuasion and biases in language, held at the University of Neuchâtel in January 2011. A number of original proposals and stimulating hypotheses emerge from them: we hope that these will inspire researchers in the language sciences who specialise in rhetoric to take on board cognitive scientific insights but also researchers in cognitive science to engage with the rhetoricity of their own research.

The establishment of communication systems depends on the scale of competition

How communication systems emerge and remain stable is an important question in both cognitive science and evolutionary biology. For communication to arise, not only must individuals cooperate by signaling reliable information, but they must also coordinate and perpetuate signals. Most studies on the emergence of communication in humans typically consider scenarios where individuals implicitly share the same interests. Likewise, most studies on human cooperation consider scenarios where shared conventions of signals and meanings cannot be developed de novo. Here, we combined both approaches with an economic experiment where participants could develop a common language, but under different conditions fostering or hindering cooperation. Participants endeavored to acquire a resource through a learning task in a computer-based environment. After this task, participants had the option to transmit a signal (a color) to a fellow group member, who would subsequently play the same learning task. We varied the way participants competed with each other (either global scale or local scale) and the cost of transmitting a signal (either costly or noncostly) and tracked the way in which signals were used as communication among players. Under global competition, players signaled more often and more consistently, scored higher individual payoffs, and established shared associations of signals and meanings. In addition, costly signals were also more likely to be used under global competition; whereas under local competition, fewer signals were sent and no effective communication system was developed. Our results demonstrate that communication involves both a coordination and a cooperative dilemma and show the importance of studying language evolution under different conditions influencing human cooperation.