Wer ist der beste Volksvertreter? : Ansprache an die Urwähler und Wahlmänner

Boberach: Die künftigen Abgeordneten sollen sich zu dem im Patent von 18. März enthaltenen Grundsätzen bekennen und für ausgedehntes Wahlrecht, Zweikammersystem und absolutes Veto des Königs in der preußischen Verfassung eintreten

Verfassungs-Urkunde für das Herzogthum Anhalt-Dessau

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): Veröffentlichung der am 29. Oktober 1848 für Anhalt-Dessau-Köthen gewährten "demokratischen Musterverfassung" (Botzenhart): Der Herzog ist Repräsentant des Volkswillens, ihm wird nur noch ein suspensives Veto der Legislative gegenüber zugebilligt (Verabschiedung von Gesetzen nur mit Zustimmung des Landtages). Die Stände sind aufgehoben, der Adel abgeschafft. Der Katalog der Bürgerrechte umfaßt die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, persönliche u. Gewerbefreiheit, Presse-, Vereinigungs- und Versammlungsfreiheit sowie die Trennung von Schule und Kirche

Hohe National-Versammlung! Die Berathung der Verfassung beginnt nunmehr ...

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): Petition an die Preußische Nationalversammlung: direkte Wahlen, Möglichkeit der Mandatsentziehung durch die Wähler, nur suspensives Veto für das Staatsoberhaupt, Möglichkeit zukünftiger Verfassungsänderungen

Vor den Wahlen bedarf es unter politischen Freunden des offnen Ausdrucks ihrer Gesinnung ...

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): Erklärung der Volkspartei, nur solche Deputierte zu wählen, die mit folgenden Punkten übereinstimmen: die oktroyierte Verfassung vom 5. Dezember 1848 ist ein durch nichts gerechtfertigter Rechtsbruch, die Zusammensetzung der zweiten Kammer muß dem Wahlgesetz vom 8. April 1848 unterliegen, die Beschränkung des Wahlrechts zur ersten Kammer durch Standesvorrechte ist abzulehnen, alle Abgeordneten beider Kammern haben ein Anrecht auf Diäten und Reisekosten, kein absolutes legislatives Veto der Krone, kein legislatives Recht für das Ministerium, keine Suspension von Grundrechten ohne Befragung der Volksvertretung, alleiniges Steuerbewilligungsrecht für die zweite Kammer, Vereidigung des Heeres auf die Verfassung.

P. P.: In dem beigefügten Programm haben die unterzeichneten Urwähler ...

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): 17 Berliner Urwähler sprechen sich dafür aus, die oktroyierte Verfassung vom 5. Dezember 1848 anzuerkennen, fordern jedoch ihre Revision in folgenden Punkten: kein absolutes, sondern nur ein suspensives Veto des Königs, keine Beschränkung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts, Bewilligung von Diäten auch für die erste Kammer, Feststellung der Zivilliste (Krondotation), eine freisinnigere Kommunalverfassung, Steuerbewilligungsrecht nur für die beiden Kammern, keine Gesetzgebungsbefugnis für das Ministerium bei Abwesenheit der Kammern (Art. 105), Möglichkeit der Aufhebung von Grundrechten durch das Ministerium im Falle von Krieg und Aufruhr nur provisorisch und vorbehaltlich der Zustimmung beider Kammern. Bekenntnis zur konstitutionellen Monarchie auf breiter demokratischer Grundlage

GeMSE: A new low-background facility for meteorite and material screening

We are currently setting up a facility for low-background gamma-ray spectrometry based on a HPGe detector. It is dedicated to material screening for the XENON and DARWIN dark matter projects as well as to the characterization of meteorites. The detector will be installed in a medium depth (∼620 m.w.e.) underground laboratory in Switzerland with several layers of shielding and an active muon-veto. The GeMSE facility will be operational by fall 2015 with an expected background rate of ∼250 counts/day (100-2700 keV).

Apuntes sobre el proceso de atención del aborto en segundo trimestre

Presentación en la 4ta. Conferencia Regional del CLACAI. Reafirmando el legado de Cairo: Aborto legal y seguro. Lima, 21 y 22 de Agosto de 2014

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

Chairship system and decision making by consensus in international agreements : the case of ASEAN

How are different positions reconciled under decision making by consensus in international agreements? This article aims to answer this question. Consensus rule provides each participant a veto, which risks resulting in non-agreement. Taking ASEAN as a case study of international organizations that have adopted consensus rule as the main decision-making procedure, this article presents the chairship system as an analytical scheme to examine how different positions are or are not reconciled under consensus rule. The system is based on conventional knowledge regarding the chair in international conference, which can be defined as an institution where the role of the chair is taken by one member state in an international organization and plays a role in agenda-setting. The agenda-setting power given to the chair varies across organizations. This article assumes that the chair in ASEAN is given a relatively strong agenda-setting power to enable the chair to reach agreements and bias such agreements in its own favor.

Accession clause of TPP : Is it really open?

One of the most important policy questions relating to the future impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the global and regional economy is whether other countries in the region, particularly China, will join the partnership. While several commentators have made some observations regarding the future prospects of TPP expansion, little scholarly analysis has been conducted. To go beyond the speculation of a certain country's accession to TPP, we first attempt to generalize the issue before moving on to a specific question. We conduct a comparative analysis of a large number of regional trade agreements for a better understanding of the parameters of RTAs that are critical for membership expansion. This general framework enables us to conduct a systematic examination of specific membership expansion cases, such as China's membership in TPP. The paper also proposes a necessary "accession practice" that truly facilitates new members' participation.

Reforma Faz Sarney perder a paciência

Veto de Ulysses e Jereissati foi a gota d'água e Presidente já prepara ofensiva.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.

Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as Usual? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 32, November 2013

As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.