Absence of the fourth cranial nerve in congenital Brown syndrome.

PURPOSE: To elucidate the aetiology of congenital Brown syndrome. METHODS: Four consecutive patients diagnosed with unilateral congenital Brown syndrome had a comprehensive standardized ocular motility examination. Any compensatory head posture was measured. Brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) with regard for the IV cranial nerve (CN) was performed in all patients. Orbital MRI was performed in 2/4 patients, with images acquired in eight directions of gaze and superior oblique (SO) muscle areas compared. RESULTS: CN IV could not be identified bilaterally in two patients, but was absent only on the side of the Brown syndrome in the two other patients. On the normal side, orbital MRI revealed a smaller SO muscle area in upgaze than in downgaze, demonstrating normal actions of this muscle. On the side of the Brown syndrome, the SO area remained the same in upgaze and in downgaze and approximately symmetric to the area of SO in downgaze on the normal side. CONCLUSIONS: These cases add further anatomical support to the theory of paradoxical innervation in congenital Brown syndrome. CN IV was absent in two patients on the side of the Brown syndrome, but without muscle hypoplasia. SO muscle size did not vary in up- and downgaze, which we interpreted as a sign of constant innervation through branches of CN III.

Development of model observers applied to 3D breast tomosynthesis microcalcifications and masses

The development of model observers for mimicking human detection strategies has followed from symmetric signals in simple noise to increasingly complex backgrounds. In this study we implement different model observers for the complex task of detecting a signal in a 3D image stack. The backgrounds come from real breast tomosynthesis acquisitions and the signals were simulated and reconstructed within the volume. Two different tasks relevant to the early detection of breast cancer were considered: detecting an 8 mm mass and detecting a cluster of microcalcifications. The model observers were calculated using a channelized Hotelling observer (CHO) with dense difference-of-Gaussian channels, and a modified (Partial prewhitening [PPW]) observer which was adapted to realistic signals which are not circularly symmetric. The sustained temporal sensitivity function was used to filter the images before applying the spatial templates. For a frame rate of five frames per second, the only CHO that we calculated performed worse than the humans in a 4-AFC experiment. The other observers were variations of PPW and outperformed human observers in every single case. This initial frame rate was a rather low speed and the temporal filtering did not affect the results compared to a data set with no human temporal effects taken into account. We subsequently investigated two higher speeds at 5, 15 and 30 frames per second. We observed that for large masses, the two types of model observers investigated outperformed the human observers and would be suitable with the appropriate addition of internal noise. However, for microcalcifications both only the PPW observer consistently outperformed the humans. The study demonstrated the possibility of using a model observer which takes into account the temporal effects of scrolling through an image stack while being able to effectively detect a range of mass sizes and distributions.

On the Structural Difference between the Evolutionary Approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

Experimental design on the simplex

Optimum experimental designs depend on the design criterion, the model andthe design region. The talk will consider the design of experiments for regressionmodels in which there is a single response with the explanatory variables lying ina simplex. One example is experiments on various compositions of glass such asthose considered by Martin, Bursnall, and Stillman (2001).Because of the highly symmetric nature of the simplex, the class of models thatare of interest, typically Scheff´e polynomials (Scheff´e 1958) are rather differentfrom those of standard regression analysis. The optimum designs are also ratherdifferent, inheriting a high degree of symmetry from the models.In the talk I will hope to discuss a variety of modes for such experiments. ThenI will discuss constrained mixture experiments, when not all the simplex is availablefor experimentation. Other important aspects include mixture experimentswith extra non-mixture factors and the blocking of mixture experiments.Much of the material is in Chapter 16 of Atkinson, Donev, and Tobias (2007).If time and my research allows, I would hope to finish with a few comments ondesign when the responses, rather than the explanatory variables, lie in a simplex.ReferencesAtkinson, A. C., A. N. Donev, and R. D. Tobias (2007). Optimum ExperimentalDesigns, with SAS. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Martin, R. J., M. C. Bursnall, and E. C. Stillman (2001). Further results onoptimal and efficient designs for constrained mixture experiments. In A. C.Atkinson, B. Bogacka, and A. Zhigljavsky (Eds.), Optimal Design 2000,pp. 225–239. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Scheff´e, H. (1958). Experiments with mixtures. Journal of the Royal StatisticalSociety, Ser. B 20, 344–360.1

Campaign effects in direct-democratic votes in Switzerland

The purpose of this article is to analyse the conditions under which referendum campaigns have an impact on voting choices. Based on a model of opinion formation that integrates both campaign effects and partisan effects, we argue that campaign effects vary according to the context of the popular vote (size and type of conflict among the party elite and intensity and direction of the referendum campaign). We test our hypotheses with two-step estimations for hierarchical models on data covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration policy in Switzerland. Our results show strong campaign effects and they suggest that their strength and nature are indeed highly conditional on the context of the vote: the type of party coalition pre-structures the patterns of individual voting choices, campaign effects are higher when the campaign is highly intense and they are more symmetric when it is balanced.

The economic effects of a Spanish trade boycott against Catalan products

We study the potential consequences of a hypothetical trade boycott against Catalan products organized by some sectors of the Spanish society mainly for political reasons. A symmetric trade boycott would have two effects: a reduction of Catalan exports to Spain and a partial process of import substitution in Catalonia. In order to quantify the economic impact of the boycott, we compare the "actual" Catalan economy, as described in the input-output table for 2005, with a "simulated" Catalan economy that takes into account the effects of a boycott on the trade exchanges between Catalonia and Spain.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

An adaptation of correspondence analysis for square tables

The application of correspondence analysis to square asymmetrictables is often unsuccessful because of the strong role played by thediagonal entries of the matrix, obscuring the data off the diagonal. A simplemodification of the centering of the matrix, coupled with the correspondingchange in row and column masses and row and column metrics, allows the tableto be decomposed into symmetric and skew--symmetric components, which canthen be analyzed separately. The symmetric and skew--symmetric analyses canbe performed using a simple correspondence analysis program if the data areset up in a special block format.

Correspondence analysis of raw data

Correspondence analysis has found extensive use in ecology, archeology, linguisticsand the social sciences as a method for visualizing the patterns of association in a table offrequencies or nonnegative ratio-scale data. Inherent to the method is the expression of the datain each row or each column relative to their respective totals, and it is these sets of relativevalues (called profiles) that are visualized. This relativization of the data makes perfect sensewhen the margins of the table represent samples from sub-populations of inherently differentsizes. But in some ecological applications sampling is performed on equal areas or equalvolumes so that the absolute levels of the observed occurrences may be of relevance, in whichcase relativization may not be required. In this paper we define the correspondence analysis ofthe raw unrelativized data and discuss its properties, comparing this new method to regularcorrespondence analysis and to a related variant of non-symmetric correspondence analysis.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).