A Importância do Empreendedorismo na Actividade Turística

Na actualidade, o empreendedorismo vem impulsionando o desenvolvimento de negócios em diferentes sectores com ênfase na qualidade dos serviços, tendo em vista não só a satisfação mas também a difícil tarefa de conquistar a lealdade dos clientes a médio e longo prazo. No mercado turístico, a satisfação do cliente é importante para que a actividade possa manter-se competitiva, uma vez que os clientes tornam-se mais exigentes à medida que vão-se tornando experientes. Neste contexto, o empreendedorismo aparece como forma de desenvolvimento do turismo, sendo que os resultados que se esperam das acções empreendedoras são a entrada em novos negócios, inovação, agregação de valor aos produtos/serviços e maior qualidade dos produtos/serviços. O objectivo central do trabalho é demonstrar a importância do empreendedorismo na actividade turística e como o mesmo contribui para agregação de valor e geração de resultados económicos. Para melhor compreensão do assunto da pesquisa, dividimos o enquadramento teórico em três momentos. No primeiro, abordamos o empreendedorismo, no segundo o turismo e, por fim, o empreendedorismo no turismo. O enquadramento teórico permitiu responder à questão: será que o empreendedorismo contribui para agregar valor e gerar resultados económicos na actividade turística? Os resultados do questionário aplicado aos proprietários das empresas turísticas evidenciaram que estes possuem características geralmente patentes nos empreendedores. No entanto, os resultados não são conclusivos quanto ao seu potencial empreendedor. In the present, time the entrepreneurship is driving the businesses development in different sector with emphasis on services quality in order not only satisfaction but also the difficult task of winning the costumers loyalty in the medium and long term. In the tourist market, the costumer’s satisfaction is important in order to remain the activity competitive, because the costumers become more demanding while they become experienced. In this context, the entrepreneurship shows up like a way to develop the tourism, because the expected results of entrepreneurial activities are entry in new businesses, innovation, the aggregation of value and more quality of the products/services. The central objective of this work is to demonstrate the importance of the entrepreneurship in to the tourism and how it contributes for adding value and generating economics results. To better understand the research’s subject, we divided the theoretical framework in three moments. At first one we approached entrepreneurship, then the tourism, and finally, we approached entrepreneurship in the tourism. The theoretical framework to allowed answer to the question: will the entrepreneurship contributes to add value and generate economics results in the tourism? The results of the questionnaire applied to the owners of tourists’ enterprises evidence that they possess the characteristics usually presented by the entrepreneurs. However, the results are not conclusive relatively to their potential entrepreneur.

Endogenous credit cycles

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.

New ideas need new space

We develop a setting with weak intellectual property rights, where firms' boundaries, location and knowledge spillovers are endogenous. We have two main results. The first one is that, if communication costs increase with distance, entrepreneurs concerned about information leakage have a benefit from locating away from the industry center: distance is an obstacle to collusive trades between members andnon-members. The second result is that we identify a trade-off for the entrepreneur between owning a facility (controlling all its characteristics) and sharing a facility with a {\it non-member} (an agent not involved in production), therefore losing control over some of its characteristics. We focus on ``location" as the relevant characteristic of the facility, but location can be used as a spatial metaphor for other relevant characteristics of the facility. For theentrepreneur, sharing the facility with non-members implies that the latter, as co-owners, know the location (even if they do not have access to it). Knowledge of the location for the co-owners facilitates collusion with employees, what increases leakage. The model yields a benefit for new plants from spatial dispersion (locating at the periphery of the industry), particularly so for new plants of new firms.We relate this result with recent empirical findings on the dynamics of industry location.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Does foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurship?

In analyzing firm entry and exit across Belgian manufacturing industries,this paper presents evidence that import competition and foreign directinvestment discourage entry and stimulate exit of domestic entrepreneurs.These results are in line with theoretical occupational choice modelsthat predict foreign direct investment would crowd out domesticentrepreneurs through their selections in product and labor markets.However, the empirical results also suggest that this crowding out effectmay be moderated or even reversed in the long-run due to the long termpositive effects of FDI on domestic entrpreneurship as a result oflearning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreignand domestic firms.

Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgement

Excess entry or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions is often attributed tooverconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entryis an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does notimply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone isunderconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarilyoverconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and amongsuccessful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that entrepreneurs areoverconfident and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility inproducing economic outcomes.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Excess entry, ambiguity seeking and competence: An experimental investigation

Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.

Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

Expertise and finance: Mergers motivated by technological change

This paper argues that a large technological innovation may lead to a merger wave by inducing entrepreneurs to seek funds from technologically knowledgeable firms -experts. When a large technological innovation occurs, the ability of non-experts (banks) to discriminate between good and bad quality projects is reduced. Experts can continue to charge a low rate of interest for financing because their expertise enables them to identify good quality projects and to avoid unprofitable investments. On the other hand, non-experts now charge a higher rate of interest in order to screen bad projects. More entrepreneurs, therefore, disclose their projects to experts to raise funds from them. Such experts are, however, able to copy the projects and disclosure to them invites the possibility of competition. Thus the entrepreneur and the expert may merge so as to achieve product market collusion. As well as rationalizing mergers, the model can also explain various forms of venture financing by experts such as corporate investors and business angels.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

Entrepreneurial risk, investment and innovation

In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model with risk averse entrepreneurialfirms and with public firms. The model predicts that an increase in uncertainty reducesthe propensity of entrepreneurial firms to innovate, while it does not affect thepropensity of public firms to innovate. Furthermore, it predicts that the negativeeffect of uncertainty on innovation is stronger for the less diversified entrepreneurialfirms, and is stronger in the absence of financing frictions in the economy. In thesecond part of the paper I test these predictions on a dataset of small and mediumItalian manufacturing firms.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.

Estudi tècnic-econòmic per a la instal·lació d'una granja d'ànecs per a producció de foie-gras situada en el terme municipal de Fontanals de Cerdanya

Inversors però, principalment professionals de l'àmbit agrari, per tal de buscar una diversificació de l'activitat agrícola i ramadera que desenvolupen a les seves finques, sobretot joves emprenedors, poden estar interessats en produccions alternatives com la producció d'ànecs per a foie-gras, per tal de complementar la seva renda agrària. Actualment cal augmentar la competitivitat de les finques agrícoles per tal que aquestes siguin econòmicament viables. L’objectiu de l'estudi és determinar la viabilitat econòmica d’una explotació ramadera d’ànecs per a la producció de foie-gras, en el terme municipal de Fontanals de Cerdanya, analitzant les diverses alternatives en quant a dimensionament i disseny de les instal·lacions, segons el cicle productiu de l’animal. L'alternativa escollida per realitzar l'estudi es la de semi-integració (cria, engreix i embocat), de règim semi-intensiu (durant l'etapa de l'engreix), amb animals mascles de la raça híbrida Mulard. Les instal·lacions tindran una capacitat de 6.500 animals, amb lots de 250 caps. Aquest dimensionament permet, durant la fase d'embocat, en la qual es requereix més dedicació, que la demanda de mà d'obra pugui ser satisfeta per un únic treballador. La principal conclusió que es pot extreure de l'estudi és que la inversió projectada és massa elevada i que aquesta econòmicament no és viable o rendible, ja que la despesa és massa elevada. Es mouen uns fluxos de caixa molt elevats i el marge comercial és molt reduït. Únicament si l'objectiu del promotor és obtenir una remuneració per la seva feina, sempre i quan és produeixi un augment del preu actual de la carn i una disminució del preu del pinso, es podria recomanar que es portés a terme la implantació de l'explotació, intentant, però, reduir la despesa d'execució de construccions i instal·lacions.